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“The conversations I have had with continental lawyers left me with the
impression that abus de droit is regarded as a dangerous expedient which
should only be utilized to prevent manifest injustice [...] It [abuse of rights]
resembles a drug which at first appears to be innocuous, but may be followed by
very disagreeable after effects. Like all indefinite expressions of an ethical
principle it is capable of being put to an infinite variety of uses, and it may be
employed to invade almost any sphere of human activity for the purpose of
subordinating the individual to the demands of the State. […]. But it is clear
that the theories of abuse and of relativity of rights, in general, have no place in
our law as it now stands”
H. C. Gutteridge1

INTRODUCTION
This article explores a crucial, though often neglected, episode in the
history of modern private law: the nineteenth and early twentieth century
debate over the concept of “abuse of rights”. In broad terms, the formula evokes
the idea of an abusive, because malicious or unreasonable, exercise of an
otherwise lawful right. The doctrine was applied in a variety of subfields of
private law: property, contract, and labour law. It was conceived as a response
to the urgent legal questions posed by the rise of modern industrial society: the
limits of workers’ right to strike, the limits of industrial enterprises’ property
rights on land vis a vis the rights of residential neighbours, the limits of a
landowner’s property right on crucial economic resources, such as water or
coal-land. This article uses a comparative analysis of European and American
cases and legal writing to interrogate a widely-shared understanding of the
impact and significance of abuse of rights, neatly articulated in H. C.
Gutteridge’s passage. First, it challenges the notion that abuse of rights is a
peculiar “invention” of civil law jurists, absent in the common law. Second, it
questions the idea that abuse of rights operated as an effective social
“corrective” preventing the “manifest injustices” allowed by modern
individualist private law.
More broadly, this article touches upon a number of critical debates in
comparative law and legal historiography. It investigates the relation between
1

H. C. Gutteridge, Abuse of Rights, 5 CAMBRIDGE L. J.22, 44 (1933-1935).
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law and social change, between the conceptual constraints and potentialities of
legal doctrine and private lawyers’ aspirations to social reform. Moreover, it
attempts a comparative inquiry into styles of judicial reasoning, inviting
further reflection on the coexistence of “deductive” and “instrumental” modes of
justification in American, as well as in continental European, late nineteenth
century cases. Further, the article draws upon and revisits the “functionalist”
method of comparative legal analysis, arguing for the enduring relevance of a
“textured functionalism”. Finally, the story of abuse of rights, speaks to the
critical issues faced by contemporary private lawyers: the nature and the role
of private law in the era of the crisis of traditional social democracy and the
need for new legal tools that would broaden the conversation about the future
of our socio-economic institutions.
Abuse of rights was a most typical “invention” of the wave of social legal
thought that developed in France and Germany starting from mid-nineteenth
century. Swift technological progress, change in the industrial structure,
notably the shift from small, artisanal producing units to large scale
enterprises, and the consequent outburst of social unrest and class antagonism
brought to the fore the question of the terms of liberty in new social and
economic conditions. Confronted with the need to foster freedom of enterprise
and economic development while attenuating its social repercussions, “social
jurists” revolted against “classical” modern private law. They deemed the
formalistic and deductive mode of reasoning relied upon by classical “civilistes”
as well as their individualistic assumptions inadequate to accommodate
economic change and social cohesion, freedom of action and security. In
contrast, “social jurists” called for a sociological and organicist mode of
reasoning that takes into account the purpose of legal rules and the complexity
of “social mechanics”2. At the substantive level, they advocated complementing
RUDOLF VON JHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (trans. Mac Millan, New York 1924). In “Law as a Means
to an End” Jhering furnishes both a critique of conceptual formalism and a purposive definition of law. Jhering’s
“naturalist” conception of law reveals the illusionary nature of the grandiose formalist conceptual architecture,
bringing to light the reality of “social mechanics”. The formalist image of law as clockwork that runs its regulated
course into which no disturbing hand enters is contrasted with the image of law as a ”mighty machine” in which
“thousands of rollers, wheels, knives move restlessly, some in one direction, some in another, apparently quite
independent of one another as if they existed only for themselves, and yet all work ultimately together
harmoniously for one purpose”. The force that moves the wheelwork is the “will of thousands and millions of
individuals, the struggle of interests, of the opposition of efforts, egoism, self will”. Purpose is the moving force
behind law; “everything found on the ground of law was called into life by a purpose and exists to realize some
2
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“individual law”, i.e. law that regulates conflicts among individuals by
delimiting their respective rights with a “social law”, i.e. law that favours social
cohesion and privileges collective interests3.
The doctrine of “abuse of rights” reflected both the yearning for a new style
of legal reasoning and the call for social solidarity. The concept of “subjective
right”, elaborated over the centuries by continental legal science and defined by
German Pandectist Windscheid as the sphere of the individual’s absolute and
unlimited will,4 appeared to “social jurists” formalistic and unworkable.
Rapidly changing socio-economic conditions demanded a conceptual tool that
would account for “subjective rights”’ relative and relational nature. Abuse of
rights was thought to be such tool. It allowed a purposive analysis of competing
rights in light of larger social interests and it promised to deliver distributively
fair outcomes.
Conceptually, the doctrine was variously articulated; while subjective
formulations focus on the right holder’s motive or intent, objective formulations
scrutinize the right holder’s conduct. Thus, different formulations of the
doctrine may be arranged along a spectrum that runs from subjective to
objective, each, potentially, entailing a different degree of compression of the
right.
In a first formulation, located at the subjective end of the spectrum and
known as “aemulatio”, the right holder is said to abuse her right when her
purpose.
3 GEORGES GURVITCH, L’IDEE DU DROIT SOCIAL. NOTION ET SYSTEME DU DROIT SOCIAL (1932, reprint
Scientia Verlag 1972). See also, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW, (preface by Roscoe Pound) 166 (1947 reprint Routledge &
Kegan Paul 1973) for a later formulation of the idea of “Social Law”; “First we observe the contrast between social
law and individual law (or better inter-individual law) corresponding to the contrast between sociality by
interpenetration and sociality by interdependence (intuitive union and communication by signs). “Social Law” is a
law of objective integration in the “We”, in the immanent whole. It permits the subjects, to whom it is addressed,
to participate directly in the whole, which in turn effectively participates in jural relations. That is why “Social law”
is based on confidence, while individual law, i.e. inter-individual and inter-groupal law is based distrust. One is the
law of peace, mutual aid, common tasks, the other the law of war, conflicts, separation. For, even when individual
law partly draws together subjects as in the case of contracts, it simultaneously separates them and delimits their
interests. All law being a linking of the claims of some with the duties of others, an “imperative-attributive”
regulation, in social law claims and duties interpenetrate each other and form an indissoluble whole, while in
individual law they only limit and crash against each other. In social law distributive, in individual law,
commutative justice predominates”.
4 BERNHARD WINDSCHEID, LEHRBUCH DES PANDEKTENRECHTS (1862).
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exercise of the right is driven by the sole malicious intent to harm another. The
classical text-book example of the landowner who erects a tall fence for the sole
malicious purpose of depriving her neighbour of light illustrates this narrow
subjective formulation of the theory.
In a second formulation, an abuse of a right is detected any time malice is
the dominant, though not the exclusive, motive animating the actions of the
right holder. For instance, in the previous example, while the fence also serves
the purpose of holding ornamental vines, the landowner would have never
erected it if not moved by ill will towards her neighbour.
According to a third formulation, a subject is deemed to abuse her right
when acting with a lack of “legitimate interest”, though not necessarily
spitefully. In late nineteenth century developing economies, the landowner who
pumped from her land the groundwater feeding her neighbour’s mill only to
end up wasting it was often found to have abused her right. Although this
formulation centres on the subject’s motive, it entails a dose of objectiveness in
the definition of what amounts to a “legitimate interest”.
In a fourth articulation, a right holder acts abusively if she exercises her
right contrary to the “normal function” of the right. While, similarly to the
previous, this formulation gauges the subject’s purpose against the objective
criterion of “normal function” of the right, it may entail a higher degree of
compression of the right, “normal function” being, potentially, susceptible of a
more restrictive definition than “legitimate interest”. At the height of
nineteenth century industrial struggles, unions were found to abuse their right
to strike when their action departed from the right’s “normal function”.
Finally, in a fifth formulation, located at the objective end of the spectrum,
a right is abused when exercised contrary to its “socio-economic purpose”. In
this articulation, the focus of the scrutiny is shifted from the subject’s intent to
the nature of her conduct. The test allows sharp limitations of the right holder
whose conduct is weighed in light of larger social needs and interests. A
landowner who in an arid region drains ground water, diminishing the
community’s supply, to sell it for the irrigation of distant lands may be deemed
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to use of her right contrary to its “socio-economic destination”, defined as the
productive use and enjoyment of land respectful of the larger needs of the
community.
Drawing on an influential comparative law tradition, this article
investigates the “functional equivalents” of abuse of rights in the common law.
In the 1950s and 60s, at the height of functionalist comparative law5, a copious
literature cast light on the operation of “functional analogues”. Arthur von
Mehren magisterially examined the various techniques employed in French
and German law to solve the problems that the common law handles through
the doctrine of consideration6. More recently, John Langbein has suggested
that trust is a uniquely Anglo-American institution, foreign to the civil law
tradition and that Europeans achieve mostly by means of contract what the
On “functionalism” in comparative law see: Michele Graziadei, The Functionalist Heritage, in COMPARATIVE
LEGAL STUDIES. TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS, 100, (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003); Ralf
Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 339
(Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006). Max Rheinstein has offered the clearest account of the
functionalist method to date. Every rule, according to Rheinstein, “has to justify its existence under two inquiries:
first, what function does it serve in present society ? second, does it serve this function well or would another rule
serve better?”. See Max Rheinstein, Comparative Law: Its Functions, Methods and Usages, 22 ARKANSAS LAW REV. 415
(1968-69); Id, Comparative Law and Conflict of Laws in Germany, 2 UNIV. CHICAGO LAW. REV., 232 (1934-35); Id,
Teaching Comparative Law, 5 UNIV. CHICAGO LAW REV 615 (1937-38). Functionalism was a crucial methodological
innovation of early twentieth century comparative lawyers. Saleilles and Lambert’s emphasis on rules’ “function”
was meant as a powerful critique of the formalism of conceptual analysis and “legal dogmatics”. The second
generation of comparative lawyers further developed functionalism’s critical potential. Pound’s functionalist
approach rested on a set of critical moves: a critique of “mechanical jurisprudence”, a functional definition of law
as an instrument of social control and an “is to ought” move that derives the normative assessment of law from
the positive facts of social life. A pragmatic legal science solicits the adjustment of legal principles and doctrines to
the human condition they are to govern, to the findings of the science of society. Legal rules derived from social
needs and functions are effective in ordering the satisfaction of conflicting and overlapping individual claims with
a minimum of friction and waste. In other words, law is to be tailored on the discoverable “social objectives” of
an ultimately coherent “society”. The “is to ought ”move was one of the main targets of the Realist critique. If on
the one hand, Felix Cohen appropriated the functionalist discourse, denouncing conceptualist legal science as
“transcendental nonsense” and advocating a functionalist jurisprudence, on the other hand, he rejected the” is to
ought” move, viewing functionalism as a crucial tool for an “ethical criticism” of law. Cohen envisages the
normative use of a functional definition of law as the prime danger of the functional approach. In order to avoid
blindness, functionalism is to couple an objective legal science and a critical theory of social values. In recent
decades functionalism has come under attack on several fronts. It has been charged of reductionism in that it
focuses exclusively on rules’ socio-legal function and overlooks a whole range of complicating factors: culture,
mentality, ideology. Further, critics claim, functionalism assumes a “mirror theory” of the relation between law
and society and ignores the fact that law acts upon social interests and needs: the facilitative and ideological role
played by law. Finally, functionalism interrogates the comparative effectiveness of functionally equivalent rules,
eluding questions of broader legal reform.
6 Arthur T. von Mehren, Civil Law Analogues to Consideration: An Exercise in Comparative Analysis, 72 HARV. L. REV.
1009 (1958-1959).
5
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Anglo-American systems do through trust7. Similarly, Friedrich Kessler and
Edith Fine showed that while the common law seems to have no counterpart to
the German doctrine of culpa in contrahendo, notions of good faith as well as
the doctrines of negligence, estoppel and implied contract have served many of
the functions of culpa in contrahendo8.
This corpus of literature has focused mostly on the socio-legal function
performed by analogous private law doctrines, neglecting their rhetorical
dimension, that is, the arguments and the justifications common lawyers and
civilians provided for functionally equivalent doctrines as well as the
expectations and the anxieties the latter spurred. Rather than merely
identifying abuse of rights’ “functional equivalents”, this article seeks to do full
justice to the rich rhetorical texture of the abuse of rights debate.
In France and in Italy, abuse of rights spurred reactions of dire
condemnation and hyperbolic eulogy. Its critics envisaged it as “a barren
logomachy”9, a “medieval relic thoughtlessly carried over”10 or, at best, as “a
pure piece of sentimentality”. By contrast, its champions acclaimed it as the
triumph of “a more perfect and broad vision of justice”. The wave of
emotionality stirred by abuse of rights seems to be far from drying up. Writing
in 1965, Italian jurist Pietro Rescigno noted that the changing fortunes of
abuse of rights are evidence of “the jurist’s agony in redeeming law’s ancient
misery”11. More recently, an experts’ report published by the Council of Europe,
retrieving nineteenth century social rhetoric at its best, concluded that abuse of
rights makes it possible “to establish the connection between the justice
ostensibly guaranteed by positive law and genuine justice”12.
In England and in the United States the debate over the concept of “malice”
John T. Langebein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L. J. 667 (1995-1996) at 669 ff.
Fredriech Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Baragining in Good Faith and Freedom of Contract. A
Comparative Study, 77 HARV. L. REV. 701 (1963-1964).
9 MARCEL PLANIOL, TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL, v. 2 n. 870 (Paris, 1907)
10 Vittorio Scialoja, Aemulatio, in ENCICLOPEDIA GIURIDICA ITALIANA, Napoli-Milano (1884) I 2. I 426 ff.
11 Pietro Rescigno, L’Abuso del Diritto, Riv. Dir. Civ. vol. I 205 (1965); PIETRO RESCIGNO, L’ABUSO DEL
DIRITTO (1998).
12 ABUSE OF RIGHTS AND EQUIVALENT CONCEPTS: THE PRINCIPLE AND ITS PRESENT DAY APPLICATION,
Proceedings of the nineteenth colloquy on European Law, Luxembourg 6-9 November 1989 p. 10.
7
8
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reached similar rhetorical peaks. When discussing “malice” common lawyers
seemed to loose their habitual aloofness. Gutteridge described abuse of rights
as “an instrument of dangerous potency in the hands of the demagogue and the
revolutionary”13. In a 1905 article on the role of malicious torts in the field of
labor relations, Bruce Wyman, from Harvard Law School, evoked “the horror of
anarchy or the hopelessness of socialism”.
Exploring the rhetoric surrounding abuse of rights and its analogues may
help elucidate the actual stakes of the debate, the multiple, and complexly
intertwined, questions and interests laying behind doctrinal disputes and
judicial argumentation. Rhetoric illuminates abuse of rights’ political saliency.
The debate over abuse of rights pitted against each other jurists with different
political commitments and various power allegiances. Further, rhetoric sheds
light on jurists’ relation with larger legal ideological models. The debate over
abuse of rights is also a duel between proponents of different models of
property, the unitary and absolutist and the pluralized and relativized14.
Finally, rhetoric allows a glimpse on jurists’ hidden professional agendas. In
France and in Italy, the debate over abuse of rights was critical to the conflict
between different segments of the legal-academic profession as well as to the
relation between the professoriate and the judiciary.
Relying, thus, on a “textured functionalism”, this article advances and
interrogates two hypotheses. First, it suggests that, in vast and highly
transversal areas of the law, such as water law, nuisance, tortious interference
with contractual relations or economic expectancies and labor law, nineteenth
and early twentieth century American courts weighed defendants’ motives and
conduct through malice tests and reasonable user rules that closely parallel
abuse of rights. However, contrary to continental European systems where
rules limiting a malicious or unreasonable exercise of one’s right congealed in
the unitary conceptual and legislative category of “abuse of rights”, in the
H. C. Gutteridge, supra note 1 at 44.
For the US, see Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance Law: 1850-1920, 59 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1104 (1985-1986). Bone discusses the normative theories that jurist used to reason about nuisance
disputes between the 1850s and the 1920s; he focuses on three different legal-ideological models: the “competing
rights” model, the “static absolute dominion” model and the “relative property rights” model.
13

14
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United States, these same rules remained largely non-integrated.
This article investigates the reasons why a unitary conceptual category of
“abuse of rights” was never developed in the United States. In France and in
Italy, I suggest, the shaping of an overarching concept of “abuse of rights” was
part of the jurists’ struggle to preserve the conceptual coherence of private law
at a moment when, under the pressure of social and economic change, new
fields of law were being carved out of “droit privé”15. These new legal
disciplines, zoning law, labor law, welfare law, were deemed to be more apt to
govern social and economic change. Private lawyers stood up as the staunch
defenders of the systematic unity of private law as well as of their own
professional power as the “legal architects of modern society”. Conversely, in
the United States, where pretensions to law’s conceptual coherence were
increasingly coming under attack, rationalization of these non-integrated
reasonableness tests and malice rules was achieved by means of a unitary style
of reasoning rather than by means of conceptual integration. This
instrumentalist style of reasoning, featuring “balancing”, cost-benefit analysis
and policy arguments, differed significantly from orthodox late nineteenth
century American legal thought. Judges consistent reliance on this pragmatic
style of reasoning, I argue, invites a revision of the traditional portrait of
nineteenth century classical orthodoxy16.
Further, this article advances a second hypothesis. The comparative
analysis of American cases suggests that, despite the rhetorical hysteria it
spurred, abuse of rights’ potential as a tool for social reform was consistently
defused. Abuse of rights heralded two promises. First, it promised to provide a
social corrective to the individualistic language of modern private law, the
language of will, property and fault. Second, it promised to operate as critical
tool for progressive lawyering, enabling fair distributive outcomes. Both
promises remained largely unfulfilled.
As to the latter promise, rarely and timidly did courts deploy abuse of
FRANZ WIAECKER, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO GERMANY, (Tony Weir trans.
1995) at 430ff. Duncan Kennedy, Thoughts on Coherence, Social Values and National Tradition in Private Law in THE
POLITICS OF A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE (Martijn W. Hesselink ed 2006) at 9.
16 See Stephen A. Siegel, The Revision Thickens, 20 LAW & HISTORY REV. 631 (2002);
15
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rights and its analogues to effect distributive choices that shifted the balance of
power and wealth from socio-economically strong actors, i.e. owners, employers
or stronger contractual parties, to weaker actors or to privilege collective
interests over individuals’ self-interest. At times, the doctrine was articulated
as to impose duties on strong parties only to secure and reinforce their
“absolute” rights. In “spite fences” cases, abuse of rights served as a buttress to
individual property rights, imposing a limit to owners’ self-interest to protect
the symmetrical “absolute” rights of other property holders. More often, duties
of “reasonableness” or “fairness” in the exercise of rights were imposed on
weaker parties rather than on strong parties. For instance, in labor cases,
abuse of rights was often operated against the weaker party, courts finding
unions to have exercised abusively their right to help themselves in the “free”
and “fair” competition with employers or with rival unions.
As to the first promise, even when abuse of rights did in fact relieve weaker
parties, as often in the case of malicious interference with contractual
relations, it did so by virtue of the pervasive individualistic proprietary logic.
Existing contracts or future economic expectancies were considered “property”
and abusees “owners” to be protected in the quiet enjoyment of their property
or in the effort to gain it.
Abuse of rights’ corrective potential has been largely overestimated. In the
United States the functional equivalents of abuse of rights served as tools for
governing and facilitating economic life and the “release of individual creative
energy”17 rather than as social correctives. Time and again, courts’ reliance on
malice rules and reasonableness tests was premised on the desirability of
maximizing economic growth 18. In water law cases and in nuisance cases, courts
consistently deployed “reasonable user” standards to favour technological
improvement and new productive uses of land by mills, mining companies and
large developers. In cases of interference with contractual relations, judges relied
on reasonableness rules and malice tests to define the sphere of legitimate
economic competition. Further, at the height of late nineteenth century labor
JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED
STATES (1984).
18 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 (1977) 35 ff.
17
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upheaval, courts used malice rules were to govern industrial struggle, curbing the
effectiveness of the various tactics with which unions threatened proprietary
capitalists.
The American developments invite closer scrutiny of the impact of abuse of
rights in continental Europe. In France and in Italy, I suggest, abuse of rights
was a critical element of a private law system centred on property and
paramount to the solidity and longevity of the modern bourgeois socio-economic
order. More specifically, abuse of rights paralleled the ambiguities of a wider
strategy of “social solidarity” aimed at boosting industrialization while
mitigating its social repercussions. Animated by humanitarian impulses,
paternalistic concerns and the quest for maximum economic profit, this
strategy entailed social legislation and experiments in “avant-garde
capitalism”. Judges and jurists joined policy makers and capitalists in the
effort to demonstrate that, in the era of predatory capitalism, enlightened
economic development was possible. Incorporated into the conceptual “system”
and purged of its radical potential abuse of rights seemed to allow a fair, and
innocuous, compromise between development and solidarity. Abuse of rights
was less the vehicle of radical aspirations to social reform than the site where
other crucial methodological and political battles took place. It was the battlefield where jurists and writers voiced claims of cultural identity and sought to
delineate the boundaries between law and morals and law and politics.
This article is divided in two parts. Part I. tracks the various malice rules
and reasonableness tests that worked as functional equivalents of abuse of
rights in the common law. It investigates the techniques of legal reasoning
through which nineteenth and early twentieth century American courts
operated these rules as well as the social and economic concerns that drove
judges’ resort to “reasonableness” and “malice”. Part II shifts the focus from
judicial elaborations to scholarly discussions. It shows that the debate spurred
by the theory of “intentional tort” at the turn of the nineteenth century in the
United States parallels the contemporary European controversy over abuse of
rights. Part III and part IV turn to France and Italy, tackling, respectively, the
curbing of abuse of rights’ potential as a tool for redistributive policy and the
methodological and cultural stakes of the academic debate over abuse of rights.
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I. ABUSE OF RIGHTS IN AMERICAN COURTS
A. The Functional Equivalents of Abuse of Rights: Malice Rules and Reasonableness Tests
For some decades between the second half of the nineteenth and the first
half of the twentieth century abuse of rights assiduously occupied the minds of
continental European jurists. It dominated academic discussions and it
appeared with increasing frequency in courts’ decisions. A newly crafted
unitary conceptual scheme resting on medieval sources, it allowed judges to
weigh conflicting individual rights, tempering their absoluteness and
amplitude, in a variety of legal subfields. Susceptible of application to both
extra-contractual rights and contractual rights, it helped courts deal with
questions regarding relations among neighbours, conflicts over water
resources, marital and paternal authority, the formation of contracts,
unilateral recess, business competition and conflicts between capital and labor.
A central organizing concept on the Continent, abuse of rights was, allegedly,
hardly of any concern to common lawyers. The relatively sparse English
literature on abuse of rights insinuates that the concept is nowhere to be found
in the common law. A unitary notion of abuse of rights was neither part of the
conceptual armoury of academic writers nor readily available in the courts’ tool
box.
However, a look at courts’ records suggests that abuse of rights was, indeed,
silently at work in English and, more significantly, in American law. The
scattered references to continental European theories should not deceive. In
various areas of the law, judges relied on “functional equivalents” of abuse of
rights. In other words, the socio-legal function played by abuse of rights on the
continent, i.e. limiting the amplitude of individual rights and balancing
conflicting rights, was performed by a variety of “malice” tests and “reasonable
user” rules that, although not integrated into a unitary category of “abuse of
rights”, presented a highly similar conceptual pattern. In disputes as diverse as
conflicts between riparian owners and controversies between employer and
employees, defendants’ conduct, otherwise lawful, was deemed to entail
liability either because of its malicious nature or by virtue of its
unreasonableness. Significantly, the hidden conceptual unity of these various
rules did not elude common lawyers. Opinions abounded with allusions to the
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parallel operation of similarly structured malice rules in different areas of the
law.
1. Water Law
Water law had long been the terrain on which continental theories of
abuse of rights were elaborated and tested. Justinian law contained scattered
provisions prohibiting aemulatio in relation to water rights, provisions which
were of avail to medieval jurists in their effort to work out a general theory of
aemualtio. Drawing on these Roman and medieval precedents, nineteenth
century French and Italian jurists framed conflicts over competing uses of
water as abuses of landowners’ property rights. Cujus est solum, ejus est usque
ad coelum. As the maxim recites, a landowner’s right was said to extend to
surface of the land as well as to everything that is upon or above it to an
indefinite height. However, although exclusive and absolute, this right was
deemed to be susceptible of abuses. Spitefully pumping off the water
percolating underneath one’s land thereby draining the neighbour’s well
amounted to one such instance of abuse.
Not surprisingly, in England and in the United States, courts dealt with
abuses of water rights relying on rules that closely parallel the continental
doctrine. In Acton v. Blundell, a case decided by the Exchequer Chamber in
1843 19, the plaintiff, a cotton spinner, used for the operation of his mill a well
which was fed by underground streams of water percolating from the soil
underneath the land of the defendants. The latter erected engines and pumps
which drained the water preventing it from flowing and percolating to the
plaintiff’s well and thereby procuring him pecuniary loss. In the court’s
assessment, the draining of the well amounted to damnum absque iniuria and
could not become the ground of an action20. A landowner, the court noted, has
the right to avail herself of all that lies beneath the surface, unless she does so
Acton v. Blundell, [1843] 12 M. & W. 324. The cause was tried before Rolfe, B. at the Liverpool Spring Assizes
in 1841. Against the direction of the Judge, the counsel for the plaintiff tendered a bill of exceptions which was
argued before the Court of Exchequer Chamber (Tindal J).
20 The inferior court directed the jury that, if the defendants had proceeded and acted “in the usual and proper
manner” for the purpose of working a coal mine, they might lawfully do so and that the plaintiff’s evidence was
not sufficient to support his allegations. Against the direction of the inferior court, the counsel for the plaintiff
tendered a bill of exceptions which was argued before the Court of Exchequer Chamber.
19
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animo vicino nocendi, i.e. maliciously, with the intent to injure the neighbour.
However, since ill will was not alleged, the malice qualification was obiter.
In Chasemore v. Richards (1859), Lord Wesleydale, hinted at a notion of
“reasonable use” that resembled continental notions of “normal function”21. The
appellant had owned and operated for sixty years a mill on a river which was
fed by the water percolating through the underground strata from higher
lands. The respondent, the local Board of Health of the town of Croydon, for the
purpose of augmenting the town’s supply of water and for other sanitary
purposes, sunk a large well in a piece of land situated above the plaintiff’s mill.
The operation of the well drained the subterranean stream that would have
otherwise oozed in the river, diminishing its flow and therefore hampering the
working of the appellant’s mill. The latter brought action for damages. The
Court of Exchequer and the Court of Exchequer Chamber gave judgement in
favour of the respondents. The House of Lords confirmed the decision of the
lower courts, affirming the respondent’s right to intercept subterranean
streams. Lord Wensleydale, in an opinion which is “as close to a dissenting
judgement as possible without recording a formal dissent”22, carefully
investigated the modalities and purposes of the respondents’ use of the water,
suggesting that a use not connected with the enjoyment of the land may be
“unreasonable”23.
Chasemore v. Richards [1859] 7 H. L. Cas 349.
MICHAEL TAGGART, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND ABUSE OF RIGHTS IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND: THE STORY OF
EDWARD PICKLES AND THE BRADFORD WATER SUPPLY (2002).
23 However, a few decades later, in Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles, the House of Lords stepped back, finding
motives to be immaterial. The Mayor, Aldermen and Burgesses of the Borough of Bradford Appellants v. Edward
Pickles Respondent, [1895]AC 587. Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles is another case involving interference with
underground water. The respondent, Mr Pickles, owned land on a higher level than the parcel of land acquired by
the appellants and used for the operation of the Bradford Waterworks Company. Allegedly for the purpose of
working minerals, Mr Pickles drained from the soil the ground water, which would have otherwise percolated to
the appellants’ land, thereby reducing the latter’s supply of water. The appellants brought an action seeking an
injunction to restrain the respondent from continuing to sink the shaft or doing anything to draw off the water
or diminish its quantity. They claimed that the respondent was motivated by the intent to injure thereby inducing
them to purchase his land, rather than by a bona fide intention to work his minerals. While the inferior court
granted the injunction, the Court of Appeals reversed. The House of Lords confirmed the latter court’s decision,
dismissing the appeal. In the court’s analysis it is the act, not the motive for the act, that must be regarded. The
deliberate nebulosity of Mr. Bell’s Principles of the Law of Scotland should not deceive, Lord Watson warned.
Aemulatio is a misleading expression and, while its operative scope in the law of Scotland is narrow, translating in
mere variations of degree in the courts’ assessment in cases of nuisance, it was never part of English law. On
Bradford v. Pickles see: MICHAEL TAGGART, supra note 26.
21
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In the United States, notions of “reasonable use” closely resembling
continental objective formulations of “abuse of rights” proved crucial organizing
concepts in nineteenth century water law, a legal field key to the progress of
industrialized agriculture as well as to the development of manufacturing
industry. Starting from the 1820s, water law took shape as a distinctively
American conceptual creation24. Joseph Angell’s “A Treatise on the Common
Law in Relation to Watercourses” appeared in 1824, laying the foundations on
which Justice Story and Chancellor Kent were to shape the common law of
waters 25. ”Reasonable user” rules were central to this new conceptual
structure. In all of the three major sub-domains of water law, surface
watercourses, ground water and diffuse surface water, “reasonable user”
doctrines gradually supplanted earlier rules of allocation.
With regard to the first category of waters, i.e. surface watercourses, in
the humid eastern states, riparianism soon emerged as the controlling
doctrine. According to the riparian doctrine, ownership of riparian land creates
a perpetual usufructuary right in the landowner to use the water. As to the
allocation of water among riparian owners, the earlier “natural flow” rule26,
dominant in the eighteen and early nineteenth century was gradually replaced
by the “reasonable user” principle27. The latter accords the riparian a right to
alter the flow when, balanced against the uses of other riparians, the use is
reasonable. Anticipated by Justice Story in Tyler v. Wilkinson28, the reasonable
Samuel C. Wiel, Waters: American Law and French Authority, 33 HARV. L. REV. 133 (1919), notes that: “the
common law of watercourses is not the ancient result of English law, but is a French doctrine received into
English law only through the influence of two eminent American jurists”.
25 JOSEPH ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE COMMON LAW IN RELATION TO W ATERCOURSES (1824); JAMES KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1889).
26 The “natural flow” rule prohibits any use of the stream by one riparian so as to diminish the natural flow to the
other riparian owners; it allows for modest domestic use, preventing waste, malicious diversion or extraordinary
use of water. See Michael Taggart, supra note 26; See
27 MORTON J. HORWITZ, supra note 16.
28 In Tyler v. Wilkinson 4 Mason 397 Fed Cas no 14 312 (1827), Justice Story provided a schizophrenic
articulation of the rule that reflected an uneasy transition between the older rule and the new reasonableness
principle. The case involved a typical case of conflict between riparian mill owners where the owners of the upper
dam appropriate and use a large quantity of water to the detriment of lower dam. In Story’s reasoning, the natural
flow principle was still commanding and the reasonableness test was timidly added as a qualification. “The right
being common to all the proprietors on the river, no one has a right to diminish the quantity which will, according
to the natural current flow to a proprietor below or throw it back upon a proprietor above. This is the necessary
result of the perfect equality of right among all proprietors of that which is common to all. […] When I speak of
this common right, I do not mean to be understood, as holding the doctrine that there can be no diminution
24
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use rule was fully articulated in Cary v. Daniels, a 1844 case involving a
conflict between lower and upper mill owners29. Chief Justice Shaw of the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts found that each proprietor is entitled to such
use of the stream, so far as it is reasonable in light of the needs of the
community and the developments in hydraulic technologies.
A similar development occurred in the legal regime governing the second
category of waters, i.e. underground percolating waters. While earlier cases
rely on the “absolute ownership” rule, occasionally tempered by a narrow
subjective malice qualification, by the late nineteenth century courts and
writers were shifting towards either a “reasonable user” criterion or a
“correlative rights” rule30. Professor Ernst Huffcut of Cornell Law School,
writing in 1904 on the Yale Law Journal stated confidently that “the prevailing
view in America is that, in order to justify the cutting off of another’s water
supply derived from percolating waters, it is necessary that this should be
result of a reasonable user of defendant’s rights in his own land”31. In Bassett
v. Salisbury (1862)32, a case regarding the obstruction of the natural drainage
of percolating water, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire while spelling
neatly the “reasonable user” rule, also showed awareness of the hidden
conceptual unity of reasonableness rules operating in various legal subfields:
The maxim “sic utere” & c., therefore applies, and, as in many other cases,

whatsoever, and no obstruction or impediment whatsoever, by a riparian proprietor in the use of the water as it
flows; for that would be to deny any valuable use of it. There may be, and there must be, allowed of that, which is
common to all, a reasonable use. The true test of the principle and extent of the use is whether it is to the injury
of the other proprietors or not. […] The law, here, as in many other cases, acts with a reasonable reference to
public convenience and general good and it is not betrayed into a narrow strictness, subversive of common sense,
nor into an extravagant looseness, which would destroy private rights. The maxim is applied “ sic utere tuo ut non
alienum leadas”.
29 Cary v. Daniels 8 Metcalf 466 (1844).
30 The reasonable use rule was anticipated in a number of earlier cases. In De Bok v. Doak 188 Iowa 597, 176 N.
W. 631 (1920), the plaintiff complained of an alleged injury caused him by the fact that the defendant appellant
used an excessive amount of water percolating from the ground not only as drink for his horses and cattle but
also to furnish drink and make a wallow for his hogs. The Supreme Court of Iowa, affirming the decision of the
Circuit Court which had granted injunctive relief, held that the appellant defendant had wasted the water in excess
to the detriment of the plaintiff. Justice Salinger emphasized the “modern trend” towards a “reasonable use” rule
taking into account “the local conditions, the purpose for which the landowner excavates and the use or non use
she makes of the water”.
31 Ernst W. Huffcut, Percolating Waters: The Rule of Reasonable User, 13 YALE L. J. 222 (1903-1904).
32 Bassett v. Salisbury 43 N. H. 569 (1862).
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restricts each to a reasonable exercise of his own right, a reasonable use of his
own property, in view of the similar rights of others. Instances of its similar
application in cases of watercourses, where the detention, pollution or unnatural
discharge of the water is complained of, of highways, of alleged nuisances in
regard to air or by noises &c., &c., and of the manner of the application are too
numerous and familiar to need more special mention.

Finally, reasonableness tests were also developed in relation to the third
category of waters, i.e. diffused surface waters. In the nineteenth century and
earlier twentieth century, run-off water was considered mainly in terms of
disposal and relatively little use was made of it. Earlier governed by an
absolutistic “common enemy” rule or by the so called “civil law” rule33, conflicts
over surface run-off increasingly came to be controlled, by a “reasonable use”
rule. In Short v. Baltimore City Passenger Railway, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland weighed the competing rights of the appellant, the owner of a house
in a Baltimore neighbourhood, and the appellee, a railway company, in light of
the reasonableness of the latter’s use of its property 34. After a heavy fall of
snow the railway company in clearing its track, threw the snow into the
adjoining street. The same night it rained hard and the mass of snow
obstructed the natural flow of the water which flooded the appellant’s house.
The court affirmed the judgment of the inferior court finding that the railway
company had acted in a “reasonable, usual and proper manner” and hence the
appellant’ injury was damnum absque injuria. Similarly, in City of Franklin v.
Durgee, the court declared that “the doctrines of reasonable necessity,
reasonable care and reasonable use prevail in this state in a liberal form, on a
broad basis of general principle”35.

In Gannon v. Hargadon, 10 Allen 106 (1865), a Massachusetts case, the defendant, who owned an upper parcel
of land, had placed turfs on his own land to protect it from a considerable flow of surface water caused by the
melting of the snow and the spring rains, thereby causing the water to flow off upon the plaintiff’s land33.
Resorting to the language of absolute rights and declaring that “cujus est solum,ejus est usque ad coelum” the court
applied the “common enemy” rule. The owner of a piece of land, Justice Bellow stated, may lawfully use it in
such manner as either to prevent surface water which accumulates elsewhere from coming upon it or to allow
surface water to come upon his land from elsewhere, although the water is thereby made to flow upon the land of
an adjoining landowner to her loss.
34 Hicks Short v. The Baltimore City Passenger Railway Company 50 Md. 73 (1878).
35 City of Franklin v. Durgee 58 L. R. A. 112, 51 A. 911 (1901).
33
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2. Nuisance
Nuisance was another area in which issues of abusive exercise of
property rights typically arose. In the common law world, disputes concerning
the spiteful erection of fences, walls, chimneys and other structures, largely
framed by civilians as hypotheses of “abuse of rights”, were treated as “private
nuisances”. As G. H. L. Fridman noted in an article on “Motive in the English
Law of Nuisance”, nuisance, as an area of tort liability, is central to the
discussion of abuse of rights in the common law.
In systems of law derived from the Digest a great deal is said about abuse of
rights; and the law is certainly made simpler and more patently straightforward
by provisions in codes and case law developments therefrom, dealing with jus
abutendi, abus des droits, or schikanerverbot. Such ideas are not to be found as
part of the common law. But it should not be thought that the common law
provides no remedy for such wrongs. There is an ample provision in the present
law relating to the tort nuisance for control of activities envisaged by the
continental codes36.

The essence of private nuisance is an unreasonable interference with the
use and enjoyment of land37. Liability may rest upon the defendant’s
intentional interference with the plaintiff’s interest as well as upon a merely
negligent interference or an abnormally dangerous conduct carried out
inappropriately. Therefore, subjective notions of malice, closely resembling
continental aemulatio, and more objective reasonableness tests, echoing French
and Italian notions of “normal function” of a right proved critical to
determining liability for nuisance. While malice is not necessarily implied in
nuisance, it may be an element in the commission of nuisances. Liability may
result from a course of activity maliciously designed to inflict harm. More often,
liability results from the defendant’s unreasonable and excessive exercise of
her right. Most late nineteenth and early twentieth century American courts
saw nuisance disputes as arising from a conflict between two absolute property
rights; in struggling to determine the proper limits on those competing rights
they relied, largely, on “reasonableness” and “malice rules” 38.
G.H. L. Fridman, Motive in the English Law of Nuisance, 40 VA. L. REV. 583 (1954).
Robert G. Bone, supra note 14
38 Robert G. Bone, supra, at 1137.
36
37
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American courts’ treatment of “spite fence” cases varied significantly and
changed over time39. While, in an earlier stage 40, in six of the ten states in
which actions had been brought for the spiteful erection of a fence, the opinion
of the court was against the plaintiff, by the first decade of the twentieth
century, courts consistently held defendants liable for maliciously erecting
fences or other constructions41. Further, in several states, statutes were passed
making the erection of a spite fence a tort42. In Rideout v. Knox43, Justice
Holmes reluctantly upheld one such statute. In Holmes’s reasoning, the power
to use one’s property malevolently is, to a large extent, an incident of a right
established for very different ends, which cannot be taken away even by
legislation. However, Holmes concedes, limits to property rights are a matter of
degree: while larger limitations would entail too incisive a constraint on the
owner’s right, smaller limitations may be imposed for the sake of avoiding a
manifest evil44. Similarly, In Horan v. Byrnes (1903) 45, the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire applied the “reasonable use” and upheld a statute declaring
A 1937 case furnished a telling photograph of a “spite fence” complete with the following description: “a fence
erected for no benefit or pleasure to the person erecting it, but solely with the malicious motive of injuring the
adjoining landowner by shutting out his light, air and view”.
40 In Mahan v. Brown 13 Wend 261(1835), the Supreme Court of Judicature of New York held that an action on
the case does not lie against a defendant for erecting a spite fence whereby he obstructs the lights of his
neighbour, let the motive of the obstruction be what it may, if the lights be not ancient lights or his neighbour has
not acquired a right by grant or occupation and acquiescence. In a nice display of formalistic reasoning, the court
distinguished the case at hand from the Aldred’s case where the construction of a hog house infesting the
neighbour’s property with fetid smells had been found to be a nuisance. In the latter case, Justice Savage argued, a
positive right had been invaded, every person having a right to the use of natural elements in their purity.
Conversely, in the case at hand, the plaintiff enjoys a mere easement that may ripen into a right. But, before
sufficient time has elapsed to raise a presumption of a grant, he is deprived of no right, but only prevented from
acquiring a right, without consideration, in his neighbour’s property.
41 See James Barr Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of the Actor, 18 HARV. L. REV.,
411 (1905).
42 Id., at 415; the states were: Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont and Washington.
43 Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass 368, 19 N. E. 390 (1889).
44 Holmes’ concern with the arbitrariness of jury’s inquiry into motives echoes the arguments raised by opponents
of abuse of right on the Continent: “It has been thought by respectable authorities that even at common law the
extent of a man’s rights in cases like the present might depend upon the motive with which he acted. […] We do
not so understand the common law, and we concede further that to large extent the power to use one’s property
malevolently in any way which would be lawful for other ends is an incident of property which cannot be taken
away even by legislation. It may be assumed that under our constitution the legislature would not have the power
to prohibit putting up or maintaining stores or houses with malicious intent and thus to make a large part of the
property of the commonwealth dependent upon what a jury might find to have been the past or to be the present
motives of the owner. But it does not follow that the rule is the same for a boundary fence, unnecessarily built
more than six feet high. It may be said that the difference is only one of degree. Most differences are, when nicely
analyzed”.
45 Horan v. Byrnes, 72 NH 93 54 A 945 (1903).
39
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that any fence unnecessarily exceeding five feet in height and erected to annoy
an adjoining owner, shall be a private nuisance. Chief Justice Parsons’
reference to Franklin v. Durgee, the earlier water case mentioned above,
betrays awareness of the underlying conceptual unity of the various
“reasonable use” tests operating in different fields of the law:
The common law right of the ownership of land […] does not sanction or
authorize practical injustice to one landowner by the arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of the right of dominion by another (Franklin v. Durgee), but makes the
test of the right the reasonableness of the use under all circumstances. In such
case the purpose of the use, whether understood by the landowner to be
necessary or useful to himself, or merely intended to harm another, may be
decisive upon the question of right. It cannot be justly contended that a purely
malicious use is a reasonable use.

Reasonableness rules were also deployed in cases of nuisance involving
conflicts between industrial enterprises and residential landowners. In the St.
Helen case (1865) 46, involving a major episode of industrial pollution, the
House of Lords formulated a reasonableness rule placing emphasis on time and
locality. Again, the existence of a unitary conceptual pattern linking malice
rules and reasonableness tests in disparate legal domains could hardly elude
the court. Lord Wesleydale, who a few years before, in Chasemore v. Richards,
had boldly alluded at a “reasonable use” rule far exceeding the narrow scope of
subjective “malice”, approvingly concurred in his bretherns’ articulation of
“reasonableness”.
3. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations or Economic Expectancies
Cases of tortious interference with contractual relations were a third
category of cases raising issues of “abuse of rights” solved through malice rules
and reasonableness tests similar to continental doctrines. The typical instance
of interference with contractual relations was that of a third party who, in the
exercise of her lawful right to compete on the market, interfered with an
existing or prospective contractual relation between two parties in order to
obtain some advantage. The question facing the courts was whether the
interloper had abused her right to compete. Until the 1850s, it was widely
46

St. Helen Smelting Co. V. Tipping XI HLC 642 (1865).
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assumed that a remedy for a breach of contract could be obtained only against
the other party to the contract. Courts accorded contractual relations
protection from a variety of third parties interferences, but no formally unified
tort had developed. While the master-servant relation was shielded through an
action of enticement against third parties who persuaded a servant to leave her
employment, other contractual agreements were protected from a variety of
interferences such as slander, libel, fraud, coercion.
By the 1850s, socio-economic developments and conceptual innovations
had cast new light on the problem of third parties’ interference. Courts were
now inclined to envisage contractual expectations as a form of property to be
afforded absolute protection47. Once again, the concept of “malice” well served
courts’ efforts to provide such protection. The defendant’s right to compete and
the plaintiff’s “contractual property” were balanced in light of standards of
“malice” or “unreasonableness”. As Prosser lamented in his treatise “On Torts”,
the law of interference with economic relations became “shrouded in a fog of
catchwords and rubber-stamp phrases”,48 most of which turned on the question
of the defendant’s malicious motive or purpose.
In Lumley v. Gye (1853) 49, the Court of Queen’s Bench extended the
action of enticement to malicious interference with contractual relations other
than the master-servant relation. The case involved a contract between the
plaintiff, the lessee and manager of the Queen’s Theatre in London, and Miss
Johanna Wagner, a singer, for the performance by her for a period of three
months at the plaintiff’s theatre. The court found that the defendant, the
impresario of a competing theatre, had procured Miss Holmes to breach the
contract animated by a “malicious intention” and awarded damages to the
plaintiff.

47

See John T. Nockleby, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relation in the Nineteenth Century: The Transformation of
Property, Contract and Tort, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1979-1980). Frances Bowes Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36
HARV. L. REV. 663, 675 (1922-1923). “If this tort it not to be regarded as simply a particularized manifestation of
the old doctrine of Keeble v Hickeringill its true basis would seem to lie in the policy of the law to accord to
promises the same or similar protection as is accorded to other forms of property. By lending its protection to
promised advantages, the law creates and secures additional property values which further the social welfare”.
48
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, (4TH ED. 1971)at 927.
49
Lumley v. Gye, Court of Queen’s Bench (Coleridge, Erle, Wightman and Crompton, JJ.) [1853] 2 E&B 216.
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In Temperton v. Russell (1893) 50, the Court of Queens Bench extended
the principle of liability for interference beyond existing contractual relations
to relations which are merely prospective or potential. Lord Esher saw no
distinction between the two categories of relations, the malicious, and hence
wrongful, intent and the kind of injury being the same. As nicely put in a later
American case, since a large part of what is most valuable in modern life seems
to depend more or less directly upon “probable expectancies”, it would seem
inevitable that courts will “discover, define and protect from undue interference
more of these “probable expectancies”51. However, in Allen v. Flood, a 1897 case
involving a union’s interference with the employment relation between the
employer and employees affiliated to a rival union52, the role of malice was
minimized. A classic in the literature on abuse of rights, Allen v. Flood is seen
as the undisputable evidence that “abuse of rights” had a short life in England.
The House of Lords recast and deactivated the doctrine of malice. Malice, Lord
Watson noted, depends not upon evil motive but upon the illegal character of
the act committed 53
50

Temperton v. Russel (Lord Escher, MR, Lopes and A. Smith LJJ [1893] 1QB 715.
Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 NJ Eq 759, 53 A 230 (1902).
52
Thomas Francis Allen Appellant v. William Cridge Flood and Walter Taylor Respondents, supra note 19. Along
with Pickles v. Bradford, Allen stands as the foremost authority for the absence of abuse of right in English law.
The appellant, Allen, the delegate of the union of iron-workers, in order to punish the respondents, a group
shipwrights who had in the past engaged in practices resisted by the union, had informed the employer that unless
the latter were discharged, all the iron-workers would be called out. Pressed by this threat, the employer
discharged the shipwrights and refused to employ them again. The respondents brought an action against the
appellant. The inferior court awarded damages to the respondents. The decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeal. Reversing the latter court’s decision, the House of Lords gave judgement in favour of the appellant
arguing that, however malicious or bad his motive might be, he had done no unlawful act. A deep and hardly
disguisable anxiety permeates the court’s profuse discussion of the essence and the scope of malice. The court is
eager to vindicate and defend its role as the arbiter of social and economic conflict. The conceptual vagueness of
malice is said to threaten legal certainty by putting the assessment of human actions at the mercy of juries, hence
resulting in great danger for the community and for individual freedom. Retrieving the well-know adagio of
malice’s conceptual obscurity, the court restates the doctrine. The definition provided by the court is the same
offered by the Mogul Steamship case “a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse”; the
emphasis, however, is on the wrongful nature of the act, rather than on the presence of a just cause. By shifting
the emphasis from the motive to the nature of the act, the court closes the narrow space left open for a theory of
abuse of right in the Mogul case. In the Allen court’s words: “For the purpose then in hand [in the Mogul case]
the statement of the law may be accurate enough, but if it means that a man is bound in law to justify or excuse
every wilful act which may damage another in his property or trade then I say with all respect the proposition [of
Lord Bowen] is far too wide; everything depends on the nature of the act, and whether it is wrongful or not”
53
“The root of the principle is that, in any legal question, malice depends not upon evil motive which influenced
the mind of the actor, but upon the illegal character of the act which he contemplated and committed. In my
opinion it is alike consistent with reason and common sense that when the act done is, apart from the feelings
which prompted it, legal, the civil law ought to take no cognizance of its motive”
51
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From England, the tort of interference with economic relations migrated
to America. Frances Bowes Sayre, writing in 1922 in the Harvard Law Review,
lamented the little careful inquiry American courts devoted to the precise
limits and fundamental nature of the doctrine. In Sayre’s words:
Much of the uncertainty surrounding this tort comes from the shifting ideas
which have clustered around the requirement of “malice”. Following in the
footsteps of Justice Crompton, courts still carefully repeat the formula which
requires “malice” as one of the essential elements of the tort. But thus far what
constitutes “malice” has been passed over in silence or covered by remarks of the
most ambiguous nature54.

In fact, in cases of interference with contractual relations as well as in cases
of interference with prospective advantage, malice was variously framed. While
in sparse instances American courts deemed malice irrelevant, a majority of
cases held the defendant liable for maliciously or unreasonably interfering with
the plaintiff’s “contractual property”. In Chambers v. Baldwin, a 1891 case of
interference with a contract for the sale of a crop of tobacco, the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky found that the defendant, in procuring the purchaser of
the crop to break the contract, had exercised, rather than abused, his right to
compete on the market of goods, his alleged malicious motives being
immaterial55. Once again, the reasoning of the court betrays awareness of a
hidden unitary conceptual structure. The court explicitly drew on water cases
to affirm the irrelevance of motive and the absoluteness of the defendant’s
right. Justice Lewis quoted Chatfield v. Wilson and other earlier water cases to
the effect that “an act legal in itself, and which violates no right, cannot be
made actionable on account of the motive which induced it”. As the landowner
who diverts subterranean percolating waters does so in the exercise of her
absolute property right, so a tobacco dealer who interferes with contractual
relation between the seller and another buyer to become purchaser in his
stead, does so in the exercise of his right to compete on the market.
To the contrary, in Jones v. Leslie, a 1910 case of interference with an

54
55

Frances Bowes Sayre, supra note 53, at 672.
Chambers v. Baldwin 11 L. R. A. 545 15 SW 57 (1891).
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employment contract, the court found malicious motives material56. The
plaintiff, formerly an employee of the defendant, had found a better job and
stipulated an oral contract with the new employer. The defendant induced the
latter to discharge the plaintiff by threatening to drive him out of business if he
engaged the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Washington fitted the fact pattern
within the mould of a subjective notion of malice as wanton malevolence.
Most courts, however, privileged broader tests that focused on the
reasonableness of the interloper’s purpose rather than on her mere malevolent
intent. In a 1911 case of interference with economic relations, the Supreme
Court of Iowa assessed the interloper’s conduct in light of a “reasonableness”
standard and explicitly suggested the parallel with water cases and nuisance
cases. A wealth of water cases and labor cases, Justice Weaver noted, provide
authority for the proposition that an act which is legally right when done
without malice may become legally wrong when done “maliciously, wantonly or
without reasonable cause”.
4. Labor Law
Finally, inquiries into motives and notions of “reasonable exercise of a
right” were central to emerging modern labor law. In 1901, in Quinn v.
Leathem57, the House of Lords, faced with a conflict between capital and labor,
retrieved the notion of malice previously ruled out in Allen v. Flood. The
appellant was an official of a meat workers union determined to unionize the
respondent, owner of a slaughter yard, who was not willing to bend to the
union’s pressures. Quinn and other officials notified the retail butcher to whom
the respondent regularly sold all of his product, that, unless he ceased dealing
with the latter, they would call out his workers. As a consequence, the retail
butcher sent a telegram to the respondent, letting him know that he would no
longer buy his meat. The latter, who, having just killed a quantity of fine meat,
suffered great economic loss, brought action against the appellants. The
inferior court gave judgement in favour of the respondent and the Irish Court
of Appeal affirmed. Quinn alone appealed and the House of Lords affirmed the
56
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Jones v. Leslie 61 Wash. 107, 112 P. 81. (1910).
Quinn v. Laetham, [1901] A.C. 495 85 LT 289.
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decision of the latter court, finding the appellant to have acted maliciously.
Lord Shand disguised the court’s sudden drift in the understanding of malice
with bold and abstract claims as to law’s illogical nature:
[…] a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it
can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a
mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every
lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all. My lords, I think
the application of these two propositions [the first being that every judgement must
be read as applicable to the particular facts proved] renders the decision of this case
perfectly plain, notwithstanding the decision of the case of Allen v. Flood.

Likewise, in the United States, at the turn of the nineteenth century,
notions of “malice” played a significant role in the development of labor law.
American courts deployed reasonableness tests to widen or narrow the scope of
permitted collective action. Early American labor cases are said to reflect “a
spirit of medievalism with its antagonism to the working classes”. These cases
involved criminal indictments for conspiracy rather than injunction or damage
suits. The unions’ very right to exist was at stake. In the 1806 case of the
Philadelphia cordwainers a combination to raise wages was held illegal; in a
1835 New York case, People v. Fisher, the court took the same view. As Edwin
Witte noted in the Yale Law Journal in 1925, Commonwealth v. Hunt (1842)
marked “the overthrew of these archaic doctrines and the beginning of the
modern law of labor combinations”58. Rather than questioning the union’s right
to exist or the legality of the combination itself, the court focused on the
purpose sought and the means employed by the union. In the following decades
criminal conspiracy cases became less frequent and, in a number of states,
legislation repealing the conspiracy doctrine was enacted.
By the 1890s, with the tremendous rise in both the size and the
organization of labor unions, the old doctrine of criminal conspiracy had been
abandoned. Courts came to rely extensively on the labor injunction, an equity
remedy, justifying it as the protection of a newly coined concept of
“entrepreneurial property rights” from irreparable injury59. Further, tort law
58
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Edwin E. Witte, Early American Labor Cases 35 YALE L. J. 825 (1925-1926).
Haggai Hurvitz, American Labour Law and the Doctrine of Entrepreneurial Property Rights: Boycotts, Courts, and the

di Robilant

ABUSE OF RIGHTS

26 of 99

came of avail. Picketing, strikes and secondary boycotts were subsumed within
the category of malicious torts. Courts focused on the purposes driving unions
assessing them in terms of wanton malice, reasonableness and lack of
legitimate interest.
For instance, in Moores v. Bricklayers Union, a 1889 Ohio boycott case,
Justice Taft resorted to a reasonableness test that echoed continental ideas of
“normal function of a right”60. A bricklayers union, seeking to coerce an
employer to accept its requests, sent the latter’s customers a circular stating
that any dealings with him would lead to similar measures against them. Since
one of the customers, the Moores Lime Company, upon receiving the circular,
stopped selling lime to the employer by delivery, the latter sent a teamster who
bought it for cash at Moores’ car. Having disregarded the union’s circular, the
Moores Lime Company was banned and brought an action for damages. The
question facing the court was whether the defendant union had unreasonably
or maliciously exercised its right to the free pursuit of trade. Taft assessed the
“immediate motive” driving the Bricklayers’ Union in light of the “normal
operation of the right to labor”, and found it malicious.
5. A Hidden Unitary Concept?
Although operating in an analogous fashion in all these various legal
subfields, “malice” and “reasonableness” rules never congealed into a unitary
category of “abuse of rights”. At times, common lawyers have regarded the
absence of a unitary category of abuse of rights with regret, attributing it to the
flaws of common law-style legal thinking. As an observer noted:
The piece-meal, empiricist approach to judicial decision making that characterizes
the common law is its greatest weakness as well as its greatest strength. […] in so
far as malicious or improper motive is relevant to the determination of a legal right
in our law, we probably will now reach the same result as those jurisdictions which
have the doctrine [of abuse of rights]; but the reluctance of our courts to consider the
theoretical foundations of our law has resulted in a legal fabric that abounds with
loose ends, and requires constant and ad hoc patching61.
Juridical Reorientation of 1886-1895 in 8 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LAW JOURNAL 307 (1986).
60
Moores & Co. v. Bricklayers Union et Al., 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 665 (1889).
61
Hamar Foster, Abuse of Rights. Civil Law, Legal Reasoning: Bradford v. Pickles Revisited, 8 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV.
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However, cross-references in cases dealing with water rights, nuisance,
tortuous interference with economic relations and labor law are not the only
evidence of courts’ awareness of an overarching conceptual scheme. Individual
personalities also played a role in designing an unstated, though powerfully
operative, conceptual structure resembling “abuse of rights”. A significant
number of the decisions discussed in this article were rendered by the Supreme
Courts of Massachusetts and New Hampshire. The vanguard of legal thinking,
these two courts, under the guidance of, respectively, Chief Justice Shaw and
Chief Justice Doe, were the laboratory where reasonableness standards
fashioned on a unitary mold were elaborated. Well-read jurisprudents,
conversant with European legal theory, Doe and Shaw may have been well
aware of the parallel with the continental theories of abuse of rights62. In any
case, Doe and Shaw’s innumerable discussions of “reasonable use” or
“reasonable exercise of a right” betray awareness of an underlying unitary
framework 63.
Furthermore, a clear sense of the conceptual unity of the scheme emerges
from Jeremiah Smith’s opinions and writings. A colleague of Doe on the New
Hampshire bench, Smith, in a series of articles, analyzed the questions raised
by “malice” and “reasonableness” rules in apparently distant fields, i.e.
relations among neighbors and labor disputes64. Although aware of the unitary
nature of such rules, Smith expressed skepticism towards the general
categories and mathematical formulas relied upon by his continental
colleagues:
The question of legal regulation of conflicting rights is not confined to rights in
regard to the use of land, but extends to all cases of conflicting rights as to other
matters or subjects. […] It is generally admitted that it is impossible to frame a rule
so definite that its application will instantly solve all cases of conflicting rights. […]
343 (1973).
62
LEONARD LEVY, LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW (1957); JOHN PHILIP REID, CHIEF
JUSTICE. THE JUDICIAL WORLD OF CHARLES DOE (1967); FREDERIC HATHAWAY CHASE, LEMEUL SHAW: CHIEF
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS 1830-1860 (1918). SEE ALSO G. E. WHITE, THE AMERICAN
JUDICIAL TRADITION (1978).
63
Green v. Gilbert, 60 NH 144 (1880); Thompson v. The Androscogging River Improvement Co., 54 NH 545
(1874).
64
Jeremiah Smith, Reasonable Use of One’s Own Property As A Justification for Damage to A Neighbor, 17 COLUM. L.
REV., 383 (1917); Crucial Issues in Labour Litigation, 20 HARV. L. REV., 345 (1906);
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The respective rights and liabilities of adjoining landowners cannot be determined
in advance by a mathematical line or a general formula. As we said in regard to so
called “private nuisances”: “No hard and fast rule controls the subject, for a use that
is reasonable under one set of facts would be unreasonable under another”65

B. Reasonableness Tests: Unorthodox Legal Reasoning?
Although not integrated into a unitary concept of “abuse of rights”, as in
France and in Italy, malice rules and reasonableness tests were, in fact, unified
through a unitary mode of reasoning. When applying these rules, American
courts relied on techniques for doctrinal analysis and modes of justification
that were hardly consistent with the dictates of so-called “Classical Legal
Thought”. Attempts at balancing and cost-benefit analysis, justifications drawn
from social morals and inquiries into the social consequences of legal doctrines
coexisted, at times in the same opinion, with deductive and formalistic
reasoning. Although still rudimentary and abstract if compared with post-WW2
“conflicting considerations” analysis, these early instances of balancing and
policy reasoning invite a re-characterization of nineteenth century legal
reasoning, one that places less emphasis on the discontinuity between
subsequent styles of thought and more on courts’ continuous reliance on both
instrumentalist and formalist modes of reasoning.
A substantial body of legal historical scholarship has traced a neat
picture of the orthodox mode of legal thinking dominant in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century66. The “Formal Style” which, around the 1850s,
ousted an earlier “Grand Style”, featuring clear reasoning and attention to
policy, was seen as resting on a number of related assumptions. In Llewellyn’s
words: “the rules of law are to decide the cases”; policy is for the legislature
rather than the courts; “opinions run in deductive form with an air, or
expression, of single-line inevitability”; the legal order is an ordered system of
rules and principles.
Subsequent historical work has further elaborated
65

this picture.

Jeremiah Smith, Reasonable Use supra at 385
ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1938); KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION. DECIDING APPEALS (1960); GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977).
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Variously named, “Classical Legal Thought”, or “Formalism” or “Classical
Orthodoxy”67 has been described as a relatively homogenous and coherent
mode of thought. While the actual characterization and the political nature of
legal classicism are a matter of dispute68, there is substantial agreement on its
two major implications for judicial reasoning. First, judicial outcomes were
deduced, either logically inferred or analytically derived69, from a relatively
small number of conceptually ordered abstract principles. Further, in justifying
their outcomes judges appealed to law’s internal coherence rather than to “the
norms’ purposes, the general policies underlying the legal order or the
MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1860-1960 (1992); DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE
RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT (2006); Thomas C. Grey, Landgell’s Orthodoxy 45 U. PITT. L. REV.
1 (1983-1984).
68 American historians have drawn different images of late nineteenth century formalist legal thought. Duncan
Kennedy’s account focuses on the internal structure of “Classical Legal Thought” as a mode of consciousness.
The unity of a mode of thought or consciousness comes from the existence within this structure of a dominant
doctrinal subsystem within which concepts, reasoning techniques, ideals and images are analogous across legal
domains. In classical legal thought this dominant subsystem consisted of a number of elements: a) all legal rules
were built out of a “will theory” using strictly analogous conceptions of public power and private right; b) private
law rules were organized around the public/private distinction; c) the preferred mode of reasoning was
induction/deduction d) the ideal was the deployment of democratically validated power as the framework for
private freedom e) the key image was powers and rights “absolute within their spheres”. See DUNCAN KENNEDY,
THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT , supra. Morton Horwitz, on the other hand, focuses more
on the relation between legal thought and ideology, between Classical Legal Thought and Liberal Legalism.
Classical legal thought was intimately linked to a central aspiration of American legal thinkers, the separation
between law and politics, the quest for an autonomous system of law untainted by politics. After the trauma of
the Civil war and at the moment of swift social and economic change jurists sought even more fervently to create
a system of autonomous law. Through a process of systematization, integration and abstraction they built a
coherent legal architecture that sought to depoliticize law by mediating a series of basic contradictions of antebellum American law. This legal architecture was characterized by: a) the private-public distinction; b) the creation
of increasingly abstract and general legal classifications and categories such as will, ownership or fault; c) clear,
distinct bright-line classifications of legal phenomena; d) deductive and analogical reasoning which conferred
upon legal reasoning the qualities of “certainty” and “logical inexorability”. See MORTON HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960 supra. Finally, Thomas Grey focuses on the epistemological
premises of Classical Orthodoxy. In Grey’s analysis, Classical legal science was a set of ideas to be put to work
from inside by those who operate legal institutions. It envisioned the legal system as “complete” (i.e. its
substantive norms provide a uniquely correct solution for every case that can arise under it.) through “universal
formality” (i.e. the outcomes of the system are dictated by rationally compelling reasoning. The system can be
made “universally formal” through “conceptual order (i.e. the substantive bottom level rules can be derived from
a small number of relatively abstract principles and concepts which themselves form a coherent system. Grey
emphasizes the analogy between classical orthodox legal science, which claims to be empirical and yet highly
conceptual, experimental and inductive, and Euclidean geometry, seen, in the late nineteenth century, as a set of
well confirmed inductive generalizations about the physical world. For legal science the universe of data was not
the totality of sense experience of the physical world but the restricted set of reported common law decisions. See
Thomas C. Grey, supra. More recently see WILLIAM WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL
THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA 1886-1937 (1998).
69
Thomas C. Grey, supra note 65 at 7-8.
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extrajuristic preferences of the interpreter”70. Vague standards, such as
reasonableness, or rules requiring determinations of state of mind, such as
malice, are deemed to have been largely foreign to this style of reasoning71.
Abuse of rights cases complicate this understanding of legal classicism,
presenting us with courts consistently resorting to unorthodox reasoning
techniques. The operation of reasonableness standards required two major
modifications in courts’ “orthodox” reasoning technique. First, deduction
yielded to balancing. Rather than deducing limits to individual rights from
abstract principles, judges weighed the defendant and the plaintiff’s conflicting
rights in light of multi-factor reasonableness standards allowing an assessment
of geographical, technological and economic elements. Second, justificatory
arguments changed significantly. The factual nature of a judgement of
“reasonable exercise of a right” opened up space for policy-based justifications.
Rather than invoking the legal system’s logical cogency or internal coherence,
judges became more inclined to discuss openly the social consequences of their
decisions and to rely on extra-juristic considerations.
Nevertheless, this instrumental style of reasoning retained elements of
formalism. While the language of balancing and cost-benefit comparison was
often abstract and vague, the outcomes’ “air of single-line inevitability” was
hardly attenuated. Moral norms supposedly rooted in the aspirations of the
community, policies allegedly finding wide support in society, and informed
experiential propositions72 substantiated the standard of “reasonableness”,
conferring a patina of universality and inevitability upon courts’ justifications,
and lifting them out of the incandescent arena of policy preferences.
Numerous of the thousands of decision rendered by Chief Justice Shaw
during his thirty years at the head of the Massachusetts bench exemplify this
unorthodox style of reasoning. A figure of transition, operating at the moment
when the “Grand Style” was gradually yielding to classical orthodoxy, Chief
Justice Shaw heavily relied on reasonableness tests. On the one hand, Shaw,
Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formalism, in THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES 8634 (2001).
71 Thomas C. Grey supra note 65 at 11.
72
See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988).
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deeply preoccupied with basic principles, envisaged law as a science founded on
reason and strove to impart to the law system and symmetry. On the other
hand, in the course of Shaw’s tenure, Massachusetts experienced swift
economic development and social change. Shaw embarked resolutely in the
task of accomodating legal doctrine to meet the new problems posed by a
rapidly changing environment and turbulent economic growth. Constantly
searching for ways to adapt the old to the new, Shaw used reasonableness
tests, to be extracted from a shared, and hence non-contentious, common sense,
to restate legal fields as diverse as water law and labor law as to make them
“practical and plastic”73. Reasonableness satisfied both his quest for general
principles as well as his idea of law as responsive to shifting social conditions.
In Shaw’s analysis, a variety of factors determines the judgement of
reasonableness. A reasonable use of one’s property is a question of degree74,
purpose, natural and geographical conditions75, and technological
advancement. For instance, in Thurber v. Martin, Shaw, called to assess the
reasonableness of the use of a stream of water, declared that:
In determining what is such reasonable use, a just regard must be had to the
force and magnitude of the current, its height and velocity, the state of
improvement in the country in regard to mills and machinery, and the use of
water as a propelling power, the general usage of the country in similar cases
and all other circumstances bearing upon the question of fitness and propriety in
the use of the water in the particular case.

While Shaw’s balancing of the landowners’ competing interests is an exercise in
pragmatic and purpose-oriented comparative reasoning, the allusion to social
customs and shared notions of propriety and fitness prevented him from seeing
the case as requiring an analytic choice between alternative policies as to the
nature and goal of property.
A similar judicial philosophy, and a similar propensity towards
reasonableness standards, is typical of another anomalous “classicist”76, Justice
73

Leonard W. Levy, supra note at 24.
Lewis Elliott v. The Fitchburg Railroad Co., 64 Mass 191 (1852).
75 John Thurber v. Benjamin Martin 2 Gray 394 Mass 1854.
76 Llewellyn saw Doe as an exception in the “Formal Style, see KARL LLEWELLYN, supra note 64.
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Doe of New Hampshire. Basset v. Salisbury (1862) and Swett v. Cutts (1870)
signalled the Supreme Court’s of New Hampshire turn to the standard of
“reasonableness” that Doe will further perfect. In the latter case, Chief Justice
Bellow, weighed the conflicting rights of two adjoining landowners disputing
over the diversion of the flow of surface water in the season of melting snow,
and equated “reasonable use” to domestic, agricultural and manufacturing
purposes. Further, Bellow clarified the factual assessment of reasonableness by
listing, among the circumstances to be considered, “the nature and importance
of the improvements sought to be made”, “the extent of the interference with
the water”, “the amount of injury done to the other land-owners as compared
with the value of such improvement” and, finally, “whether such injury could or
could not have been reasonably foreseen”.
An Associate Justice when Swett v. Cutts was decided, Charles Doe
became Chief Justice in 1876. In the twenty years of Doe’s tenure,
reasonableness became a general principle in the law of torts and the
instrument for balancing conflicting rights77. Doe’s predilection for
reasonableness was rooted in his methodological beliefs. In Doe’s
understanding law was “experience developed by reason and reason checked
and directed by experience”78. For Doe, legal doctrines were justifications for
results obtained by reason and justice, where the latter stood for fairness and
practicality. This notion of “justice” led the Chief Justice to favour balancing as
a reasoning technique and reasonableness as the guiding criterion. Far from
being a vague standard for the lazy, reasonableness took effort to apply; it was
to be extracted from the shared norms and practices of a changing society.
In Thompson v. Androscogging R. I. Co., Doe laid bare the complexities
of an assessment of reasonableness in the use of property. Drawing on an
earlier case, he discussed an hypothetical “unreasonable use” by a riparian
77

See JOHN P. REID, supra note at 133 ff. Though Mr Holmes has received most of the credit for awakening the
bar to the need for a theory of torts and for developing the main lines along which that theory was first
formulated, others were working in the vineyard, notably Charles Doe; his determination to bring rationality to
the chaotic patterns of tort liability is one of the most significant contributions to American law” and p. 145 “As
we shall see in a future chapter, few judges expected as much from the concept of “reasonableness” as did Doe.
He called it a general principle and in the law of torts made it the instrument for resolving most factual issues”.
See also G. E. WHITE, supra note 60.
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owner who had a made a deep cut through the river’s bank. Doe emphasized
that the reasonable expectation of damage is only one of the many factors
figuring in “the catalogue of all the possible elements of reasonableness and
unreasonableness”. In Green v. Gilbert, called to decide whether a mill owner
who had devised an ingenious mechanism to discharge the sawdust into a river
had exercised his property rights reasonably, Doe further specified the nature
of the judgement of reasonableness. Reasonableness is a question of fact
depending upon the circumstances of the case, including the purposes, old and
new of the parties’ use and upon a comparative assessment of the respective
costs and benefits.79 Doe recognized, with the founder of German’s “Interests
Jurisprudence”, Philip Heck, that “law operates in a world full of competing
interests and, therefore, always works at the expense of some interests”, but for
him, as for Shaw, a multifactor standard of “reasonableness” grounded in
societal experience, mandated the correct and desirable balance.
Courts were well aware of the implication of reasonableness standards
for legal reasoning. Occasionally, they engaged in an explicit and sharp critique
of the classicist deductive mode, advocating an instrumental style of judicial
analysis. In Tuttle v. Buck, the Supreme Court of Minnesota, faced with the
question of defining the proper scope of competition and of deciding which
injury to permit without compensation, declared that abstract maxims about
malicious motives are of little avail to courts. Rather, the court acknowledged,
the question of competition is to be decided by weighing competing social and
economic objectives. Justice Elliott profusely elaborated on this new style of
reasoning and the judicial philosophy inspiring it. In Elliott’s vision, balancing
is a corollary of a new organicist notion of law and legal change:
Mr Justice Black said that malicious motives make a bad case worse, but they
cannot make that wrong which in its own essence is lawful. […] Such
generalizations are of little value in determining cases. […] We do not intend to
enter upon an elaborate discussion of the subject, or become entangled in the
subtleties connected with the words “malice” and “malicious”. We are not able to
accept without limitations the doctrine above referred to, but at this time
content ourselves with a brief reference to some general principles. It must be
remembered that the common law is the result of growth, and that its
79
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development has been determined by the social needs of the community which it
governs. It is the resultant of conflicting social forces, and those forces which are
for the time dominant leave their impress upon the law. It is of judicial origin,
and seeks to establish doctrines and rules for the determination, protection and
enforcement of legal rights. Manifestly it must change as society changes and
new rights are recognized. To be an efficient instrument, and not a mere
abstraction, it must gradually adapt itself to changed conditions. Necessarily its
form and substance has been greatly affected by prevalent economic theories.
For generations there has been a practical agreement upon the proposition that
competition in trade and business is desirable, and this idea has found
expression in the decisions of the courts as well as in statutes. But it has led to
grievous and manifold wrongs to individuals , and many courts have manifested
an earnest desire to protect the individuals which result from unrestrained
business competition. The problem has been to so adjust matters as to preserve
the principle of competition and yet guard against its abuse to the unnecessary
injury to the individual.

Courts’ language and reasoning techniques in abuse of rights cases seem
to add evidence to the growing strand of revisionist scholarship that invites a
more nuanced understanding of late nineteenth century legal thought. Writing
in the mid 1970s, Harry Scheiber significantly downplayed the allegedly blunt
discontinuity between an instrumental “Grand Style”, dominant until the
1850s, and a subsequent formalist style, heavily dependent on deduction and
conceptual coherence80. Rather, Scheiber contended, late nineteenth century
judicial reasoning may be best characterized as an “amalgam” of
“instrumentalism” and “formalism”. Scheiber’s study of post-1865 decisions on
property, eminent domain and resource-allocation law sought to show that
instrumentalism was well and alive in the late nineteenth century. Even when
they posited highly formalist theories of higher law and inalienable rights,
judges simultaneously relied on reasoning methods and on concepts, such as
“public purpose” or “public use”, that validated broad discretion in setting
economic priorities.
Harry N. Scheiber, Instrumentalism and Property Rights: A Reconsideration of American Styles of Judicial Reasoning in the
19th Century, 1975 WIS. L. REV. 1 (1975); Schieber’s article is a response to the discontinuity thesis advanced by
William Nelson who argues that the “instrumental” style of judicial reasoning fell into disfavor after the 1850 s
and was supplanted by a “formalist” style. A significant causal factor explaining this shift is, in Nelson’s analysis,
the success of anti-slavery jurisprudence. The moral crisis over slavery discredited the amoral instrumentalism
which had become an obstacle on the path of the anti-slavery movement and called for a principle-orineted
jurisprudence reinforced by greater use of precedent. See William Nelson, The Impact of the Anti-Slavery Movement
Upon Styles of Judicial reasoning in Nineteenth Century America 87 HARV. L.REV 513 (1974).
80
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More recently, legal historians have questioned the idea that all late
nineteenth century private law jurisprudence operated under a unified
Langdellian paradigm, pointing at the diversity that characterizes Classical
legal thought. “Anomalous” figures, such as Justice Stephen Field or James
Coolidge Carter, it has been argued, may be more exemplary of late nineteenth
century legal thinking than Landgell81. A theistically-oriented historical
jurisprudence that looked at morals and social customs coexisted with and
rivalled Landgellian formalist orthodoxy. Others seek to discard the formalistrealist antithesis. Throughout the formalist age, Brian Tamanaha contends,
prevailing understandings of law and of judicial decision-making were, in
essential respects, as realist as the accounts propounded by later Realists82.
Most legal professionals were well aware that law is indeterminate, that judges
make policy decisions and that personal predilections may influence judicial
outcomes.
The exam of abuse of rights cases may contribute to a further
“thickening of the revision”. While the political tilt of Classical Legal Thought
has been intensely debated, its style of legal reasoning may be more various
than assumed. In circumscribed, though critical, legal subfields, courts resorted
to rudimental forms of balancing and extra-juristic justificatory arguments
well before the echoes of Sociological Jurisprudence were heard. This technical
and stylistic variety may have conferred Classical Legal Thought an inner
resilience, contributing to its longevity.

See the Forum “Once More Unto the Breach: Late Nineteenth Century Jurisprudence Revisited” in 20 LAW & HIST. REV.
(2002); see in particular Stephen A. Siegel, supra note; Manuel Cachan, Justice Stephen Field and Free Soil, Free Labor
Constitutionalism at 541; Lewis A. Grossman, James Coolidge Carter and Mugwump Jurisprudence at 577; Id., Extending the
Revisionist Project at 639.
82 Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Realism of the Formalist Age (on file with author, St John’s University School of Law);
Tamanaha challenges the view that depicts Holmes as a solitary “proto-Realist”. By contrast he argues that the
standard account of the “formalist” age is fundamentally wrong; prevailing understanding of law and of judicial
decision making throughout the formalist era period were, in essential respects, every bit as “realistic” as the
accounts propounded by the later Realists. (p.4) “Realist” notions and a “realist” vocabulary were used in a variety
of contexts: effectuating legal reform or legal change, doing justice in particular cases, expressing concern about
judicial elections, promoting codification, and criticizing courts for excessive judicial invalidation of legislation. In
Tamanaha’s account, the Realists are the latest episode in a long history of skepticism about the common law and
judging prompted by concerns about the disordered state of the law or by objections, often politically motivated,
to the actions of courts” (p. 66).“See also David Seipp, Formalism and Realism in Fifteenth Century English Courts (on
file with author, Boston University School of Law).
81
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C. A Drug With Very Disagreeable After-Effects or a Buttress for Economic Growth?
Despite the anxiety with which Professor Gutteridge was left after
conversing with civilian colleagues, in the United States, the “continental drug”
fell short of having “very disagreeable after-effects”. Malice rules and
reasonableness tests were deployed to achieve a wide variety of outcomes.
Occasionally, courts used them to redress distributional asymmetries. More
often, through reasonableness rules, judges sought to stir and govern economic
growth, creating the conditions for the “release of creative energy”. Rather than
directly responding to the entrepreneurial class’ particularized demands, the
functional equivalents of abuse of rights may have played a more general
facilitative role. While belief in the facilitative potential of reasonableness and
malice rules was only one of a larger set of beliefs driving judges, it is plausible
to claim that it was an important one. “Reasonableness” and “malice” were
among the legal tools affirmatively deployed to create a legal framework for
economic change. Easily manoeuvrable, they allowed courts to expand or
restrict at need the range of reasonable, and hence lawful, social and economic
“uses” or “activities”. The facilitative role played by these rules is not to obscure
their ideological function. As suggested earlier, emphasis on shared socioethical standards of “reasonableness” helped justify and naturalize changing
notions of “permitted” uses of property, “legal” organized labor activity and
“lawful” business competition, ultimately precluding alternative arrangements
and different distributive outcomes.
The relationship between doctrinal developments in water law, most
notably the shift from the “natural flow” rule to the “reasonable user” standard,
and economic growth has been discussed at length. Some have posited a direct
relation83. Reasonableness tests allowed courts to balance the relative
efficiency of conflicting uses of water, effectively promoting newer economically
valuable uses and sweeping away established and less remunerative uses.
Others have challenged the thesis of a direct influence, claiming that, for all
their talk of balancing, courts rarely denied relief to an established user whose
interests were interfered with by a newcomer. These critics foreground non-
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MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, supra note 16.
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utilitarian elements in riparian water law84. While the language of
reasonableness might be taken to suggest that courts tended to privilege more
valuable uses and hence divest the old, this was not the case. Only in cases of
flagrantly wasteful use, did courts wipe out an established use. Further, the
argument runs, especially in the Western regions of the country, courts bent
the reasonable user doctrine to achieve outcomes that did not necessarily
favour new economically profitable uses of water.
However, while actual divestment of established users might be less
frequent than broadly assumed, judicial opinions show that courts were well
aware of the potential of reasonableness rules for fostering economic growth
and were often keenly oriented towards such end. In a large number of cases
the conflicting rights of riparian owners were balanced with a bias towards
dynamic and productive property85. In Cary v. Daniels, Chief Justice Shaw of
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts neatly enunciated the productivity
rationale of the new rule:
“But one of the beneficial uses of a watercourse, and in this country one of the
most important, is its application to the working of mills and machinery; a use
profitable to the owner and beneficial to the public. It is therefore held, that each
proprietor is entitled to such use of the stream, so far as it is reasonable,
conformable to the usages and wants of the community and having regard to the
progress of improvement in hydraulic works and not inconsistent with a like
reasonable use by the other proprietors of land”.

Shaw’s words suggest that, at the time when, as his biographer notes, “out
of the older rural agrarian-merchant society was evolving a complex industrial
one”, the reasonable user rule appeared to him as an effective trigger for
economic development. Rhetorically, the allusion to the conditions and needs of
the country and to the interest of the community struck a critical chord in a
society where energy and dynamism, particularly in the realm of the economy,
were dominant values.
Stephen Williams, Transforming American Law: Doubtful Economics Makes Doubtful History, 25 UCLA L. REV 1187
(1977-1978).
85 MORTON HORWITZ supra note 16 at 31; JAMES WILLARD HURST, supra note 15 at 24 “dynamic property as an
institution of growth: when new forms of technology required an abridgement of older types of property the
older forms were forced to yield.
84
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Similar developmental concerns permeate the court’s reasoning in Wheatley
v. Baugh (1855). Chief Justice Lewis held the defendant, a mining company,
not liable for reducing the flow of the subterrenean spring which fed the
machines of the plaintiff, a neighbouring tannery86. The defendant, Lewis
suggested, was not animated by malice but by the reasonable purpose of
working his coal mine. Replete with references to continental theories of abuse
of rights, the opinion betrays Lewis’ favor for valuable economic activities such
as mining. An absolutistic notion of property rights of continental flavor is
marshalled in support of developmental considerations:
In conducting extensive mining operations, it is in general impossible to
preserve the flow of the subterranean waters through the interstices in which
they have usually passed, and many springs must be necessarily destroyed in
order that the proprietors of valuable minerals may enjoy their own. The public
interest is greatly promoted by protecting this right, and it is just that the
imperfect rights and lesser advantage should give place to that which is perfect,
and infinitely the most beneficial to individuals and to the community in
general.

On the other hand, critics rightly point at the ambiguous persistence of
non-utilitarian concerns in courts’ articulation of the new rule. While the
maximization of growth and productivity were critical concerns driving judges,
occasionally “reasonable user” rules were deployed to reach bold distributive
outcomes. In Western states, the “correlative rights” rule brought into sharp
focus the notion of general welfare at the expense of individual economic
dynamism and new valuable uses of water. Courts equated “reasonable use”
with use on riparian land, thereby severely limiting flexibility in water use87.
For instance, in Katz v. Walkinshaw, the critical potential of the
reasonable use doctrine was fully exploited and the notion of a social function
of property, although not explicitly articulated, was alluded to. The defendant,
who owned a lot of land in arid Southern California, drained from his land with
powerful pumps the underground water which would have otherwise
percolated to plaintiffs’ land feeding their artesian well. The defendant
Wheatley v. Baugh 25 Pa 528, (1855).
Williams, Samuel C. Wiel, Fifty Years of Water Law, 16 OREGON L. REV. 203 (1937); Id., Theories of Water Law 27
HARV. L. REV., 530 (1913-1914).
86
87

di Robilant

ABUSE OF RIGHTS

39 of 99

diverted the water in order to sell it to for the irrigation of distant lands. The
Supreme Court of California reversed the decision of the inferior which had
given judgement in favour of the defendant. Considerations of public policy
drove the court’s reasoning. Having profusely examined the impact of the
reasonable use rule in light of California’s peculiar climatic situation, the court
weighed the profit of the individual owner against the interest of the
community at large 88.
In short, the members of the community, in the case supposed, have a common
interest in the water, It is necessary for all, and it is an anomaly in the law if
one person can for his individual profit destroy the community and render the
neighbourhood uninhabitable.

A similar variety of results, and an analogous tension between the
promotion of productive and economically valuable uses of property and the
protection of static property, characterizes nuisance cases involving questions
of malice or reasonableness. In dealing with disputes among residential
neighbours, courts relied upon malice rules and reasonableness tests to weigh
neighbours’ respective right to a peaceful enjoyment of their property,
favouring quiet habitation, agriculture and other time-honoured uses of the
land.
In Christie v. Davey, a 1892 English case, the Chancery Division
carefully examined the reasonableness of the parties’ conduct, holding that
while the giving of musical lessons seventeen hours a week by a music teacher
did not constitute a nuisance, the annoying noises produced by the latter’s
neighbour as a malicious response did amount to a nuisance to be restrained89.
In a 1888 West Virginia case concerning the troublesome cohabitation of two
Katz v. Walkinshaw 64 L. R. A. 236 70 P. 663 (1902). “Such law as has been made upon the subject comes
from countries and climates where water is abundant and its conservation and economical use of little
consequence as compared with a climate like Southern California. The learned counsel for appellants state in their
brief that water at San Bernardino is worth $ 1,000 per inch of flow. Percolating water or water held in the earth is
the main source of supply for domestic uses and for irrigation without which most lands are unproductive.
[….]But the maxim cuius est solum, ejus est usque ad inferos furnishes a rule of easy application and saves world of
judicial worry in many cases. And perhaps in England and in our Eastern states a more thorough and minute
consideration of the equities of parties may not often be required. The case is very different, however, in an arid
country like Southern California where the relative importance of percolating water and water flowing in definite
courses is greatly changed.
89
Christie v. Davey, [1893]1 Ch. 316.
88
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litigious families, the court gauged against the yardstick of reasonableness the
defendant’s right “to enjoy the privileges of a home” and the plaintiff’s right “to
security in their home”, finding that the former had been exercised
unreasonably and maliciously90. Conversely, in a Michigan case, the intrinsic
usefulness of the purpose, excused the defendant’s conduct. A shed used for
coal and wood, although spitefully erected by the defendant so as to shut off
some of the neighbour’s light, was not considered a nuisance on account of it
serving a useful purpose91.
However, with the expansion of industry and the development of steampowered, coal-burning and synthetic alkali technology, the question of the
reasonable use of property assumed a new dimension. Effective in protecting
landowners’ quiet enjoyment of their “static” property in cases involving
disputes among residential neighbours, reasonableness tests soon became a
critical tool for protecting “dynamic” property in cases pitting against each
other residential landowners and industrial enterprises. As the century
progressed, conflicts between residential or agricultural and industrial uses of
land came to comprise a greater portion of courts’ dockets. “Reasonable user”
tests allowed courts to weigh exploitive and conservatory uses of land, often
favouring the former. For the most part, productive and manufacturing firms
were not found to abuse their rights over the land. In analysing the
“reasonableness” of the use, courts’ focused on the economic context and social
utility of industrial activity.
Legal historians and social historians have debated at length the
relationship between developments in the law of nuisance and the
advancement of the Industrial Revolution in England. Some have suggested
that courts consciously established a new balance between industrial uses and
other uses, effectively emasculating the law of nuisance as a useful curb on
industrial pollution and leaving little room for successful legal action by
Medford v. Levy, 2 L.R.A. 368 8 S.E. 302 (1888) The defendants’ habit to open the door leading from the
kitchen to the hall, thereby “filling the whole house with objectionable odors owing to the frequent cooking of
cabbage, onions, and other things the odor of which is particularly nauseating” was deemed unreasonable in light
of the plaintiff’s wife suffering from a form of neuralgia that made her “nervous and excitable” and hence
peculiarly affected by the incidents of domestic habits not conform to those of “a neat and tidy housewife”.
91
Kuzniak v. Kozminski 107 Mich. 444 65 N.W. 275 (1895).
90
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individuals and communities adversely affected by it92. Others have posited a
more loose relationship between courts’ articulation of nuisance and the needs
and demands of nascent big industry, pointing at a variety of institutional,
procedural and social factors complicating too easy a deterministic account93.
The cost of litigation, the difficulty of establishing cause and effect in the
absence of sophisticated scientific monitoring, the existence of private ordering
as a valid alternative to litigation, and, finally, the social exclusion of the prime
victims of industrialization, the urban working classes, to whom legal action
was largely unavailable, explain the weakness of the common law of nuisance
as a response to the adverse effects of industrialization. And, overall, these
observers note, “the body of nuisance law which developed during the
Industrial Revolution was anything but monolithic in quality and could well
have encouraged the victim of industrial pollution, as it may have done the
perpetrator”.
While the relation is a highly ambiguous and layered one, in a
significant number of cases, English courts relied on reasonableness tests to tilt
the balance between residential and industrial uses in favour of the latter. By
the mid nineteenth century, courts expanded the range of factors to be
considered in assessing the reasonableness of defendants’ use of the land,
increasingly often taking into account not only the modalities of use but also
the locality in which the contested use was carried out. In Hole v. Barlow
(1858), the Court of Common Pleas found the defendant not liable for erecting a
brick-kiln in front of the house of the defendant and burning a large quantity of
bricks thereby causing a noxious and unwholesome vapour which invaded the
plaintiff’s house and garden. The court ruled that no action lies for the
92

Joel F. Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 403 (1973). Brenner’s thesis is that
until the very end of the eighteen century courts strongly held the view that in nuisance cases, unless the
inconvenience caused by a defendant’s activity was trivial, liability would follow once the plaintiff had established
an interference with the use and enjoyment of her land. The predominant thought was that the plaintiff had a preeminent claim to protection; it was considered no defence the fact that the defendant had acted reasonably in the
circumstances or that her activity was of public utility. With the advent of industrialization, and the new relavence
and frequency of conflicts between ttime-honoured conservatory uses of land and new exploitive industrial uses,
courts’ view changed. After a period of vacillation, the House of Lords compromised with industrial interests,
emasculating the common law of nuisance as a curb on air, noise and water pollution.
93
John P. S. McLaren, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution. Some Lessons from Social History, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 155 (1983). See also, A. E. Dingle, “The Monster Nuisance of All”: Landowners, Alkali Manufacturers, and Air
Pollution, 1828-64, 35 THE ECONOMIC HISTORY REVIEW, 529 (1982).
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reasonable use of a lawful trade in a convenient and proper place, even though
some one may suffer inconvenience. The court reported and approved the trial
judge’s finding that:
It is not every body whose enjoyment of life and property is rendered
uncomfortable by the carrying on of an offensive or noxious trade in the
neighborhood, that can bring an action. If that were so, -as has already been
observed by the learned counsel for the defendant,- the neighbourhood of
Birmingham and Wolverhampton and the other great manufacturing towns of
England would be full of person bringing actions for nuisances arising from the
carrying on of noxious and offensive trades in their vicinity to the great interests
of the manufacturing and social interests of the community”. I apprehend the
law to be this that no action lies for the use, the reasonable use, of a lawful place
in a convenient and proper place, even though some one may suffer annoyance
for its being so carried on.94

Judge Willes of the Court of Common Pleas neatly spelled out the link between
public interest and the needs of productivity:
The common law right which every proprietor of a dwelling house has to have
the air uncontaminated and unpolluted, is subject to this qualification, that
necessities may arise for an interference with that right pro-bono publico, to this
extent that such interference be in respect of a matter essential to the business
life, and be conducted in a reasonable and proper manner, and in a reasonable
and proper place.

A few years later, the House of Lords’ decision in the St. Helen case95,
arguably the most important case of industrial pollution of the era96, made
residential owners’ “actions in respect of discomfort virtually impossible in the
industrial Midlands and in regions such as Swansea and Cardiff.”97. The
activity of the St. Helen Copper Smelting Company caused large quantities of
“noxious gases, vapours and other noxious matters” which diffused over the
land of the plaintiff, damaging the vegetation and injuring the cattle. The
House of Lords upheld the Exchequer Chamber’s decision that the company
94

Hole v. Barlow [1858] 4 C. B. (N.S.) 334.
St. Helen Smetling Co. v. Tipping supra note 44.
96
See Joel F. Brenner, supra note 50 at 413.
97
Id., at 413-414.
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was liable for any physical damage but not for the deterioration of the
plaintiff’s comfort. When the cause was tried before Mr Justice Mellor at
Liverpool in 1863, the defendant’s counsel submitted that the three questions
which ought to be left to the jury were “whether [the copper smelting activity]
was a necessary trade, whether the place was a suitable place for such trade
and whether it was carried on a in a reasonable manner”. The opinion of the
House of Lords focused on the reasonableness of the locality. In Lord
Cranworth’s words:
You must look at it not with a view to the question whether, abstractedly, that
quantity of smoke was a nuisance, but whether it was a nuisance to a person
living in the town of Shields.

A few paragraph later, Lord Wesleydale neatly spelled out the court’s concerns:
a more stringent articulation of the reasonableness test would impact
adversely national economic development:
The defendants say: “If you do not mind you will stop the progress of works of
this description” I agree that it is so, because no doubt, in the county of
Lancaster above all other counties, where great works have been created and
carried on, and are the means of developing the national wealth, you must not
stand on extreme rights and allow a person to say “I will bring an action against
you for this and that and so on”.

Similarly, in the United States, in pollution cases, courts deployed
reasonableness tests with an eye at economic growth, largely disregarding the
costs imposed on the victims of development, i.e. workers and residential
owners. The impact of nineteenth century tort doctrine on the economy has
been the object of a well-known debate. A substantial body of scholarship has
agreed, although with different methodological and political nuances, on the
view that courts deliberately structured tort law to promote industrial
expansion and powerful economic interests, by exempting corporate enterprises
from liability for the harm caused by their activity98. In its most controversial
This view has been variously articulated, reflecting different methodological approaches and political positions.
JAMES WILLARD HURST, supra note 15 argued that the development of 19th century American private law
promoted economic growth in that it was shaped by a variety of economic, social, geographical and technological
needs. More specifically, it reflected the needs of the emerging industry and a broad societal consensus, among
the various social groups, on a set of shared societal values, above all, “the release of individual creative energy”.
98
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formulation, this thesis claims the doctrinal development of tort law translated
into a “subsidy” to the rising entrepreneurial class; this “subsidy” was coerced
from the very victims of economic growth and ultimately increased the
inequalities of wealth and power in nineteenth century America. Others have
objected that, depending on the industrial sector, the latter thesis is either
irrelevant or false.99 Generally speaking, these critics note, evidence of
utilitarian or growth-driven judicial reasoning is scant100. Further, records
show that the negligence system was applied with impressive sternness to
major industries and that courts exhibited a keen concern for victim’s welfare.
While a critical appraisal of the debate is largely beyond the scope of this
article, a glance at air and water pollution cases seems to add evidence in
support of the “maximization of economic growth” thesis.
More specifically, studies of pollution nuisance cases in states which
were early bloomers in nineteenth century American industrialization, such as
Pennsylvania, New York and New Jersey, have shown that, by and large,
courts deployed balancing tests to deny plaintiffs injunctive relief or
damages 101. In weighing the right of defendant industries against that of
pollution victims, courts were inclined to emphasize the reasonableness of the
former’s use and to overstate the ruinous impact a judgement in favour of the
These economic and social factors shaped private law, and tort law in particular, in the sense that they exerted
“pressure” on law; Hurst assumes a complex notion of historical causation and distinguishes between three types
of such “pressure”: focused pressure, functional pressure and inertia. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW (1973) provides a more deterministic and materialist account of the development of nineteenth
century tort law. The contours of American nineteenth century tort law, Friedman argues, are molded by
economy and society, by the interplay of plural pressure groups motivated primarily by economic interests, an
interplay where the group that wins is that of the capitalist-entrepreneurs. However, the most well known and
controversial formulation of the thesis is due to MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1780-1860 supra note 16; Horwitz argued that in the nineteenth century courts, working in concert with big
economic interests, effected a revolution in tort law, that from strict liability to negligence, which promoted
industrialization by exempting corporate enterprises from liability for the harm caused by their activity. This
doctrinal shift translated into a subsidy to the entrepreneurial class, a subsidy coerced from the very victims of
industrialization.
99 Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L. J. 1717
(1980-1981).
100 Other s have placed emphasis on other factors, such as the litigation costs, that, along with or more than the
judiciary’s ideology and its conscious objectives in shaping tort doctrine, explain tort law’s weak response to
industrial pollution at the moment of industrialization. See John P. S. McLaren, supra note 92 and, more generally,
Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Costs and the Economic Theory of Tort Law, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 111 (1991-1992).
101
Christine Rosen, Differing Perceptions of the Value of Pollution Abatement Across Time and Place: Balancing Doctrine in
Pollution Nuisance Law, 1840-1906, 11 LAW AND HISTORY REV., 303 (1993).
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plaintiff would exert on economic life. Courts’ judgements of reasonableness
betray a constant preoccupation with economic growth and a tendency to
“domino-effect” thinking. Typically, a judgement granting injunctive or damage
relief was seen as originating a parade of horrific effects: from the termination
of all coke manufacturing in Pennsylvania, to the automatic stifling of all
industrial development in the state, to decline of industrial cities and people’s
deprivation of all the benefits of urban life102.
The Sanderson case (1886), the last episode of a protracted dispute
among residential owners and a coal mining company, may be exemplary of
courts’ attitude103. The defendant, the Pennsylvania Coal Company discharged
large volumes of mine water into the stream flowing through the Sandersons’
land thereby corrupting the water to such an extent as to render it totally unfit
for domestic and agricultural purposes. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
did not found the defendant to have abused their property rights, declining to
award damages to the Sandersons. In the court’s analysis, “reasonable use”
was equated with “ordinary and natural use” The defendants, the court argued,
being the owners of a lot of coal land, had the right to the “natural use and
enjoyment” of their property. Since coal mining in the ordinary and usual form
is the “natural use” of coal land, the court concluded, any damage resulting
from such natural use is, in the absence of negligence or malice, damnum
absque injuria. Developmental concerns were key to the court’s notion of
“reasonableness”. Justice Clark profusely examined the dimensions and the
social utility of coal mining in Pennsylvania’s economy:
It has been stated that 30.000.000 of tons of anthracite and 70.000.000 of
bituminous coal are annually produced in Pennsylvania. It is therefore a
question of vast importance, and cannot, on that account, be too carefully
considered. […] Indeed if the right to damages in such cases is admitted, equity
may, and under the decisions of this court undoubtedly would, at the suit of any
riparian owner, take jurisdiction, and, upon the ground of a continuous and
irreparable injury, enjoin the operation of the mine altogether104.
Christine Rosen, supra at 319
Coal Co. v. Sanderson 113 Pa 126 (1886). For an extensive discussion of the Sanderson case, see
Robert Bone supra note 35.
104 Similarly, in the Huckenstine case (Huckenstine Appeal 10 Penn St. 102 Am Rep 669 (1872), the court
reversed the decision of the lower court which had issued an injunction preventing the defendant from burning
102

103Pennsylvania
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A few years later the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania embarked in a
bolder argumentation105. The plaintiff brought an action against a coal
company to recover damages for injury to his farm caused by the smoke and
gas from the coke-ovens erected on the adjoining land. The defendants relied on
Sanderson to claim that the alleged injuries did not entitle the plaintiff to
recover, since they were the natural and necessary consequence of a reasonable
use of their property. The court distinguished the case from Sanderson. Since
the land in question is not coal land, the court reasoned, the injury results from
the defendant’s decision to devote their land to the burning of coal mined
elsewhere, rather than from the natural use of their land. However, Justice
Williams found the selection of the location reasonable and proper. The court’s
discussion of the measure of the damages betrays its developmental concerns:
The plaintiff’s farm is a in a region in which bituminous coal is obtained in large
quantities. He himself mines coal upon his own land for sale. The conversion of
coal into coke to supply fuel for the great iron and steel mills of Western
Pennsylvania is one of the great industries of the region. Many millions of
money are invested in, an many thousands of men are employed about, its
production. It has been largely instrumental in the development, growth, and
general prosperity of the region. The plaintiff shares the general benefits […]
these considerations should be borne in mind in adjusting the damages if any
have been sustained

Economic preoccupations also pervade opinions dealing with instances of
malicious interference with contractual relations. Loaded with distributive
implications, this relatively new tort raised critical questions as to the role and
bricks, thereby causing injury and annoyance to the plaintiff. The defendant’s use of his land, the court argued,
was a reasonable one, the land having upon it a deposit of fine brick clay which could be made into bricks with
profit if this was done near the pit form which the clay was taken. See also Doellner v. Tynan 38 How. Pr 176,
NY Super (1869): the court found that the defendant exercised his business of blacksmithing reasonably and
refused to grant an injunction; Quoting an earlier English case the court noted: an action does not lie for a
reasonable use of my right, though it be of annoyance of another. The court dismissed the plaintiffs injury as
mere annoyances and remarked the usefulness of the blacksmith trade in urban life. See also, Rhodes v. Dunbar
16 Am. Law Rec. W.L. 7175 (1868): the defendants owned a planning mill that produced shavings, chips and saw
dust; further the material used in it was highly inflammable, rendering it dangerous to buildings in the vicinity. In
May 1866 the mill burned, injuring many houses in the neighborhood. The plaintiffs sought to prevent the
defendants form re-building the mill. Chief Justice Thompson conceded that the species of property in question is
extra-hazardous ( but this is a question of policy to be decided by the legislator, we only decide about legal rights)
but claimed that if carried on reasonably, the business cannot be a nuisance. Justice Thompson discussed at length
the benefits and the problems of modern urban life.
105 Robb v. Carnegie Bros & Co. 145 PA 324, 22 A. 649.

di Robilant

ABUSE OF RIGHTS

47 of 99

scope of market competition. Most instances of interference involved
employment contracts or sale contracts, thereby calling courts to define the
proper and reasonable limits of “the right to compete in business life or in the
labor market”. As Prosser’s treatise on the law of torts notes, “in this field,
perhaps more obviously than any other, the problem has continuously been one
of adjustment of the conflicting claims of different enterprises, industries,
classes and groups where interests are nicely balanced and decisions on the
basis of social policy is not an easy matter”106.
In cases involving business competition, reasonableness tests and malice
rules proved useful tools for governing and stirring economic life by delimiting
the sphere of fair and permissible market competition. In Dunshee v. Standard
Oil and Co. (1911) the Supreme Court of Iowa struggled with the perplexities
arising “in the effort to sustain, on the one hand, the widest practicable liberty
of men to engage in any and every line of business, and, on the other, to protect
the business of each from wrongful encroachment or interference by others”107.
The plaintiff, who retailed oil from tank wagons driven about the streets, used
to leave green cards with customers to display in their windows when in need
of oil. The defendant, a former wholesale supplier of the plaintiff seeking
revenge upon the latter, entered the retail business trying to sell his oil
wherever the plaintiff’s green cards were exposed. The court found that the
defendant had transgressed the bounds of legitimate competition. While the
defendant, the court conceded, has the right to establish a retail oil business
and to send their agents over the same routs covered by the plaintiff, he ought
to exercise such right reasonably and without malice. The court expressed its
view as to the perversions of unbound competition. The laws of competition in
business are harsh enough; the rule that motive is irrelevant would lead to
pernicious consequences, justifying the worst wrongs upon the theory that “it is
business”. Fortunately, Justice Weaver added:
There has for many years been a distinct tendency of the courts to look beneath
the letter of the law and give some effect to Its beneficent spirit, thereby
preventing the perversion of the rules intended for the protection of human
rights into engines of oppression and wrong.
106
107

WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, (4TH ED. 1971) at 927.
Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co. 152 Iowa 618, 132 N. W. 371
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Justice Waeaver’s bold social language should not deceive.
The
functional equivalents of abuse of rights left largely untouched and, ultimately
strengthened, the pervasive individualistic vocabulary of “rights” and
“property”. In justifying the protection granted to the victims of the
interference, courts resorted to the theory of “contractual property”. Contracts
were conceptualized as a form of intangible property to be protected. In Jones
v. Leslie, the Supreme Court of Washington deployed a subjective notion of
malice as wanton malevolence to protect the weaker contractual party.
Significantly, however, the court’s effort to “correct” the balance of power
between the stronger actor, the former employer, and the weaker party, the
employee seeking a better job, was not paralleled by a “correction” of the
individualistic notion of “contractual property”. Rather, the court profusely
articulated the property rationale underlying the protection of employment
relations from malicious interference:
It would be well to remember in the beginning that a man has a right to be
protected in his property. This was the doctrine of the common law, is, and
always has been, the law in every civilized nation. It is of necessity one of the
fundamental principles of government, the protection of property being largely
one of the objects of government. […] Is, then, the right of employment in a
laboring man property? That it is we think cannot be questioned. The property
of the capitalist is his gold and silver, his bonds, credit etc., for in these he
deals and makes his living. For the same reason, the property of the merchant
is his goods. And every man’s trade or profession is his property because it is
his means of livelihood, because through its agency, he maintains himself and
family and he is enabled to add his share towards the expenses of maintaining
the government. […] To destroy this property, or to prevent one from
contracting it or exchanging it for the necessities of life is not only an invasion
of a private right but it is an injury to the public, for it tends to produce
pauperism and crime.

Not dissimilarly, in Huskie v. Griffin (1909)108, the court’s decision to
afford protection to the weaker party was couched in the language of ample and
equal individual freedom rather than in that of solidarity and social duties. The
issue presented by the case at hand, the court noted, is “that of the existence
and extent of what has come to be known as the right to an open market”, a
108

Huskie v. Griffin 75 NH 74 A 595, (1909).
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right “inherent in the idea of Anglo-Saxon liberty”. Far from being an absolute
right, the right to an open market is to be exercised with respect of the equal
right of others. How far one may lawfully interfere to prevent the making of
contracts between third parties depends upon a reasonableness test that takes
into account the motive of the defendant as well as the circumstances109.
With the intensification of labor upheaval in the latter part of the
nineteenth century, the tort of interference with contractual relations became
critical to the struggle between labor unions and capitalist employers. As in
cases of business competition, courts relied on standards of “reasonableness” or
“malice” to define the compass of legitimate labor competition. However, when
dealing with episodes of unions’ interference with employment relations,
courts’ commitment to ensuring fairness and to protecting weaker contractual
parties often translated into an effort at stifling union’s energetic activism.
A prolific literature has shed light on the powerful attack mounted
against organized labor by courts alarmed by the economic power acquired by
nationally organized trade unions and state federations110. The burgeoning of
new types of collective action such as secondary boycotts, sympathy strikes,
recognition strikes, called for a prompt legal response111. The doctrine of
“malice” was part of such response. A study of the re-orientation of labor law
between 1886 and 1895, has shown that the concept of “malice” proved critical
for containing labor’s ability to use concerted action112. The interloper union
was often found to have acted maliciously rather than in the pursuit of free
competition. In a similar vein, an analysis of late nineteenth century labor
decisions in Massachusetts and Illinois has described how courts consistently
One may not interfere with his neighbour’s open market or “reasonable expectancies” solely for the purpose
of doing harm. It has been said, however, in several cases that a wrongful motive cannot convert a legal act into
an illegal one, and many judges have thought this was the end of the law upon the question. They seem to
proceed upon a theory of absolute right in the defendant […] [the right] is a qualified one and rightfulness of its
exercise depends upon all those elements which go to make up a cause for human action. The reasonableness of
the act cannot be satisfactorily determined until something is known of the state of the actor’s mind. The
justification may be found sometimes in the circumstances under which it is done, irrespective of motive,
sometimes in the motive alone, and sometimes in the circumstances and motive combined.
110 WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991); DANIEL R.
ERNST LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR. FROM INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO CORPORATE LIBERALISM (1995).
111 WILLIAM E. FORBATH supra.
112 Haggai Hurvitz, supra note 57.
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relied on a circular, and apparently neutral, notion of “malice” to assert unions’
rights in abstract while negating them in practice. Judges “referred to the
actions of unions as malicious as if that was a finding of fact, in order to
support a legal conclusion that the union actions were not legally justified”113.
A widely known case of obstruction and interference with employment
relations, Walker v. Cronin (1871) well exemplifies the use of “malice” to curb
labor’s action114. The defendant, the agent of a union, in order to compel a shoe
manufacturer to agree on higher wages, had persuaded a large number of the
latter’s actual and prospective employees to abandon their job. The employer,
who as a consequence of the union’s action had difficulties recruiting other
skilled workmen and had to pay higher wages, brought an action for damages.
The question around which the case revolved was whether the defendant union
had exercised maliciously its right to freely compete for better conditions. The
court refused to see the controversy as an instance of competition between
labor and capital and fit the case into the template of subjective “malice”. The
defendants’ efforts to induce the shoemakers to abandon their jobs were seen as
driven by the arbitrary and malicious purpose of causing disturbance and
economic loss rather than as instrumental to broader labor objectives. As the
court concluded:
Everyone has the rights to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own
enterprise, industry, skill and credit. He has no right to be protected against
competition; but he has a right to be free from malicious and wanton
interference, disturbance or annoyance. If disturbance or loss come as a result
of competition or the exercise of like rights by others it is damnum absque
injuria, unless some superior right by contract or otherwise is interfered with.
But if come from the merely wanton or malicious acts of others, without the
justification of competition or the service of any interest or lawful purpose, it
then stands upon a different footing and falls within the principle of the
authorities first referred to [the suggestion in Greenleaf v. Francis that
malicious acts without the justification of any right, that is, acts of a stranger,
resulting in like loss or damage, might be actionable]

Ellen M. Kelman, American Labor Law and Legal Formalism. How Legal Logic Shaped and Vitiated the Rights of
American Workers 58 ST. JOHN’S L. REV 1 (1983-1984).
114 Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass 555 (1871).
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In Vegelahn v. Guntner (1896), the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
examined the reasonableness of the means employed by the defendants the
defendants’ and found them to fall outside the compass of permissible
competition, amounting to an unlawful combination to injure the employer 115.
The case involved episodes of picketing, obstruction and intimidation in front of
the employer’s factory on the part of workers seeking to obtain higher wages
and shorter time schedules. The employer filed a bill for an injunction
restraining the workers from picketing and obstructing. Again, the critical
question was whether the defendants had exercised maliciously their right to
freely communicate in a public space, the sidewalk in front of the employer’s
premises, to improve their labor conditions116. Justice Allen examined the
reasonableness of the defendants’ purpose and activity and granted an
injunction:
The defendants contend that these acts were justifiable because they were only
seeking to secure better wages for themselves by compelling the plaintiff to
accept their schedule of wages. This motive or purpose does not justify
maintaining a patrol in front of plaintiff’s premises as a means of carrying out
their conspiracy. A combination among persons merely to regulate their own
conduct is within allowable competition and is lawful although others may be
indirectly afflicted thereby. But a combination to do injurious acts expressly
directed to another by way of intimidation or constraint either of himself or of
persons employed or seeking to be employed by him is outside of allowable
competition and is unlawful.

In his widely quoted dissent, Justice Holmes investigated the possible
malicious nature of the means employed by the defendants, i.e. a combination,
to reach the opposite conclusion. While an individual has an undeniable right
to freely communicate in order to better her position, a collective exercise of
such right, entailing a higher degree of pressure and disruption, might be
deemed an unreasonable, malicious and unjustified exercise of the right.
However, Holmes noted, “free competition means combination and the
organization of the world now going on so fast, means an ever increasing might
Vegelahn v. Guntner 35 L. R. A. 722 44 N.E. 1077 (1896). By interfering with “his right to engage all persons
who are willing to work for him at such prices as may be mutually agreed upon” and with the other actual or
prospective employees’ right “to enter into or remain in the employment of any person or corporation willing to
employ them”.
116
Later free speech see Thornhill v. Alabama 310 US 88 (1940)
115
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and scope of combination”.
When the notion of subjective malice or the inquiry into the reasonableness
of the means did not help, courts resorted to rigid and pre-fixed notions of
“reasonable and legitimate purpose” as a restrictive, and apparently neutral,
yardstick for assessing the objectives sought by unions. As discussed earlier, in
Moores v. Bricklayers, the court analyzed the immediate motive driving the
defendant union and found it to be that of “showing to the building world what
punishment and disaster necessarily followed a defiance of their demands”.
Such purpose, Justice Taft concluded, if assessed in light of the “normal
operation of the right to labor”, defined as the securing of workers’ wages and
terms of employment, appears malicious. Justice Taft’s opinion is ridden with
anxiety. A new and effective form of organized action, boycotts spurred alarm
among judges and lawyers. Labor historians have investigated the different
modalities of capital’s response. Some have told the story of the American AntiBoycott Association, examining the efforts of proprietary capitalists to organize
and lobby against labor117. Others have analysed the imaginative metaphorical
language developed by judges to deal with boycott cases 118. Abuse, malice and
unreasonableness were central to this vocabulary, emphasizing labor’s
irresponsible and tyrannical exercise of its rights. As Justice Carpenter noted
in State v. Glidden (1887):
If a large body of irresponsible men demand and receive power outside of law, over
and above the law, it is not to be expected that they will be satisfied with a moderate
and reasonable use of it. All history proves that abuses and excesses are inevitable.
The exercise of irresponsible power by men, like the taste of human blood by tigers,
creates an unappeasable appetite for more.

Although less inventive than Carpenter, Justice Taft must have shared these
fears and, towards the end of his opinion, quoting an earlier case, described
boycotts as “oppressive to the individual, injurious to the prosperity of the
community and subversive of the peace and good order of society”.
Did the equivalents of abuse of rights operate as dangerous “social
117
118

Daniel R. Ernst, supra note 107.
GARY MINDA, BOYCOTT IN AMERICA. HOW IMAGINATION AND IDEOLOGY SHAPE THE LEGAL MIND (1999)
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drugs” exerting potent after-effects? The cases discussed above indicate that
malice rules and reasonableness tests were thought to perform a powerful role
in facilitating and governing economic growth. Rather than being consistently
deployed to redress distributive asymmetries, as the rhetoric surrounding
abuse of rights suggests, they were used to allocate and to shift roles and costs
between the various actors of nineteenth century blooming economic
development: developers of land and large “static” landowners, industrial
enterprisers and smaller residential owners, capitalist employers and
organized labor. While not necessarily single-mindedly and systematically used
to subsidize the “interests” at the expense of the weaker social strata,
standards of “malice” and “reasonableness” were largely deployed to facilitate
the needs of the more dynamic and economic actors. Of course, as observers
have noted, concern for economic development was only one element of a larger
set of beliefs that determined judges’ reliance on “malice” and “reasonableness”,
beliefs about the principles of legal reasoning, about the nature of rights and
the value of property119.

II. COMMON LAWYERS DEBATING MALICE AND THE THEORY OF INTENTIONAL TORT
The frequent deployment by English and American courts of functional
equivalents of “abuse of rights” raises the question of the place of the latter in
the scholarly debate. The absence of a unitary concept of “abuse of rights” in
the common law may be taken to suggest that, while on the continent a heated
controversy pitted against each other proponents and critics of the doctrine,
Anglo-American legal scholarship showed tepid interest for the continental
querelle. However, this does not seem to be the case.
Continental theories of “abuse of rights” were well-known and profusely
reviewed. In his 1905 disquisition on the relevance of wrongful motive in tort
liability, James Barr Ames corroborated his analysis with Continental
examples, examining French and Belgian decisions along with American and
English cases120. Similarly, in the 1910 issue of the Harvard Law Review, F. P.
See Robert Bone, supra note 14.
James Barr Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of the Actor, 18 HARV. L. REV. 411
(1904-1905).
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Walton of McGill University accurately laid out the main positions in the
French debate, contrasting the different articulations of the doctrine by
Josserand, Saleilles, Charmont, and Esmein121.
Further, “malice” was at the centre of a vibrant transatlantic
conversation. For a twenty-year period spanning the turn of the twentieth
century, Michael Taggart suggests in his study of Bradford v. Pickles, the place
of “malice” in the law of torts was “a fashionable topic of conversation on both
sides of the Atlantic, at a time when British and American lawyers spoke much
the same language and listened to one another”.122 The conversation took place
in the pages of the Harvard Law Review, the American Law Register and the
Law Quarterly Review between the 1880s and the 1920s. Henry Terry,
Frederick Pollock, Oliver Wendell Holmes, William Draper Lewis, James Barr
Ames, Bruce Wyman and Ernst Huffcut were the participants. The
conversation developed along lines similar to those of the continental debate on
abuse of rights. Similar methodological and political questions were raised. At
stake were the organization of the conceptually haphazard law of torts, the
development of a new mode of legal thought, alternative to Classical Legal
Thought, and, ultimately, the choice between competing models of socioeconomic governance.
The question of malice, was, in the first place, a matter of clear
analytical reasoning. The actual significance of the question of “malice” could
only be elucidated through a re-organization of the conceptual structure of the
law of torts. The abolition of the modern common law forms of action in the mid
nineteenth century confronted American jurists with the problem of organizing
the various forms of civil liability in a unitary conceptual scheme. Henry Terry,
Frederick Pollock and Oliver Wendell Holmes struggled to draw an analytically
clear map of the law of torts that would dispel the fog of empty abstractions
that had long obfuscated the problem of malice, bringing to light its real
F. P. Walton, Motive as an Element of Torts in the Civil Law and in the Common Law, 22 HARV. L. REV. 501 (19081909).
122 MICHAEL TAGGART, supra note 20 at 167. See Cosgrove Our Lady The Common Law, the formation of a
community dedicated to the celebration of the common law for its unifying force dated from about 1870, reached
a zenith of influence in the years before WWI and then declined until about 1930, when it ceased to attract
loyalty on either side of the Atlantic. See FREDERICK POLLOCK THE LAW OF TORTS (1887 1st edition), p. V.
121
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nature. The maps they sketched contributed to the refutation of one of the
central tenets of classical legal science, i.e. the proposition that individuals
exercise their rights, absolute within their spheres, so as not to injure the equal
rights of others. Rather, there are instances in which individuals are permitted
to exercise their rights maliciously or unreasonably to the injure of others. The
question of “malice” is the question of defining these instances and is,
ultimately, a question of policy.
In an article on malicious torts published in 1884, Henry Terry
integrated malice in a conceptual scheme that reflected the most sophisticated
analytical tradition123. Terry’s scheme aimed at showing that there is a general
duty not to act maliciously which is subject to exceptions motivated by reasons
of policy and justice. Rather than questions about the nature of malice,
malicious torts raise crucial questions regarding the possibility of admitting
exceptions to the general duty to refrain from malicious acts. These questions
are not to be decided by deduction from an abstract notion of malice,
depending, instead, on broad considerations of justice and policy.
The widespread misapprehension of the problem of malice, Terry noted,
arises from a lack of clear views about certain elementary legal ideas and their
relation to each other. By tracing a clear analytical scheme of legal ideas, Terry
sought to disentangle the different kinds of questions posed by malicious torts,
clarifying the actual role played by malice. Terry drew a threefold classification
of legal duties: peremptory duties, duties of reasonableness and duties of
intention. The latter include both duties not to act with a mere intention to
produce a certain result, which may be broken without malice, and duties not
to act maliciously, in the breach of which malice is essential. Malice means an
intention to cause harm or damage to another, the harm or damage as such
being the very thing desired.
Further, Terry distinguished between two types of rights. Permissive
rights are liberties to do or refrain from an act uncorroborated by a duty on
others not to interfere. Protected rights, on the other hand, describe the legal
condition of a person for whom the law protects a condition of fact by imposing
123

Henry Terry, Malicious Torts, 20 L. Q. REV. 10 (1904).
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duties on others. The protected condition of fact is the content of the right, any
impairment of such condition amounting to a violation of the right. Terry
delineated several classes of protected rights, i.e. rights of personal security,
rights in the persons of others, normal property rights, abnormal property
rights and rights of pecuniary condition, each displaying different features and
corresponding to different duties. In rights of pecuniary condition the protected
condition of fact is the holding of value or purchasing power in some form.
Having laid out this table of elementary legal ideas, Terry confined the
relevance of malice to a specific hypothesis. An actual question of malice, he
noted, arises in case of breach of a duty not to act maliciously followed, as its
proximate consequence, by the violation of a corresponding right of pecuniary
condition.
When it appears that there has been a violation of the right of pecuniary
condition and of no other right and the case is not one of fraud, then the duty
which must be proved to have been broken will usually be a duty not to act
maliciously, malice will be an essential question on case of action and the
question will arise, what is malice? And what is the legal duty as to malicious
conduct?

However, even in this hypothesis, Terry added, malice might be irrelevant, the
question being whether there is any exception to that duty. There may be good
reasons why a particular class of cases should be excepted out of the general
rule; the opportunity of these exceptions “is to be decided upon grounds of
justice or policy special to each class of cases”.
To sum up: when malice is alleged the questions maybe be any of the
following…..If there has been a malicious act and thus prima facie a breach of the
last named duty, whether there is any exception to that duty that covers the case.
Thus depends not on any theory of malice, but on considerations of justice and
policy.

A decade later, the appearance of Holmes’ article “Privilege, Malice and
Intent” marked a shift in the conceptualization of malice124. Holmes’
conceptualization of malice further developed Terry’s idea that, in certain
124
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cases, policy reasons suggest that malicious acts may be done, without the
actor being liable. However, Holmes took Terry’s scheme one step further,
developing a general theory of intentional tort in which malice was purged of
any moral connotation and equated with “the absence of just cause or excuse”.
Holmes’ scheme proved extremely influential, setting the terms of a
transatlantic conversation between Frederick Pollock and the Americans.
“Privilege, Malice and Intent” represents the final stage in the shaping of
a new conceptual structure of tort law; Holmes altered and refined his earlier
conceptual scheme of tort law according malice a central role. Holmes’ earlier
efforts were directed at anchoring liability to an external objective standard,
ultimately dependent on policy considerations, rather than to an internal
subjective standard based on fault125. The general purpose of the law of torts,
Holmes argued, is to secure a man indemnity against certain forms of harm,
not because they are wrong but because they are harms. The preoccupation
with articulating an objective, policy-based theory of liability, induced Holmes
to arrange different types of torts in a “philosophically continuous series”,
running from intentional torts to negligent torts to strict liability. The
continuum was organized according to the degree of foreseebility of the harm,
rather than on any subjective notion of fault. For this scheme to hold, the role
of malice was to be eclipsed. Malice was deemed to be a comparatively
insignificant form of liability, circumscribed to isolated instances, and
malicious torts were disguised into the broader category of intentional torts.
Holmes noted that there certain harmful acts which may done even with
malevolent intent.
[A man] may establish himself in business where he foresees that the effect of his
competition will be to diminish the custom of another shopkeeper, perhaps to ruin
him. He may erect a building which cuts another off from a beautiful prospect, or
he may drain subterranean waters and thereby drain another’s well; and many
other case may be put.

Privileged malicious acts and strict liability functioned as the two extremes
proving the irrelevance of any subjective moral standard of liability.
125

Id., The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652 (1872-1873); see also lectures III and IV in ID., THE COMMON
LAW (1881).
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As the law on the one hand allows certain harms to be inflicted irrespective of the
moral condition of him who inflicts them, so at the other extreme it may on
grounds of policy throw the absolute risk of certain transactions on the person
engaging in them irrespective of blameworthiness in any sense.

The echo of Holmes’ scheme was heard on the other side of the Atlantic.
In 1887, setting out to show that “there is really a Law of Torts, not merely a
number of rules about various kinds of torts”, Frederick Pollock acknowledged
his debt with Holmes, warning him that “you will recognize in my armoury
some weapons of your own forging”. Pollock’ distinction between causes of
action based on intentional conduct, negligent conduct and strict liability
mirrored Holmes’ continuum. Further, similar to Terry and Holmes he
emphasized the range of situations in which injury is legally permitted without
compensation. Pollock pointed to trade competition and the interception of
water as instances in which “the exercise of ordinary rights for a lawful
purpose and in a lawful manner is no wrong even though it causes damages”.
As to the role of malice, Pollock noted that, while in Roman law the exercise of
a right accompanied by a malicious intent is ground for an action, there is no
positive English authority on the matter.
By the 1890s, Holmes had revised his conceptual structure of tort law,
hinging it on intentional torts and according malice central relevance by
linking it to the question of justification. The new arrangement was neatly
spelled out in “Privilege, Malice and Intent”126. Acknowledging that the
objective test of the degree of manifest danger does not exhaust the theory of
torts, Holmes shifted the focus from the external objective standard of liability
to the assessment of the subjective state of mind. Malice gained new centrality.
In some cases, Holmes noted, the actor is not liable for a very manifest danger
unless he actually intends to do the harm; in other cases actual malice may
render the actor liable, when, in the absence of it, she would have not incurred
in liability; still in other cases, the actor may even intend to do the harm and
yet not have to answer for it. The intentional infliction of temporal damage, or
the doing of an act manifestly likely to inflict such damage and inflicting it, is
actionable if done without just cause. When acting with just cause, the actor is
privileged to inflict the damage. Motive affects claims of privilege. Actual
126
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malice or improper motive is a crucial factor in weighing the defendant’s
justification. While a good motive justifies the intentional infliction of harm, a
bad motive may render the actor liable. The question of justification, Holmes
warned, ultimately rests on delicate considerations of policy, rather than on
empty logical deductions. Two years later in his famous dissent in the
Vegelhan case127, Holmes restated the gist of the problem of malice. In
numberless instances, Holmes noted, the law warrants the intentional
infliction of temporal damages because it regards it justified. The true ground
of justification, he continued, are considerations of policy and of social
advantage which are rarely unanimously accepted.
While at the conceptual level, the debate on malicious torts translated in
an ambitious effort of analytical clarification, at the level of legal reasoning, it
was the laboratory where a new mode of policy analysis, anticipating the
relativist and pragmatic approach of Legal Realism, was developed. The
conceptual clarification of the problem of malice confronted American jurists
with the task of modifying and attuning their reasoning techniques128. If, as
Terry and Holmes suggested, the question of malice was, essentially, the
question of admitting exceptions to the general duty to refrain from
intentionally inflicting damage, and, if such question was ultimately decided on
the basis of considerations of policy, a new and more sophisticated mode of
policy analysis was to be developed. The tools of classical legal science, i.e.
logical deduction and the rudimental forms of policy analysis that we have seen
deployed by the courts, were to abandoned or refined. Terry, Holmes, Ames and
127

Vegelhan v. Guntner, supra note 111.
This organicist and policy-oriented mode of reasoning was proudly championed as a peculiarly American trait,
distinguishing American jurists and judges from their English counterparts.. In a 1910 article on the influence of
social and economic ideals on the law of malicious torts, Gordon Stoner effectively contrasted the social
organicism of American judicial reasoning with the formalistic approach of the English courts. The questions
raised by malice and abuse of rights signal the need for a law organically reflecting evolving ethical, social and
economic ideals. Judges are called to adjust the pace of legal change to that of social and economic evolution.
American judges, Stoner notes, were best equipped for this daunting task. Quoting Justice Park in Mirehouse v.
Rennel, Stoner argues that English common lawyers aim at uniformity, consistency and certainty. Their mode of
reasoning consisted in the mechanic application of rules derived from judicial precedents and their ultimate goals
were the rigour and coherence of legal science. Justice Park’s words are contrasted with Justice Elliott’s bold
organicist act of faith in Tuttle v. Buck. American courts, Stoner suggests, aim at adaptability to social needs
rather than uniformity and consistency. Their reasoning techniques and their familiarity with policy questions
enable them to facilitate law’s constant adaptation to changed conditions See Gordon Stoner, Influence of Social and
Economic Ideals on the Law of Malicious Torts, 8 MICH. L. REV. 468 (1909-1910).
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Lewis were eager to denounce the failures of hollow deductive reasoning in
solving the question of malice. In Terry’s words:
The real questions in Allen v. Flood and in Quinn v. Leathem were of this kind.
They are not questions about the nature of malice or the general duty not to do
malicious acts. Discussions of these points simply obscure the true issue. They
are of admitting exceptions to the general duty. They are not to be decided by
deductions from legal theories about malice and there are very few precedents or
established legal principles which will throw much light upon them. They are
really questions of the adjustment of the law to new states of act arising out the
new and complicated conditions of modern life…..the decisions of the courts upon
them must and will amount in reality to somewhat bold and extensive judicial
legislation, somewhat more bold and extensive than courts nowadays like to
engage in, which must be based on broad considerations of justice and policy,
with little help from precedents or theory.

The forms of balancing and policy analysis that we have seen deployed
by courts were to be further developed. When deciding the question of
justification, courts had, by and large, weighed conflicting interests in light of
multifactor standards of “malice” or “reasonableness” reflecting notions of
social morals or policy considerations presented as “widely shared” and, hence,
relatively uncontroversial. To the contrary, Holmes pointed at the fact that
questions of privilege and malice call for analytic choices among alternative
considerations of policy or justice. Judges are to balance, case by case, weighing
the actual and concrete gains and losses entailed by alternative solutions.
Balancing involves tracing the line in one place rather than in another and
hence involves gains and losses that are the result of policy preferences rather
than of universal notions of justice or the public good129. Holmes was generous
in examples:
Let us suppose another case of interference with business by an act which has
some special grounds of policy in its favour. Take the case of advice not to
employ a certain doctor, given by one in a position of authority. To some extent it
is desirable that people should be free to give one another advice. On the other
hand, commonly it is not desirable that a man should lose his business. The two
advantages run against one another and a line has to be drawn. In such a case
Duncan Kennedy & Marie Claire Belleau, Le place de René Demogue dans la généalogie depensée juridique contemporaine,
56 REVUE INTERDCIPLINAIRE D’ÉTUDES JURIDIQUES 163 (2006).
129
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probably it would be said that if the advice was believed to be good and was
given for the sake of benefiting the hearers the defendants would not be
answerable. But if it was not believed to be for their benefit and was given for
the sake of hurting the doctor, the doctor would prevail…

The scholarly debate over malicious torts revealed the limits of courts’
reasoning tool kit and the need for a more sophisticated mode of legal analysis.
But the ultimate stake of the debate lay elsewhere. Jurists and writers were
quick to realize the implications of the question of malice in the larger and
incandescent context of industrial struggles. Contrary to their continental
European colleagues who discussed the problem of abuse of rights at a rather
abstract level, they did not shy away from examining the problem of malice in
light of the questions posed by labor/capital disputes. Holmes’s scheme of
intentional tort proved a critical weapon in labor cases. As his Vegelhan
dissent shows, Holmes envisaged his theory of intentional tort as a crucial tool
for governing industrial warfare, furthering the cause of peaceful trade
unionism. By focusing on motive, Holmes was able to expand the scope of
justification, exempting from liability peaceful labor activities.
In a lengthy and careful investigation of crucial issues in labor law, that
appeared in 1907 in the Harvard Law Review, Jeremiah Smith further
elaborated the question of justification, attuning the scheme of intentional tort
to recent labor cases 130. Smith set four requisites for the validity of “just cause
or excuse” in labor cases: pertinence, reasonable fitness, proportionality and
direct conduct. First, there must be a conflict of interest between plaintiff and
defendant as to the subject matter in regard to which the damage is done.
Second, the damaging act must be reasonable calculated to substantially
advance the interest of the defendant. Third, the resulting damage must
proportional to the benefit to the defendant. Four, the justification must be
Jeremiah Smith, Crucial Issues in Labor Litigation, supra note 62. It is impossible to have any clear discussion of
the crucial labour cases, he contended, unless “we either discard certain ambiguous expressions altogether or
distinctly indicate the meaning intended to be affixed to them”. Seeking to bring clarity, he distinguished between
“intent” and “motive”: the former describes the defendant’s immediate intent, the latter denotes the defendant’s
ulterior intent. While intent is often material upon the question of the defendant’s liability, the cases where motive
is material are comparatively rare. Smith quotes Ames’ articulation of the doctrine of intentional tort as an
accurate representation of the law. In Ames’ words, “The wilful causing of damage to another by a positive act
whether by a man alone or by several acting in concert and whether by direct action against him or indirectly by
inducing a third person to exercise a lawful right, is a tort unless there was cause for inflicting the damage”.
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confined to those case where the defendant uses only his own conduct as a
lever, rather than an outsider’s conduct.
At closer inspection, Smith’s fourfold guide to justification translates in a
restrictive approach to certain sophisticated forms of labor struggle, such as
secondary boycott. The requisite of direct conduct rules out labor’s activity that
rely on a third party. While the right to abstain from work is absolute, Smith
notes, yet it cannot be used to induce a third person to take action damaging to
the plaintiff. Moreover, the requisites of reasonable fitness and proportionality
exclude methods of warfare dependent on inter-trade solidarity. Smith
concedes that while workers in one trade may take measures to strengthen
unionism in their own trade, they cannot do so to bolster unionism in another
trade.
Ultimately, the debate over malicious torts grew into a broader clash
over different models of socio-economic development and power relations
among social actors. Judicial decisions and juristic conceptualizations in the
area of malicious torts, Gordon Stoner noted in 1909, reflect changes in the
public opinion, registering variations in political, economic and ethic ideas131.
Stoner’s survey of different lines of cases involving business competition,
boycott and closed shop evinced a marked shift from individualistic thinking
committed to absolute rights and freedom of action to a social outlook weighing
individual rights against societal welfare. Stoner was eager to denounce the
asymmetry between courts’ treatment of malice in labor cases and in cases
involving business competition. In the former, he suggested, judges, when
determining liability, tend to consider the immediate motive of the defendant,
i.e. the immediate result desired to be accomplished by the act, disregarding
the ultimate motive, i.e. the result which the actor wishes to effect not by the
act as part of a broader strategy.
To illustrate suppose a labor union some of whose members are employed by a
manufacturer who also employs non-union men orders him to discharge the non
union men and threatens to compel its men to quit work if he does not comply
with the order. To avoid a strike he discharges the non-union men. Here the
immediate result desired is the injury-the discharge-of the non-union men. It
131
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may very well be that the ultimate motive is to force all laborers to join the
union and thus to increase its power and usefulness. It may be stated as a
general rule that in labor cases the courts have not regarded the ultimate motive
of the defendants in determining their liability

On the other hand, Stoner argued, courts seem reluctant to adopt the same
principle in cases of business competition, when the interests of big business
are at stake.
Suppose this principle were to be applied in the same way in suits brought by an
independent company against a trust where the trust has cut process so as to
lose money in the district where it competes with the independent company in
order to drive the independent concern out of business and so to destroy it or
force it to enter the combination to preserve itself. Here the immediate motive is
the injury or destruction of the plaintiff company, the ultimate motive the
benefit to be derived by the trust through forcing the independent concern to
unite with it or go out of business

So far, in similar cases, Stoner noted, judges have tended to adopt an
opposite principle, disregarding the immediate motive and focusing on the
ultimate motive. While fear of an increment in labor power leads courts to gloss
over the defendant union’s ultimate motive, an individualistic commitment to
freedom of action and the sacredness of unrestrained competition has so far
prompted them to deem the ultimate motive of business competition a valid
justification. A similar awareness of the asymmetry veins Walter Wheeler
Cook’s analysis .
When the legality of attempts to close a market by economic pressure on those
who deal with rivals has been called in question …the tendency has been to
regard the acts of the defendants as lawful; when the legality of similar attempts
to unionize a shop has been called in question, the tendency has been to regard
such attempts as illegal132.

On the contrary, advocates of unrestrained competition and “the open
market” denounced the power of labor unions as a threat to individual
morality, the independence of workers and employers, the natural equilibrium
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Walter Wheeler Cook, Privileges of Labor Unions in the Struggle for Life 27 YALE L. J. 779 (1917-1918).
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of competition and the principle of equality before the law133. Bruce Wyman’s
denunciation of courts’ illiberal efforts to side with labor in the mounting
industrial warfare betrays disquiet. Even to the most superficial observers of
current events, he noted, it is clear that the competitive system is threatened
from many quarters. Courts’ treatment of unions’ malicious competitive
activity poses the greatest danger to individual freedom and industrial liberty.
The doctrine of the closed shop is being surreptitiously established and the
courts seem to be abdicating their task of “protecting the freedom of the
individual against the oppression of the combination”. Unionizing and
boycotting, Wyman claimed, pose a despotic and tyrannical threat to individual
liberty, their efficacy resting on the overpowering force of numbers. Not only is
strengthening the power of labor a menace to individual freedom, it is also
prejudicial to the larger interest of society. While the public wants the best
services that can be gotten at the lowest wages that will be accepted,
unionizing means less efficient services and increasing wages. In a crescendo of
anxiety, Wyman warns that the end of the open market and the disturbance of
the competitive system would be “the final catastrophe beyond which there
could be nothing but the horror of anarchy or the hopelessness of socialism”.

III. ON THE CONTINENT: ABUS DE DROIT AND ABUSO DEL DIRITTO
Comparative law is, ultimately, an exercise in self-reflection:
comparativists use their examination of the “other” system to question their
“own”134. Our long comparative detour in nineteenth century common law calls
for a fresh look at the continental concept of abuse of rights and invites
speculations about its actual significance and impact.
In Europe, contrary to England and the United States, abuse of rights
was expressly framed as a unitary conceptual category, one that sparked a
raging controversy. Jurists holding different political and methodological
Bruce Wyman, The Maintenance of the Open Shop, 17 GREEN BAG 21 (1905); Id., The Perpetuation of the Open Market,
17 GREEN BAG 210 (1905). See also Daniel R. Ernst, supra note 103.
134 Karen Engle, Comparative Law as Exposing the Foreign System’s Internal Critique: An Introduction, 1997 UTAH L. REV.,
359 (1997).
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beliefs set out to either discredit the new jurisprudential creation or build a
systematic theory of abuse of rights. The echo of the French debate soon
reached Italian jurists, at the time intent in shaping a new private law for the
newly unified country and, hence, alert to transalpine legal novelties. While
Italian judges were reluctant to appropriate the new category, scholars were
quick to re-elaborate the theories sketched by Louis Josserand, Raymond
Saleilles and Francois Geny.
The reason for the intensity and animosity of the debate, in both France
and Italy, is said to lie in that abuse of rights was perceived by its opponents as
a threatening inroad into individual liberty and freedom of action. However, an
analysis of the language and the distributive outcomes of the decisions refracts
a different image. Abuse of rights looses some of its fabled social aura. The
alleged distance between civilians’ potent social “drug” and common lawyers’
pragmatic and growth-oriented use of “malice” and “reasonableness” shrinks.
The two fields where abuse of rights could have exerted a significant
distributive impact, i.e. property law and labor law, remained largely immune
from its potentially corrosive effect. Rather, abuse of rights served a mildly
conservative legal/political agenda. In cases dealing with property rights,
courts curbed the excesses of the absolutist modern notion of property,
ultimately strengthening it. Similarly, in labor cases, abuse of rights was part
of a bland solidaristic strategy aimed at “domesticating” the nascent labor
movement.
A. Abuse of Property Rights: A Cosmetic Corrective to Roman-Bourgeois Private Law ?
Property is the field where the theory of abuse of rights was more
extensively developed and carefully articulated. The effort of the French courts
to tame the owner’s abusive exercise of her right was widely perceived as an
attack to the grandiose and absolutist modern concept of property designed in
the wake of the French Revolution135.
The attack on modern property generated alarm136. It was seen as a fatal
On modern Continental private law see: James Gordley, Myths of the French Civil Code,42 AM. J. COMP. L. 459
(1994); ID., FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT, CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2006).
136 LOUIS JOSSERAND, DE L’ESPRIT DES DROITS ET DE LEUR RELATIVITÉ. THÉORIE DITE DE L’ABUS DES DROITS
135
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blow to the product of centuries of highly sophisticated legal/philosophical
elaborations. The cultural roots of modern property were deemed to rest in the
Roman Classical notion of dominium137, as re-invented by nineteenth century
Roman law scholars. More specifically, they rested in the new articulation of
the relation between the subject and the thing delineated by the Spanish
jurists/theologians of the Second Scholastic at the dawn of the sixteenth
century. The influence of late medieval voluntarism, the questions raised by
the Franciscan debate on poverty, the cultural sensitivity of Humanism and
the Reformation as well as the needs of a pre-capitalist socio-economic order
had concurred in shaping a new vision of property. Soto, Vitoria and their
fellows of the Salamanca School gave legal shape to this new vision of property.
Their voluntaristic premises translated in a new centrality of the
subject/owner. An expansive and domineering force, property became the
measure of the subject’s liberty. The owner’s absolute power over the thing was
seen as the quintessential expression of autonomy and the highest guarantee of
freedom138.
This early-modern subjectivist notion of the relation between the owner
and the thing was the basis on which modern property was built. The
Enlightenment and the political rise of the bourgeoisie shaped a highly
abstract and eminently individualist notion of property, enshrined in article
544 of the Code Napoleon and in article 463 of the Italian 1865 Civil Code139.
Property was endowed with absoluteness, exclusivity and irrevocability. The
(1927 1st ed, Dalloz 2006) at 5: “Comment comprendre ques certains consciences, cependant trés averties, aient
été choquèes par le développement d’une these sociale qui a deriére elle un tel passé et qui offer de semblables
gages? La responsabilité de cette attitude hostile incombe, non pas au droit romain, ni meme aux glossateurs ou
aux postglossateurs par les soins desquels il fut si souvent déformé, mais bien à notre droit révolutionnaire et aux
grandes codifications […] Né des excés et des abus de l’ancien regime, ce droit, élaboré sous l’influence
dominante des philosophes du XVIIIe siécle, est marqué au coin d’un individualisme exaspéré”
137 The 1890s is the moment when the Roman archetype was actually “invented”. The Romanists and the civilisti
were partners in a grandiose cultural and political operation: the construction of “diritto romano borghese” ; see
ALDO SCHIAVONE, ALLE ORIGINI DEL DIRITTO BORGHESE. HEGEL CONTRO SAVIGNY (1984). The archetype had
thick ethical and political implications: a) RD Sanctioning the most ample power of a single individual over a
thing, was seen as the quintessential expression of freedom. b) RD granting to a privileged individual, the Roman
citizen, full power over a thing, was seen as reinforcing the economic and political power of the ruling class.
138 The Salmaticenses envisioned self-dominon, (Dominium Sui) as the quintessential expression of freedom and
claimed that property over external things is the qualitatively identical external manifestation of self-dominion. See
PAOLO GROSSI, IL DOIMINIO E LE COSE. PERCEZIONI MEDIEVALI E MODERNE DEI DIRITTI REALI (1992).
139 Art 544: “la propriété est le droit de jouir et disposer des choses de la manière la plus absolue pourvu qu’on
n’en fasse pas un usage prohibé par les lois ou par les règlements”
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owner was consecrated “moderator and arbiter” of the thing, exercising over it
an unlimited and despotic power140. Absolute and unitary, admitting no
graduation in the scope of the right and no differentiation between proprietary
relations, property was the backbone of modern codifications. In the Code Civil,
Rene Savatier ironically noted, property and things took up 1766 articles while
only 515 articles were devoted to rights of persons. Similarly, as one of its
architects illustrated, the structure of the 1865 Codice Civile hinged on two
pillars: property as “the fundamental idea” and persons as property owners.
Not only was the attack on modern property a blow to the product of the
most sophisticated Western legal culture, it was also a rift in the solid edifice of
the bourgeois legal order, of which property was the central pillar. As Aldo
Schiavone has argued, in nineteenth century capitalist Europe, two disciplines,
a recent one, political economy, and an ancient one, Roman private law,
concurred in designing a powerful, and apparently unassailable, socio-legal
order: “Roman-Bourgeois private law”. The products of Roman legal science,
and in particular Roman Classical dominium, were put in service of the needs
of the capitalist economic system. The uninterrupted continuity of a millenary
legal science conferred upon the “Roman-Bourgeois legal order” a patina of
neutrality and universality. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, under
the pressure of new social and economic conditions, this solid edifice began to
shake. However, what in the fears of many, appeared an attack on “RomanBourgeois private law” turned out to be a mere adjustment in its structure,
ultimately contributing to its longevity.
Courts’ resort to abuse of rights was part of this adjustment. It was a
cosmetic corrective to the “volontarisme individualiste” informing the

See LOIUS JOSSERAND supra note 131 at 15: “A tout seigneur tout honneur: le droit de propriété est considéré
traditionellment comme le droit individuel par excellence, comme le prototipe de la prérogative absolue; c’est un
dominium conferant à celui qui en est investi les pleins pouvoirs, plena in re potestas; le droit révolutionnaire,
acceptant et fortifiant meme l’héritage du passé, lui a reconnu solennellment la valeur d’un attribute naturel et
imprescriptible, inviolable et sacré, de la personnalité humaine, au meme titre que la liberté, la sureté et la
résistance à l’oppression […] Dans la conception millénaire, le propriétaire est un souverain qui, rentranché dans
sa chose comme dans une fortresse, agit à sa guise, discrétionnairement, sans qu’on puisse lui demander compte
de ses actes et moins encore des mobiles qui les lui ont inspires”. In the Italian literature see: EMIDIO PACIFICI
MAZZONI, ISTITUTZIONI DI DIRITTO CIVILE ITALIANO (1874)
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absolutist model of property141, rather than its rejection. Aware of the
unsettling potential of the device they had created and wary of the distributive
issues at stake, judges tailored the doctrine of abuse of rights in a rather
narrow fashion. By and large, decisions dealing with property rights, confined
abuse of rights within the safe perimeter of a subjectivist notion. Rather than
disrupting the absolutist notion of property, abuse of rights operated as a
buttress to a more dynamic and efficient, though equally absolutist, idea of
property.
The Colmar case, decided in 1855, is considered path-breaking142. The
appellant had built a fake chimney on his roof opposite to, and nearly against,
the respondent’s window. The inspection ordered by the court showed the
chimney to bear no utility for the appellant, serving no function other than that
of obscuring the respondent’s window. Confirming the judgement of the inferior
court, which had ordered the demolition of the chimney, the Court of Appeals of
Colmar took a narrow subjectivist approach resting on a twofold test: the
owner’s malicious intent to harm and the lack of a serious and legitimate
interest. However, the court was eager to reassure that
Property rights, are absolute, allowing the owner to use and abuse of her property;
the exercise of property rights, however, finds a limit in that the use of property is
to satisfy a serious and legitimate interest; principles of morals and equity demand
that courts repress acts inspired by malicious passions that do not serve any
personal utility while causing damage to another143.

The ample and absolutist scope of property rights was left intact and
ultimately strengthened, the court limiting its intervention to the repression of
the most blatantly anti-social excesses, i.e. acts motivated by the sole purpose
LOIUS JOSSERAND supra note 131 at 1 [….] l’abus de droits qui constitue une des pièces maitresses des
systèmes juridiques de tous les pays civilises, ou, plus exactement, l’atmosphère, le “climat” dans lequel ces
sysèmes se développent et se réalisent”. On “ volontarisme individualiste” p. 7.
142
Colmar, May 2, 1855, D.P. 1856 2.9.
143Id., “Considérant que, s’il est de principe que le droit de propriété est un droit en quelque sorte absolu,
autorisant le propriétaire à user et abuser de la chose, cependant l’exercise de ce droit, comme celui de tout autre,
doit avoir pour limite la satisfaction d’un intérèt serieux et légitime; que les principes de la morale et de l’èquité
s’opposent à ce que la justice sanctionne une action inspirée par la malveillance, accomplice sous l’empire d’une
mauvaise passion, ne se justifiant par aucune utilitépersonnelle et portent un grave prejudice à autrui; qu’ainsi
c’est le cas, tout en reconnaissant l’affranchissement de la propriété de l’appelant de tout droit de servitude de vue,
de maintenir la decision des premiers juges quant à la demolition de la fausse cheminée.
141
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of harming another and lacking any utility.
The Saint Galmier mineral waters decision (1856) differs in style but not in
substance144. Relinquishing the dry and pragmatic language of the Colmar
court, the court of Appeal of Lyon indulged in a skirmish of Roman brocards,
only to re-affirm the subjectivist notion of abuse of rights. Three sources of
mineral water, that owned by the Andrè partners, the Badoit source and the
source owned by the town of Saint Galmier, were located at the distance of a
few meters from each other; the three sources were communicant, both through
a common reservoir as well as through subterranean infiltrations. The Andrè
partners built a powerful hydraulic system that pumped the water from the
reservoir, reducing of two thirds the output of the Badoit source and lowering
the level of the water of the communal Saint Galmier source. While the
hydraulic system significantly interfered with the operation of the other two
sources, the surplus of water obtained by the Andrè partners was wasted by
letting it run along the terrain into a nearby creek. Confirming the judgement
of the inferior court, the Court of Appeals of Lyon found the appellants’ conduct
to be animated by the exclusive intent to harm and awarded damages to
Badoit. The Court adopted the Colmar twofold subjective test. Andrè’s conduct
met both the test of the intent to injure, being dictated by no purpose other
than that of harming Badoit and the test of the lack of serious and legitimate
interest, revealed by the fact that the water was wasted. A passage in the
opinion is symptomatic of the Court’s reluctance to incisively curb the owner’s
absolute right. The court seemed to suggest that the absolute nature of
property rights entails the owner’s power to abuse of her property and merely
set a limit to such power 145. In the court’s words:
Considering that the owner’s right necessarily finds a limit in the obligation to let
the neighbour enjoy her property and [considering] that the [owner’s] power to
abuse of the thing cannot describe an act which, inspired exclusively by the desire
to harm, takes up, in reason of the subterranean communication between the two
lots of land, the character of an action carried on the neighbour’s land and aimed at
affecting its value by annihilating or reducing a natural resource that determines
Lyon, April 18, 1856, D.P. 1856 2.199.
Significantly the maxim reads: Le droit qu’a tout propriétaire d’abuser de sa chose trouve une limite dans
l’obligation de laisser le voisin joiur aussi de sa proprété, et ne saurait autoriser l’accomplissement d’actes inspires
uniquement par l’envie de nuire a celui-ci.
144
145
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most of the value of the land; [considering] that, this act, rightly assessed in light of
the maxim malitiis non est indulgendum, integrates an hypothesis of quasidelictum regulated by art. 1382146

Several decades later, in the Clement-Bayard case, the Court of Appeals
of Amiens imperceptibly expanded its concept of abuse of rights to include the
hypothesis of “mixed motives”147. The Court suggested that, for the owner’s
conduct to be abusive, the malevolent motive need not be the exclusive but the
dominant motive. The Court also implicitly signalled that not any interest
alleged by the defendant may count as a serious and legitimate motive. The
case was a peculiar one. Mr Coquerel had bought a small piece of land facing
the hangar for dirigibles operated by Mr. Clement Bayard. The relationship
between the two neighbours was hardly a friendly one. Mr Coquerel decided to
erect, on the border of his land, two 15 meters long and 11 meters tall wooden
fences and to adorn it with steel spikes which were meant to obstruct the
operation of the zeppelins in case of strong wind. Manifestly, the fences,
separated by an interruption of a few meters and hence inapt to serve as a
closure, did not serve any function other than damaging the dirigibles. Mr
Coquerel contended that he was driven by the desire to attempt an economic
speculation, by inducing Clement Bayard to buy his land at a conspicuous
price, rather than by the sole intent to harm. The Court carefully weighed
Coquerel’s alleged motivation. While the desire to speculate, fully profiting by
one’s property is perfectly legitimate, the Court argued, the means employed by
Mr. Coquerel are illegitimate and exclusively inspired by a malevolent intent to
harm:
Considering that, in fact, in order to justify his behaviour, Coquerel claims, that, by
carrying out these operations, thereby spurring Clement Bayard’s interest in
acquiring his land, he ventured in nothing but an act of economic speculation.
Considering that it is legitimate for the owner of a piece of a land to try to fully
Considérant, sur l’exception ainsi formulée, que le droit du propriétaire trouve nécessirement une limite dans
l’obligation de laisser le voisin joiur de sa propriété; que le pouvoir d’abuser de sa chose ne peut server à colorer
un acte, qui, inspire excluivement par l’envie de nuire, prend, aà raison d’une communication souterraine entre
deux fonds, le caractére d’une enterprise portée sur le fonds voisin, pour toucher à sa substance et anéantir ou
amoindrir un bien naturel, qui en fait la principale valeur; qu’un pareil acte sainement apprécie à la lumiére de la
régle malitiis non est indulgendum, constitue un des cas de quasi-délits prévus par l’art. 1382.
147 Amiens, February 7, 1912 D.P. III 1913.2.177; in 1915 the Court de Cassation rejected Coquerel’s appeal
confirming the arret of the Court of Appeals of Amiens, Req., August 3, 1915, D.P. 1917.1.79..
146
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reap the benefit of his property, acts of speculation being, in themselves and for
themselves perfectly licit, provided that the means employed be not, as in the case
at hand, illegitimate and inspired exclusively by a malicious animus….148.

Finding that Coquerel’s conduct amounted to an abuse of rights, the court
ordered to dismantle the fence and to pay damages. However, the court failed
to fully build on the corrective potential of its expanded notion of abuse of
rights. While this enlarged notion would have allowed a more thorough inquiry
into the value and legitimacy of different uses of property, the court ultimately
retrieved its subjectivist test. Rather than questioning Coquerel’s motives,
weighing the latter’s speculative ambitions against the public utility of
Clement Bayard’s activity, the court focused on the malicious nature of the
means employed. As in the previous cases, the court seemed reluctant to
challenge the absolutist model of property and merely curbed it excesses.
In a 1902 case dealing with subterranean waters the Cour de Cassation
opted for a more decidedly objectivist approach, drawing a notion of abuse of
rights that hinges primarily on the test of the owner’s lack of interest 149.
Confirming the judgement of the Court of Appeals of Lyon, the Cour de
Cassation found the appellants, Mr Forissier and his wife, liable for persisting
in drilling activities that, while lacking any utility for them, exerted a highly
damaging impact on the Chaverots’ source. As a footnote in the Sirey report
emphasizes, the Court went beyond the well-established subjectivist approach,
focusing instead on the objective criterion of the lack of utility for the
owners150. However, the language of the court is that of modern absolute
property and the Code Napoleon. The court compensated the shift towards a
potentially more invasive objective test with the reaffirmation of the
Considérant que Coquerel prétend , il est vrai, pour justifier ses agissements, qu’il n’à fait, en exeécutant ces
travaux et en augmentant ainsi l’intéret de Clement Bayard à se rendre acquéreur de sa piéce de terre, qu’un acte
de spéculation; Considérant que s’il est loisible au propriétaire d’un fonds de chercher à en tirer le meilleur parti
possibile, et si la spéculation est par elle-meme et en elle-meme un acte parfaitement licite, ce n’est qu’à la
condition que les moyens employés pour la réaliser ne soient pas, comme en l’espéce, illégitimes et inspirés
exclusivement par une inetntion maliceuse.
149 Req., June 10, 1902, D.P. III 1902.1.454; S. 1903.1.11.
150 Le propri[taire d’un fonds a le droit d’y faire des fuilles et de couper ainsi les veines d’eau alimentant un fonds
voisin […] Mais c’est à la condition que les fouilles ne soient pas pratiquéesmécliamment et avec inetntion de
nuire. […] L’arret actuel va plus lion, car il parait exiger que les fouilles présentent un caractére d’utilité pour le
propriétaire qui les pratique.
148
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absoluteness of property rights:
Given that, while art. 544 attributes everyone the right to enjoy and dispose of his
thing in the most absolute manner, this right is tempered by the natural and legal
obligation not to cause damage to another’s property; -

If French judges deployed the doctrine of abuse of rights with
remarkable caution, their Italian colleagues were even more hesitant. When
dealing with cases of abusive exercise of property rights, Italian courts were
wary not to exceed the safe notion of aemulatio151. In his now classic study of
abuse of rights Mario Rotondi praised the court’s scrupulous attitude,
contrasting it with the irresponsible audacity of the French courts152. All of a
sudden, France, the revered transalpine sister, appears “foreign”:
In our legal system, in all the cases in which the French courts invoke the concept
of abuse of rights, either an express legislative disposition avails or our courts were
able to reach, through a different path, these equitative solutions and
temperaments that are the greatest pride of the foreign rhetoric. […] Why turn to
dangerous constructions of liability for de iure acts, conflict of rights and similar,
that mess up the basic concept of our legal system, when the same results can be
reached through far more orthodox ways?

A widely commented 1877 decision of the Florentine Corte di Cassazione
well exemplifies the courts’ predilection for a narrow concept of aemulatio153.
The case was a relatively ordinary one. Signor Sguanci had elevated the
common wall separating his orchard from Signor Contini’s courtyard.
For Italian decisions relying on the notion of aemulatio see: Corte Appello Palermo 24 gennaio 1890, (Foro it.
1890, I, 203) “però per quanto illimitato voglia ritenersi il diritto del proprietario, suprema ragione per la
convivenza sociale impone che non possa farsene un uso sfrenato e selvaggio”. Corte di Cassazione di Torino 24
maggio 1898 (Foro it. 1898, I, 157): “ne il ricorrente cerchi rifugio nell’ art. 436 c.c. che assicura al proprietario la
facoltà di usare e disporre nel modo l più assoluto della cosa sua, purchè non ne faccia un uso vietato dalle leggi o
dai regolamenti. La legge garantisce l’uso peperò esclude l’abuso che apparisce evidente nel fatto di chi, col
pretesto di esercitare il proprio diritto, si propone e raggiunga il solo iniquo intento di nuocere ad altri”; See also
Cassazione Torino 20 aprile 1907 (Foro it. 1907, I, 163) ; Vittorio Scialoja, in his entry on aemualtio, is dismissive
of Italian courts’ use of aemulatio: “le corti italiane trascinate dalla corrente tradizionale, ammettono in generale il
divieto dell’emulazione: ma fortunatamente lo spirito pratico dei magistrati fa si, che spesso poco logicamente ma
con molta utilità da un falso principio essi deducano buone conseguenze; giungano cioè ad un giusto risultato
senza accorgersi che questo non è giusto in forza della massima, che essi credono di applicare, bensì in forza di
principi ben differenti”; see Vittorio Scialoja, supra note 9.
152 MARIO ROTONDI, L’ABUSO DI DIRITTO. AEMULATIO. (1923 first ed., 1979).
153 Cassazione Firenze 4 maggio 1877 (Foro it. 1877, I, 96)
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Confirming the judgement of the Court of Appeal, the court held that Sguanci’s
elevation works served no purpose, being exclusively directed at depriving
Contini of light and prospect, and ordered the demolition of the elevation. The
court noted that amplitude of property rights is tempered by principles of
“natural honesty” and that the law intervenes to moderate abuses and excesses
and to neutralize malice and emulation. According to the court, the prohibition
of acts ad aemulationem, implicit in the Italian Civil Code, has both the
sanction of morality, being dictated by higher principles of natural honesty as
well as that of time, being the superlative creation of medieval jurists.
B. Abuse of Rights in Industrial Relations: An Experiment in Avant-Garde Capitalism?
In France and in Italy, labor activity and strikes, relatively sparse until
the 1880s, multiplied in the latter part of the nineteenth century, changing in
size and duration and gaining new economic and political significance.
Organized labor’s new vigour called for legal and institutional responses. Abuse
of rights was private lawyers’ response.
The changing structure of French industry had rendered the 1791 Le
Chapelier Loi, prohibiting any form of association in all trades, inadequate. In
1864 a new bill sanctioning workers’ right of coalition was passed, followed, in
1884, by the Loi relative à la creation des syndicates professionels. A new
institutional structure for organized labor was soon established. In 1895 the
Federation of the Bourses du Travail and the syndicates combined in the
Confederation Generale du Travail. Empowered by more solid institutional
foundations, the labor movement launched an active strategy of strikes and
non-violent work stoppages. While the Glass Strike of 1895 in Carmaux and
the coal-miners strikes of the 1880s and 1890s in the Lower Languedoc are
well-known, the Statistique des grèves chronicles the large number of strikes
that inflamed industrial relations in the latter decades of the nineteenth
century154.
Edward Shorter & Charles Tilly, The Shape of Strikes in France 1830-1960, 13 COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN
SOCIETY & HISTORY 60-86 (1971); Harvey Goldberg, Jaurès and the Carmaux Strikes: The Glass Strike of 1895 17
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & SOCIOLOGY 307-319 (1958); Id., Jaurès and the Carmaux Strikes: The Coal
Strike of 1892, 17 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & SOCIOLOGY 167-178 (1958); Leo Loubére, Coal Miners,
Strikes and Politics in the Lower Languedoc 1880-1914, 2 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL HISTORY 25-50 (1968).
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In Italy, by the late 1890s the form and scale of labor organization and
the frequency and size of strikes were very similar to those in France. Although
trade unions had no legal recognition until 1890 a vital network of mutual aid
societies, local unions and workers’ cooperatives existed. The victory of the
liberal Zanardelli-Giolitti government in 1900 marked the beginning of what is
known as “The Golden Age of Italian Labor”. Labor’s institutional structure,
designed along the lines of the French, consisted of Camere del Lavoro,
organized in a federation and later, in 1906, in the Confederazione Generale del
Lavoro. As in France, the 1880s witnessed the intensification of strikes. The
Zanardelli Criminal Code, which entered into force in 1890, is said to have
legalized strikes, punishing strikes only when accompanied by violence and
threats. Inaugurated by the agricultural strikes of the 1890s in the Po Valley
the new season of industrial strife culminated in the general strike of 1904155.
Intensified labor activity confronted nascent labor law with intractable
legal questions. Still in its formative moment, labor law was developing in
constant dialogue with the “old” science of private law. And it was in the
latter’s toolbox that a response to the problems posed by industrial strife was
found. Courts resorted to the civilistes’ concept of abuse of rights to control
labor activity.
Two famed decisions stirred clamour and alarm among commentators. In
1903, in an interlocutory appeal of a decision of a justice of the peace, the
Tribunal of Bordeaux found that an employer who had refused to hire
unionized wood workers had abused his right, having acted out of pure
malice156. The facts were straightforward. An employer, Canis, disregarding a
written agreement reached with the Syndicat des ouvriers en bois merrains
binding him to hire members of the union, notified his intention not to hire
workers affiliated with the said union. The justice of the peace noted that
endorsing the employer’s refusal to hire unionized workers, in the name of
freedom of contract, would have frustrated the goals of the 1884 statute
Francesco Saverio Nitti, Strikes in Italy 3 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL 719-733 (1893); Nicola Rossi & Giovanni
Toniolo, Catching Up or Falling Behind? Italy’s Economic Growth 1895-1947 45 THE ECONOMIC HISTORY REVIEW
537-563 (1992); GUIDO NEPPI MODONA, SCIOPERO, POTERE POLITICO E MAGISTRATURA 1870-1922 (1969);
UMBERTO ROMAGNOLI & TIZIANO TREU, I SINDACATI IN ITALIA: STORIA DI UNA STRATEGIA (1977).
156 Bordeaux, December 14, 1903 S 1904.217 note Ferron
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recognizing and regulating unions, and thereby awarded damages to the union.
Confirming the decision of the inferior court, the Tribunal of Bourdeaux, raised
the heated question of abuse of rights, suggesting that the crucial legal issue
was whether Canis had exercised his right to freely select his own collaborators
or had committed a wrong157. As Georges Ferron emphasized in the Sirey note,
of the two alternative conceptual articulations of abuse of rights, i.e. abuse of
rights as excessive exercise of a right or as malicious exercise of a right, the
court privileged the latter158. The former, Ferron suggested, would have
infringed the sacred dogma of the employer’s widest freedom of contract
symmetric to the employee’s equally ample freedom to sell or not to sell her
labor. The court remained instead within the safer perimeter of a subjective
notion of abuse of rights. Having secured, at the conceptual level, the
individualistic pillars of the system, the court surprisingly and courageously
deployed this narrow notion in favour of the union. Noting that the employer
has an ample liberty to refuse to hire unionized workers when the refusal
serves a specific professional interest, the court found that, in the case at hand,
the employer’s refusal was exclusively motivated by the intent to harm the
union, an institution sanctioned by the law, by hindering its activity.
Given that, according to the current legislation, it seems that an employer cannot
be prevented from announcing his intention of hiring unionized workers; But, given
that the general principles of law entail limitations to this faculty; that while, for
example, this faculty cannot be contested when the employer acts in order to
safeguard an interest, it is to be denied when the employer’s interest is not at
stake, the latter acting simply to harm the union, blacklisting it…

Relinquishing the traditional arid judicial style and venturing in a bold
endorsement of labor’s claims, the Tribunal added:
[given] that, besides, employers will claim in vain that “harming the unions serves
in fact our interest!”; that justice will be deaf to such scathing words betraying
social hostility and resistance to a law…..

Attendu, en effet, que toute la question est de savoir si Canis à supposer établi ce qui lui est imputé, devrait etre
considéré comme ayant usé d’un droit ou comme ayant commis une faute. While attempts to limit the employer’s
liberty not to hire or to discharge unionized employees were still at the stage of mere legislative proposals, the
employer was deemed to have an ample right to freely choose her own collaborators.
158 Ferron attributes the first to Charmont and Capitant and the second to numerous judicial decisions.
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In a 1905 case dealing with a union’s boycott of an employer, the Cour de
Cassation took a similar position, adopting a pro-labor decision while
struggling to prevent further conceptual inroads, potentially corrosive of
capital’s power159. The case involved an episode of boycott. Monsieur Dumont,
who ran a printery in Limoges, refused to sign a clause that would subject to a
mixed commission of employers and employees any future controversy between
him and his employees concerning the tariffs negotiated with the union of the
typographers. As a reaction to Dumont’s refusal, the union called a strike and
published an announcement on several newspapers proscribing Dumont’s
printery. The boycott protracted, fuelling incidents and Dumont sued the union
for damages. The Tribunal of Limoges rejected Dumont’s claim for damages
and the Court of Appeal confirmed the judgement. The Cour de Cassation
confirmed the previous decisions and exempted the union from liability. At first
glance a full blow struck to capital’s power, the decision is, in fact, highly
ambiguous. In a succinct paragraph, the court skilfully restated the doctrine of
abuse of rights to tame its corrosive potential and to prevent further conceptual
inroads160. The boycott, the court found, did not amount to an abuse of rights
because it met a three-fold test. First, the boycott was exclusively motivated by
the need to safeguard the worker’s professional interest, and hence free from
any form of malice, violence or fraud; further, it was exclusively directed to the
members of the union; finally, it had not inflicted any appreciable harm on the
employer. As Marcel Planiol suggested in the Dalloz note:
The decision should not be attributed a reach that, in fact, it does not have. It falls
short of recognizing to the unions an absolute faculty to blacklist an employer
without incurring in liability. While undeniably, in the decision at hand, the
employer’s claim for damages is rejected, it is rejected for factual considerations;
and if we examine the conditions and the restrictions to which the right to boycott
is subjected, it appears that the union’s liability, excluded in this case, can be

Cass, March 13, 1905, D. 1906.I.113
Attendu qu’il est declarè, en fait, par l’arret attaqué et par le jugement dont la cour a adopté les motifs, que les
affiches apposes, en mai 1900, par le syndicat des ouvriers typographes des Limoges et defendant aux members de
la Federation Francaise du livre de travailler à l’imprimerie Dumont, n’avaient exercé aucune influence sur les
ouvriers non syndiquées, auxquels, d’ailleurs, elles ne s’adressainet pas, et n’avaient cause au demandeur en
cassation aucun prejudice appreciable;- Qu à cette constation, l’arret ajoute que l’interdiction don’t il s’agit,
determine par le refus de Dumont d’accepter le tariff syndacal dans l’ensemble de ses dispositions, n’a point eté
abusive, et n’a été accompagnée ni de menaces, ni de manoeuvres déloyales; - Attendu que une telle mesure, prise
en dehors de toute pensée de malveillance et pour la seule défense des interests professionnels du syndicat…….
159
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admitted in many other cases.

The court slightly widened the notion of abuse of rights, including the
hypothesis of mixed motives, only to preserve an ample scope for unions’
liability; if motivated by a combination of desire to further professional
interests and malevolent intent to harm the union would incur in liability.
Further, the court’s reference to the absence of damage, seems to imply that a
boycott which is in fact harmful to the employer would be abusive. By requiring
the absence of damage, the court emptied of any meaning and effectiveness the
union’s exercise of its right. As with the Bordeaux decision, the court ended up
delivering a pro-labor decision, but it was careful not to alter significantly the
balance of power in industrial relations.
The ambiguous potential of the doctrine of abuse of rights is even more
evident in cases dealing with the right to strike. By affirming the workers’
right of coalition, the legislator had provided labor with a powerful tool in the
increasingly heated social struggle. However, courts and commentators were
quick to turn the doctrine into a device for curbing labor’s power. As any other
right, the right to strike, Josserand suggested, is attributed for a specific
purpose, that of furthering the workers’ professional interests; any exercise of
the right that departs from this purpose amounts to an abuse161.
A 1896 decision of the Cour de Cassation well illustrates this attitude162.
The case involved an intra-labor conflict. Twelve workers of a boilermaking
firm based in Nantes had threatened to strike in order to induce the employer
to discharge their supervisor, Monsieur Monnier, because of his abusive and
authoritarian behaviour. As a consequence of his supervisees’ threats to strike,
Monsieur Monnier was discharged and, finding it hard to find a suitable and
well paid job in Nantes, had to move to nearby Saint-Nazaire. Monnier’s claim
LOUIS JOSSERAND, DE L’ABUS DES DROITS (1905) p. 27: comme tous les autres, le droit de gréve doit avoir été
concédé dans un but déterminé; il doit etre pourvu d’une finalité, sinon, il faut le rayer de nos lois. Cette finalitéla
jurisprudence et , plus spécialment la cour de cassation, l’ont parfaitment dégagée: elle s’identifie avec l’intérest
professionnels des ouvriers ou des employés; c’est pour la sauvegarde de ces intérests que le droit de coalition
leur a été accordé et c’est seulement s’ils le font servir ° cet usage qu’ils auront carte blanche et qu’ils pourront
prétendre l’iimunité ° raion des faits de gréve. Sinon. Le droit ayant été devié de son but, devient, dans la mesure
du préjudice causé par sa rèalisationn, générateur de responsabilite.
162 Civ., June 9, 1896, D.P. 1896.I.582; S 1897.I.27.
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for damages was rejected by the Tribunal of Nantes and, subsequently, by the
Court of Appeal of Rennes. While the two lower courts found that the
boilermakers had legitimately exercised their right to sell their labor, the Cour
de Cassation took a different approach. The workers, the court found, had
abused their right. Although the threats were neither violent nor fraudulent,
they were inspired by mere malevolence rather than by the purpose of
safeguarding the workers’ professional interests.
Given that, after the abrogation of art 416 c.pén., threats to strike not accompanied
by violence of fraud and addressed to an employer as part of an organized plan are
legitimate if they serve the purpose of defending a professional interest;- Given,
nevertheless, that such threats do not amount to a wrong commanding reparation
when, inspired by a purely malevolent spirit, have as an effect that of imposing to
the employer the discharge of an employee without any serious complaint
justifying it…

The court interpreted narrowly the workers’ goal and interests. Turning a blind
eye to the fact that the latter’s action, being a reaction to Monnier’s abuses, did,
in fact, reflect a professional interest to a peaceful and congenial work
environment, the court detected spite and malice.
A 1892 decision of the Court of Chambery regarding a similar case of
intra-labor conflict evinces a analogous attempt to deploy a restrictive notion of
“professional interest” to streamline unions’ power. Members of a union had
threatened to call a strike if the employer did not discharge a worker, Mr Joost,
who had withdrawn from the union. The court weighed the workers’ right to
strike against the plaintiff’s “natural right to freely exercise his craft” and
found that the workers had abused their right. The exercise of the workers’
right, the court held, served no professional interest, being exclusively driven
by a malicious intent to harm. The court suggested that it is functional to the
pursuit of a “professional interest” any action concerning salaries, relations
with the employer or work conditions. Omitting any mention of organized
labor’s interest in consolidating its bargaining power by eliminating and
containing scabs, the court reasoned that Mr Joost, far from being an
exceptional and indispensable employee, was “un home indifferent en soi”,
whose permanence or discharge would hardly have impacted salaries, work
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conditions, or the workers’ bargaining power163.
The decisions of the French courts aroused anxiety and concern among
Italian commentators. Responding to an isolated voice who had praised the
above mentioned decision of the Tribunal of Bordeaux, Mario Rotondi did not
spare his transalpine colleagues blunt criticism164. Fortunately, Rotondi noted,
since in Italy the “right to strike” is not explicitly sanctioned and, thereby,
amounts to a mere “liberty”, no similar cases arise. Hopefully, he added, Italian
courts, if confronted with similar cases, would be firm in upholding freedom of
contract.
While in late nineteenth century Italy the significance of abuse of rights
for labor cases was modest, the transition from strike as “crime” to strike as
“liberty” to strike as “right” having been fully completed only with the 1948
Constitution,165 nevertheless, reasonableness tests proved critical for limiting
the scope of labor’s “liberty to strike”. The Sardinian-Italian criminal code,
adopted after unification and in force until 1890, punished every combination
of workmen which tended, without reasonable cause, to impede, suspend or
raise the price of labor when the combination had commenced active
operations166. As observers have noted, the Italian post-unitary judiciary,
deeply “borghese” and hardly inclined to sympathize with the working classes,
effectively emptied the “reasonable cause” clause of any meaning167.
In 1882, in a rare pro-labor decision, the Corte di Cassazione of Palermo
rejected the inferior court’s contention that a reasonable cause existed only
when workers were reacting to the employer’s abusive attempt to reduce
Civ. June 22 D.P. 1892.I.449; S 1893.I.41. Attendu que les assignements du syndicat constituent à l’encontre
de Joost une attenite a droit naturel qu’a tout l’homme d’exercer librement son industrie en se conformant aux
lois; que sans doute les ouvriers syndiqués avaient de leur coté la droit de se mettre en grève, mais qu’il n’est
permis à persone d’abuser de son droit; qu’il y a abus d’un droit toutes les fois que celui qui prétend l’exercer
n’agit que dans le but de nuire à altrui, san aucun intéret pour lui-meme; que, dans l’espéce, Joost était, comme les
intimés le reconnaissent dans leurs conclusions, “un homme indiffeérent en soi”; que son maintien dans l’usine,
pas plus que son exclusion, ne pouvait avoirune influence quelconque sur la hausse ou la baisse de salaries, les
rapports des ouvriers avec le patron, ni sur aucune des conditions de travail;
164 MARIO ROTONDI, supra note 147 at 70-71
165 Pietro Calamandrei, Significato costituzionale del diritto di sciopero, RGL 1952 I 221; GIOVANNI TARELLO , TEORIE E
IDEOLOGIE NEL DIRITTO SINDACALE ITALIANO (1972)
166 GUIDO NEPPI MODONA, supra note; 150 Francesco S. Nitti, supra note 150.
167
GUIDO NEPPI MODONA, supra note 150.
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salaries168. Rather, the court took a liberal approach, arguing that the
existence of a reasonable cause is to be assessed in light of the special
circumstances and the peculiar economic conditions of the individual case.
However, decisions drawing a broad notion of reasonableness were scant. By
and large courts limited workers’ “liberty to strike” either by narrowing the
notion of “reasonable cause” or by referring “reasonableness” to the means
relied upon by the workers rather than to the cause of the strike. For instance,
in a 1886 decision of the Corte di Cassazione of Torino, the scope of
“reasonableness” was significantly narrowed. The local “workers’ society” had
sought to negotiate with the employer an employment rotation scheme
involving both employed members of the society and unemployed members.
The court found that the employer’s refusal to accept the scheme did not
constitute a “reasonable cause” for the strike which followed. Resuming the
language of “liberty” and “individual will” the court argued that the scheme
proposed by the union was an unreasonable violation of the employer’s freedom
of contract169.
Courts’ ambiguous use of abuse of rights in labor cases may be
understood as partly driven by a larger ambivalent sentiment of “social
solidarity” which became dominant in late nineteenth century France and
Italy, translating in an outpouring of social legislation as well as in efforts at
what is known as “avant-garde capitalism”170. While in 1905 the idea of a
national obligation to “social solidarity” sparked vivid debate in the French
legislature as well as in the public opinion, between the 1890s and the 1910s a
considerable body of legislation designed the main lines of the welfare system.
Similarly, in Italy, in less that a decade, an old age pension law, a law for
compulsory insurance against accidents, a Factory Act, a Public Health Act,
malaria legislation and a bill regulating labor contracts were passed.
Capitalists also joined in this policy of solidarity. Rugged individualism seemed
passé, the labor precepts of conventional conservative capitalism amoral, and
experiments at a new variant of “avant-garde capitalism” flourished171. Major
private enterprises in the French industrial firmament launched a
Cass Palermo, May 22, 1882, in 16 RIVISTA PENALE 509 (1882).
Cass Torino, March 18, 1886, in 24 RIVISTA PENALE 50 (1886).
170
J-J. Ermenc, Avant-Garde Capitalism in France, 31 THE FRENCH REVIEW 129 (1957).
171
Id., More recently see: JANET R. HORNE, A SOCIAL LABORATORY FOR MODERN FRANCE (2002).
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comprehensive strategy of social cushioning, running the gamut from citès
ouvrières, to health, welfare and education plans. While the influence of men
such as Sismondi, Fourier, Proudhon and Louis Blanc, increased the sensitivity
of the reflective capitalists to the appalling social conditions engendered by
industrialization, observers warn, the persistence of avant-garde capitalism
required more than humanitarian impulses. Concern with higher productivity
and financial profits was critical. At a moment when France’s anomalous
economic development172 was finally gaining speed and the size of production
units was expanding, a satisfied, willing and educated workforce was crucial
for the functioning of the industrial system. Abuse of rights was private
lawyers’ and judges’ contribution to this wider solidaristic strategy. It allowed
them to endorse and circumscribe labor’s claims, safely balancing the latter’s
demand for more fair and just conditions and capital’s managerial freedom and
control.

IV. THE JURISTS BATTLE OVER ABUSE OF RIGHTS
If abuse of rights’ actual impact hardly explains the rage of the storm it
originated, what was it that roused jurists’ fervor? A plunge in the heart of the
controversy suggests that abuse of rights was the site where crucial
methodological, professional and political battles were fought. Duelling tightly,
at times with striking exhibitions of rhetorical bravura, French and Italian
jurists debated over a number of critical questions. Through abuse of rights the
powerful professional guild of the civilistes or civilisti sought to defend the
citadel of its legal science, besieged by new legal disciplines; they contended
over the shaping of coherent and antithetical cultural identities; they furthered
opposite visions of the modern socio-economic order; they advanced different
conceptions of the nature of law and the boundaries between normative
systems; finally, they endorsed conflicting ideas as to the goals and the method
of legal science.

172

The debate over the retard of French economic growth is wide; for the classical retardationist view, see DAVID
S. LANDES, THE UNBOUND PROMETHEUS (1969); for the revisionist view see Rondo Cameron and Charles E.
Freedman, French Economic Growth, 7 SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORY 3 (1983).
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A. The Professional Battle: The Civilistes Resistance to the Disintegration of Private Law
The battle over abuse of rights was, in the first place, a professional
battle over the scope of private law and its role in modern society.
Industrialization, technological developments and increasing social
interdependence had rendered “Roman-Bourgeois private law” obsolete and
inadequate. The conceptual unity of the system was under attack 173. New legal
fields such as zoning law, labor law, welfare law, were being carved out of
private law. The proliferation of these new fields threatened the professional
power of private lawyers. It entailed the formation of new disciplinary tools
and vocabularies, saluted as innovative and more responsive to rapid socioeconomic change, as well as the consolidation of new academic power-groups
challenging the long unrivalled primacy of the civilistes.
Not only were the latter loosing to new academic potentates, they were
also loosing to the legislator. Their traditional role as interpreters and
“administrators” of the Civil Code was at risk as the centrality of the latter was
displaced by a burgeoning body of “special legislation”. Abuse of rights was part
of private lawyers’ defense strategy. Heralded as a product of the most refined
European private law science, rooted in Roman sources and in the elaborations
of the Commentators and the Humanists, abuse of rights had the merit of
being a private category susceptible of application to a variety of legal
questions raised by the new socio-economic conditions, questions that would
have otherwise fallen in the domain of the new disciplines174. Progressive
civilistes envisaged it as a critical tool for negotiating the new terms of liberty
in modern industrial society without yielding to legislative intervention and
the new legal disciplines. More specifically, abuse of rights was one of the
means through which progressive private lawyers sought to offer tools and
guidance to new disciplines, preserving their role as custodians of “the legal
science”. Labor law, zoning law, welfare law were to develop under the aegis of
the civilistes’ science rather than in antagonism to it175.
FRANZ WIAECKER, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE (WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO GERMANY)
(1995).
174 Mario Rotondi’s traces a long genealogy of abuse of right running from Cino da Pistoia through Baldo degli
Ubaldi to Alessandro Tartagno and Alciato; see MARIO ROTONDI, supra note at 104 ff.
175 Giovanni Cazzetta, Leggi sociali, cultura giuridica ed origini della scienza giuslavoristica in Italia tra Otto e Novecento, XVII
QUADERNI FIORENTINI, 156 (1980)
173
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Not only was abuse of rights critical to the civilistes’ struggle against the
disintegration and the de-centering of their science, it was also the site where a
methodological conflict between the civilistes themselves took place. The
conflict between the devotees of formalism, committed to deductive reasoning
and abstract conceptual architectures, and the champions of a sociological
approach privileging the study of law in its relation to social change. Again, the
methodological rift had implications for the fragile equilibria of professional
power. The proponents of the new sociological approach, who were scientifically
dominant but temporally subordinate, challenged the very criteria sanctioning
the power of the old formalistic guard176.
The formalists rejected the doctrine of abuse of rights, disputing its
conceptual soundness. The notion of abuse of rights, they claimed, does not
pertain to the domain of the legal; it is a social phenomenon hardly
translatable in a legal concept. As a legal concept, abuse of rights is a
contradiction in terms, laying on a structural contradiction between right and
abuse. Planiol was the most vocal expounder of the formalist critique:
The formula abuse of rights is a logomachy, since if I use my own right, my act is
licit and when it is illicit it is because I have exceeded my right and acted sine jus,
iniuria as the Lex Aquilia says. To reject the category abuse of rights is not to try
to hold licit the various damaging activities repressed by our courts. It is only to
note that an abusive act to the extent that it is illicit is not the exercise of a right
and that abuse of rights is not a category distinct from “illicit act”. In other words,
the right ends where the abuse begins177.

Planiol’s idea of a logomachy became the adagio restlessly repeated by
the formalists178. However, faced with a subtle conceptual problem requiring a
re-designing of the traditional categories and a modification of the conceptual
architecture of civil liability, even jurists who were timidly sympathetic to the
concept of abuse of rights defensively retreated. Rotondi’s metaphor of the
alpinist marvelously captures their sense of fear and impotence:
See GUIDO ALPA, LA CULTURA DELLE REGOLE (1999) PAOLO GROSSI, SCIENZA GIURIDICA ITALIANA (2000);
CHRISTOPHE JAMIN, LA DOCTRINE (2003).
177 MARCEL PLANIOL, supra note 8.
178 In Italy, both Rotondi and Brunetti parrot Planiol: GIOVANNI BRUNETTI, IL DELITTO CIVILE (1906) at 173176; MARIO ROTONDI, supra note at 18
176
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Our position in wandering through such disparate fields resembles that of an
alpinist who, after long roaming through mountain valleys, finds himself not at
the summit, but in front of a steep slope and looses the hope of conquering the
summit. Showing at which conclusions any theory of abuse of right fatally leads
may inspire prudence in embarking in dangerous paths.

A prudent alpinist, Rotondi called for a mitigation of the absolutist notion of
rights, but ended up retreating within the safe boundaries of formalistic legal
science.
Conversely, proponents of the sociological approach saw abuse of rights,
as an organic emanation of social facts and needs and a crucial conceptual
category. The extraordinary development of the social sciences, they suggested,
should make jurists and judges aware of their role, i.e. governing and directing
socio-economic evolution. In his monographic study of abuse of rights, Tedeschi
urged his colleagues to disregard the dictates of abstract logic, facing the
challenges posed by real life:
Often, out of respect for traditional and widely recognized principles, theories that
manifestly clash with the real necessity of things are still payed tribute; out of love
for symmetry and abstract logic the real moral, psychological ed economic forces
that govern the world are replaced with juridical categories.

B. Roman v. Medieval: Different Images of the Roman in Service of Legal/Cultural Identity
Abuse of rights also raised crucial identity questions. It involved
contradictory re-constructions of the Roman past as well as the creation of
neatly differentiated legal/cultural identities. The Roman legacy was central to
the civilian identity, differentiating it from the Anglo-American. Both the
critics and the advocates of abuse of rights cherished and claimed for
themselves the Roman legacy juxtaposing it to the “medieval” which they
coloured with a pejorative connotation.
The former envisaged abuse of rights, in the form of aemulatio, as a
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medieval creation, alien to Roman law179. In their characterization, “Roman”
stands, to a large extent, for Roman/Classical and equates absolutism and
individualism. They claimed that the medieval meaning of the word aemulatio,
i.e. acts lacking any utility and exclusively inspired by a malicious intent,
hardly approximates any of the meanings the word had in classical Latin180.
Further, the critics of abuse of rights interpreted restrictively the Roman
sources offered by their adversaries as evidence of the existence of the doctrine
in Roman law. These texts, they argued, were either too broad and, therefore,
merely declamatory, or they bore no relation to the topic of aemulatio, or they
concerned public law and were hardly extensible to private law181. Although
conceding that the individualistic Roman/Classical law was partially modified
in Justinian’s time, the critics of abuse of rights regarded the doctrine as a
medieval coinage. The prohibition of aemualtio, they noted, was masterfully
introduced by the Commentators as a response to new Christian ethic and to
the unexpected legal questions posed by the development of urban life. In their
assessment, abuse of rights was plagued with all the defects typically
associated, in the Enlightenment literature, with things medieval: excessive
complexity, uncertainty and unpredictability182.
Vittorio Scialoja notes with irony and contempt: “questa in breve è la teoria dell’emulazione segnata in ogni sua
parte dallo stampo medievale e che tuttavia volea derivarsi dal diritto romano.” See the note to Cassazione
Firenze 1877, supra note at 486.
180 See Vittrio Scialoja, supra note at 426: “Cicero in the Tusculane: lib IV cap. 8 § 17 aemulatio autem dupliciter illa
quidam dicitur ut et in laude et in vitio nome hoc sit. Nam et imitatio virtutis aemulatio dicitur….et est aemulatio aegritudo, si eo,
quod concupierit, alius potiatur, ipse careat. He adds: ma il senso che fu dato a questa voce dai giuristi medievali e che
nel linguaggio giuridico essa conserva tuttora, non corrisponde esattamente ad alcuno di quelli dichiarati dal latino
classico, sebbene si avvicini al secondo”.
181 Id., “fr. 3 de oper. Publ. 50, 10 opus novum privato etiam sine principis auctoritate facere licet, praeterquam si ad
aemulationem alterius civitatis pertineat vel mateiram seditionis praebeat vel circum theatrum vel amphitheatrum esso riguarda
il diritto pubblico ed è motivato dalla ragion politica della tranquillità dello stato. Da esso si poteva bensì derivare
l’inibizione di elevare fortezze e castelli ma non se ne doveva mai estendere l’applicazione al campo del diritto
privato. Fr. 38 de rei vindicatione 6, 1 Celso scriveva: ….constituimus vero, ut, si paratus est dominus tantum dare,
quantum habiturus est possessor his rebus ablatis, fiat ei potestas: neque malitiis indulgendum est, si tectorium, puta quod induxeris,
picturasuqe corrodere velis, nihil laturus nisi ut officias; il testo perciò non ha a che fare con l’emaulazione, come si intese
dipoi, e la massima malittis non est indulgendum va accettata nei limiti posti dal testo medesimo, cioè nel caso di
conflitto di diritti, dei quali l’uno abbia il suo fondamento nell’utilità di colui al quale è concesso contro l’altro.
Gaio, Ist libro I § 53: male enim nostro iure uti non debemus; qua ratione et prodigis interdicitur bonorum quorum aministratio.
Tutti color che hanno qualche pratica con gli scritti dei giureconsulti romani sanno che bisogna guradarsi
dall’accettare le definizioni e le massime generali da essi formulate, le quali sono per lo più troppo estese e quindi
false”.
182 Abuse of rights was seen an excessively complex rule (an exception to the general rule, the right of the
property holder is absolute, harboring in itself a further long list of exceptions to its fundamental postulate: the
intention to harm cannot be presumed, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff), allowing a broad and arbitrary
179

di Robilant

ABUSE OF RIGHTS

86 of 99

Conversely, the champions of abuse of rights claimed for the doctrine a
Roman lineage183. However, the “Roman” they invoked hardly resembled that
of their adversaries. They constructed an alternative Roman archetype,
downplaying the individualist and egoistic traits of Roman law and
emphasizing its social and equitative aspects. The Roman texts interpreted
restrictively by their adversaries were subject to extensive analogical readings.
Further, the advocates of abuse of rights viewed the emergence of the theory of
aemulatio as part of a broader shift towards a social and equitative law.
Aemulatio, along with the wealth of equitative devices designed by praetorian
law, the extra-ordinem procedure and the bona fides typical of the ius gentium,
mitigated the rigor of the ius civile184.
Reframed in social terms, the Roman archetype provided the champions
of abuse of rights with a crucial tool for shaping a coherent civilian, or “RomanGermanic”, identity and for differentiating it from the Anglo-Saxon. The
alleged absence of the doctrine in the common law bolstered bold claims as to
the respective nature of the two “races”, the Latin and the Anglo-Saxon.
Josserand and his followers were eager to vindicate altruism and equity as the
defining features of the “Latin race” as opposed to the individualist and
absolutist nature of the Anglo-Saxon tradition.
The legal world is crossed by a twofold current: the individualist current and the

equitative judgment by the courts; see cardinal DE LUCA, IL DOTTOR VOLGARE (1673) LUDOVICO MURATORI
DEI DIFETTI DELLA GIURISPRUDENZA, (1742); Vittorio Scialoja, with obvious critical and ironic intent, reports
the doctrine as it appeared from the medieval and subsequent texts: “l’emualzione si divide in buona e cattiva; la
prima è una virtù, la seconda è un vizio. In quest’ultima peraltro si deve distinguere l’aemulation putative licita,
cioè quella per cui si nuoce ad altri col fine di giovare a se stesso e l’aemualtio vera illicita per cui si nuoce animo
nocendi. L’emulazione non si presume; deve provarsi da chi l’allega ma se circostanze particolari favoriscano la
congettura dello spirito di emulazione si fa eccezione alla regola. Le principali di queste circostanze sono: ….” and
then he lists 14 circumstances, among which “quando il vicino abbia una bella moglie o belle ragazze perché si
suppone l’opera sia fatta pel fine disonesto di vederle e trattenersi con loro; quando si alzi l’edificio o si apra la
finestra in modo da vedere i segreti dei vicini o da gettare lo sguardo indiscreto nell’abitazione o nell’orto di
monache e frati”.
183 See Louis Josserand supra note at 355: responding to Ripert he notes: “dans cette direction, on va jusqu’à
présenter la thése de l’abus comme un poison nevu d’Asie, par le canal de la République des Soviets, oubliant que
ce prétendu virus a une origine romaine”.
184 See MARIO ROTONDI supra note at 75 offering an estensive reading of the same passages discussed by Scialoja.
See also Loius Josserand supra note at 314: “de meme que le préteur romain avait fait sortir du vieux droit civil
tout un droit noveau, plus humain et plus souple, ainsi nos tribunaux et nos auterus s’effrocent de dégager de
notre codification immobile”.
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social current. The individualist current, which deserves the epithet of absolutist,
is the on e which characterizes the Anglo-Saxon race. Profoundly individualist the
Anglo Saxons are in their institutions, in their philosophy, in their behavior. If
their most outstanding philosophers praise with pleasure the inexorable laws
governing the struggle for life and natural selection, their jurists, in nice
symmetry, hold a rigorous and merciless conception of law; most of all they want
legal weapons, means of action. In fact, for them, acting is everything; the only
individuals who count in their eyes are those who act. The task of the legislator is
not that of securing the reign of distributive justice but that of allowing citizens to
fully develop their faculties. This is the purpose for which they attribute rights,
prerogatives that can be exercised to pursue any goal, weapons that can be used
any direction to satisfy any interest, passion or caprice. This is the theory of
splendid isolation transposed from the nation to the individuals who invoke, for
their rights and vis à vis the equal rights of others, the application of the doctrine
of Monroe185.

To the contrary, the “Latin race” and its Germanic progeny, altruistic
and benevolent by nature, set out along a progressive evolutionary path
leading to a social law and a conception of right as instruments of social
harmony. This conception, of which abuse of rights is the quintessential
manifestation, originated in the law of the Roman Republic and of the Empire
and found fertile breeding ground in the Germanic countries, fully blossoming
in the German BGB186.

See LOIUS JOSSERAND, DE L’ABUS DE DROIT, supra note at 7, 8. Josserand’s rage seems irrepressible and does
not spare Frederick Pollock: “The applications of this point of view are innumerable; English and American
jurists apply it unpityingly and even with pride, and especially Frederick Pollock, justly of the most well-known
jurists. In his outstanding work on tort law “The Law of Torts” this author shows with a wealth of examples
taken from everyday life, this principle cherished by his compatriots, i.e. the immunity in the exercise of common
rights”.
186 In the mind of the participants in the debate the problem of abuse of rights was inextricably linked to the
question of legal/cultural identity. If Josserand viewed the doctrine as a critical element differentiating RomanGermanic legal systems from the Anglo-Saxon tradition, Italian jurists seemed eager to mark the originality of
their legal culture vis à vis the French by claiming paternity over abuse of rights. Avvocato Sebastiano Gianzana in
a well known work on water rights published in 1879 presented aemulatio, as a distinctively Italian doctrine and
was eager to prove that its existence antedated the French influence by emphasizing its significance in preunification legal systems. “And this (aemulatio), which was really an Italian doctrine, didn’t fail to pass into our
legislative systems: relying on the authority of Tesauro as well as of the Sardinian Royal Constitutions, we have
already mentioned, a propos of the appropriation of superfluous waters, that in Piedmont, until the 1500s, a
special magistrato delle aque was called to determine whether there were superfluous waters and to redistribute
them fairly among those who were in need. Also, a splendid embodiment of this theory was the diritto di
insistenza (???), long recognized by Piedmontese courts, as Richieri attests, which the courts, in the interest of
collective prosperity, turned into a weapon for the weak, bridling the powerful owners of irrigation canals”.
185
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But in Rome the rigor of this system did not last long; the citizens of the Republic
and of the Empire shaped a conception of rights more in line with the spirit of the
Latin race, so sensitive and so inclined to altruistic sentiments: this conception is
precisely that of abuse of rights. […] But it is not in Rome or among the Latin
people that this conception was fully systematized: the German countries were to
be the fertile breeding ground for this full blooming. [in the German texts and
contrary to Anglo-Saxon law] rights are no longer individual prerogatives that each
individual exercises in her own manner; they are social concepts that are to be
exercised socially, in a certain way, according to a certain spirit; they are
instruments of peace and, under any circumstance or pretext, can they be turned
into war machines; they have to accomplish their destiny rather than rebel against
it.

C. Law v. Morals: The Debate on Positivism and Natural Law
Further, the debate over abuse of rights became the site for formidable
attacks to nineteenth century legal positivism and hints at a “new naturalism”.
The doctrine of abuse of rights, critics claimed, rests on a dangerous confusion
between two neatly demarcated domains: law and morals. The two systems of
norms differ as to their ontological nature, reach and purpose. In his lengthy
study “Il Delitto Civile”, Giovanni Brunetti provided the standard formulation
of the argument:
The violation of moral norm characterizes, by and large, the factual patterns that
are usually qualified as abuse of rights. However, as we have demonstrated with
multiple arguments and from different perspectives, a fact cannot be declared
illegal, even if it results in damage, for the only reason that it offends morality.
Admitting that the objective limits of rights are to be found in moral norms, rather
than exclusively in legal norms, would mean that not only legal norms but also
moral norms provide a legal definition of human actions would therefore entail a
confusion between law and morals187.

In a similar vein, though with sharper critical verve, Vittorio Scialoja
acknowledged the need for equitative temperaments but claimed that abuse of
rights is the expression of a sentimental and bizarre aequitas cerebrina rather
than of juridical equity:
But here they [the proponents of abuse of rights] say that equity calls for a
187
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temperament of the rigor of law and that you cannot speak of law when a right is
exercised with the intent to harm. First of all, what is equity? The word has
multiple meanings: the ancient world distinguished between naturalis aequitas,
civilis aequitas, aequitas canonica, aequitas scripta and aequitas non scripta and a
form of equity they nicely called cerebrina, that is bizarre and wild, an equity that
everyone measures differently and that, lacking any rationality, is to be rejected.
Unfortunately aequitas cerebrina left deep traces and plays no little role in the
question of aemulatio188.

The critics of abuse of rights were profuse in emphasizing the dangers of
a confusion between law and morals. Some expressed deep concern regarding
judges’ ability to fulfill the daunting task of penetrating individual consciences.
Subtle technicians, judges are ill equipped to penetrate the complexities of
human psychology189. Others noted with alarm the risk of a despotic drift. In a
widely quoted passage, Adhemar Esmein noted that by substituting the notion
of moral fault for that of legal fault, the theory of abuse of rights, turns the
judge into a censor, opening the way for dangerous attacks to individual liberty
and the rule of law190.
Those who favoured abuse of rights devoted rivers of ink to refute the
law v. morals argument. Their response entailed a twofold claim: a descriptive
assertion and a normative postulation. Descriptively, they denounced the idea
of a neat separation between the two domains as a chimera191 and an outdated
legacy of the Natural Law school that triggered the shift from one excess to the
other: from the lack of boundaries between law and morals typical of the
Middle Ages to the rigid separation of the revolutionary era192. Philosophers,
moralists and jurists have racked their brains trying to draw coherent criteria
for distinguishing between the realm of law and that of moral, but their efforts
are doomed to failure. The boundaries between law and moral are highly
Vittorio Scialoja, note to Cassazione Firenze, supra note at 490
M. Marc Desserteaux, Abus de droit ou conflit de droits, REV. TRIMESTRIELLE 121 (1906). See also LOUIS
JOSSERAND supra note at 351 responding to Saleilles’s critique that an inquiry into the subjective intent is both a)
dangerous b) not useful
190
Adhemar Esmein, S. 1898. I . 17
191 LOIUS JOSSERAND, supra note at 348: nous répondrons qu’à notre sentiment ces frontiéres n’ont jamais esisté
que dans l’imagination des juristes, ou de bon nombre d’entre eux du moins: toujours elles furent inceratines et
chimerique”.
192 MARIO ROTONDI supra note at 183.
188
189
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flexible and constantly shifting. The two domains are interconnected, legal
norms and moral norms springing from the same breeding ground, the common
conscience of the people193. In Josserand’s words, “law and morals are one and
the same thing, the latter being social moral, moral in action”; moral, he added,
is the crucible where law is elaborated”. From a normative point of view, the
advocates of abuse of rights claimed that law and morals ought to be
intertwined. The degree of mutual communication between the two domains,
Rotondi argued, echoing Josserand, is an indicator of social and legal progress.
A legal system divorced from ethical considerations is repugnant and odious to
the collective sensitivity of modern societies194.
The contending parts envisaged the question of defining what is law and
what is not law as a critical one. To the champions of abuse of rights the old
positivistic paradigm seemed no longer able to mediate and disguise its
inherent contradictions. The tension between the premise of the ultimate
existence of a natural and inherently rational law and the claim that positive
law is the translation of this natural rational law in positive rules appeared no
longer containable, if not at the price of blatant contradiction. The French Ecole
de l’Exegese and its Italian followers had obliterated the naturalistic premise to
fully realize its corollaries: codification, the rule of law and the judge as the
bouche de la loi195.
A plausible mediation for the old guard of formalists, this mediation was
unsatisfactory for the new generation of social jurists who were fighting the
battle for abuse of rights. The latter propounded a new naturalism196 which
was a blend of philosophical positivism, historicism and natural law.
Familiarity with the teachings of the Historical School and the enthusiastic
acceptance of postulates of positivistic philosophy led them to foreground law’s
GIOVANNI TEDESCHI, L’ABUSO DEL DIRITTO, (1908) at 92; Louis Josserand supra note at 348.
MARIO ROTONDI supra note at 83; LOUIS JOSSERAND, supra note at 349 alluding to Italian legal philosopher
Giorgio Del Vecchio and the resurgent tradition of natural law, claimed that “In fact, law is deeply imbued in
moral, it is, as he [Del Vecchio] rightly said, “le profit social de l’éthique” and luckily so, otherwise it would
become simply odious and insensate”.
195 See Mario A. Cattaneo, entry “Positivismo giuridico”, NOVISSIMO DIGESTO, vol. defining this “Illuminismo
giuridico decapitato” (Legal Enlightnement beheaded).
196 See Giovanni Marino, Positivismo e Giurisprudenza. Biagio Brugi alla Congiunzione di Scuola Storica e
Filosofia Positiva (1986) p. 28 ff.
193
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historical and social substratum and its restless evolution. Commitment to a
rejuvenated brand of natural law inspired their belief in the moral perfecting of
law. Rejecting any positivistic deference to the command of the legislator, the
advocates of abuse of rights envisaged law as social product constantly
responding to new felt needs and evolving towards moral perfection197. The new
paradigm, however, did not escape contradiction. The old tension between the
natural law foundations of the legal order and legal positivism reappeared as
the tension between the perfection of natural law and the positive materiality
of legal/social facts198.
D. Individualism v. Solidarism: Different Visions of the Social Order
However, in the skirmish over abuse of rights, the highest peak of
tension was reached when the two factions contended over opposite visions of
the social order. The question of abuse of rights was critical to the debate over
individualism and solidarism, urging jurists of various tendencies to confront
it. The respective alignment and positioning in the debate is revealing. While
the old guard of the classical individualist school rejected the concept, the
“legal socialism” movement showed skepticism and little interest 199. In France,
Josserand’s theory, regarded as a radical manifestation of socialism by Ripert,
was dismissed as neither useful nor original by a foremost spokesman of legal
socialism, Emmanuel Lévy. Leon Duguit’s neglect of abuse of rights, on the
See BIAGIO BRUGI, LA PROPRIETÀ (1911), at 95; Id., L’abuso del diritto come concetto giurisprudenziale in Rendiconto
ACCADEMIA LINCEI XXIII (1914) AT 37 FF.
198 So evident, for example in GIOVANNI NOTO S ARDEGNA, L’ABUSO DEL DIRITTO (1909). Noto Sardegna
invokes “gli immutabili principi della legge morale svelati alla coscienza per mezzo della ragione divina scintilla
che lo illumine costantemente, dote sublime che costituisce l’eccellenza e la superiorità della sua natura”, but then
he emphisizes time and again the need to take into account the material positivity of human needs and the
struggle for life.
199 See EMMANUEL LEVY, LA VISION SOCIALISTE DU DROIT (1926); for Levy abuse of rights is artificial,
contradictory and superfluous; he sees no need for a separate conceptual category, abuse of rights falls whithin a
broader rule of civil liability:; p. 48 pour éhcapper à cette contradiction pratique, on a construit la théorie
artificielle et théoriquement contradictoire de l’abus de droit; nous serions responsables, en principe, quand nous
agissons sans droit, et, par exception, quand nous exercons abusivement notre droit. Or cette exception, c’est la
régle meme: nuos sommes obliges parce que nous exercons notre droit contre le droit d’autrui; alors seulment il
peut etre question de résoudre le conflit entre notre liberté et la liberté d’autrui. In Italy see: CESARE NANI, IL
SOCIALISMO NEL CODICE CIVILE (1892); GIOVANNI VADALÀ PAPALE, CODICE PRIVATO SOCIALE (1893);
GIOVANNI SALVIOLI, I DIFETTI SOCIALI DELLE LEGGI VIGENTI DI FRONTE AL PROLETARIATO ED IL DIRITTO
NUOVO (1906); GIOELE SOLARI, SOCIALISMO E DIRITTO PRIVATO. INFLUENZA DELLE DOTTRINE SOCIALISTE SUL
DIRITTO PRIVATO (1906); EMANUELE GIANTURCO, L’INDIVIDUALISMO ED IL SOCIALISMO NEL DIRITTO
CONTRATTUALE (1891).
197

di Robilant

ABUSE OF RIGHTS

92 of 99

other hand, was a corollary of his rejection of the very notion of subjective
rights as a metaphysical, or better theological, concept200. Similarly, in Italy,
the most prominent socialists, Cimbali, Salvioli and Vadalà Papale, barely
mentioned abuse of rights. Significantly, the champions of abuse of rights were,
by and large, either the proponents of a blander solidarism or the vanguard of
the classical school, eager to strengthen the individualist system of private law
by tempering its most blatant asperities.
The critics of abuse of rights envisaged society as the sum of independent
spheres of action; they advanced an absolutist notion of rights and they
cherished individual freedom as the highest moral principle. Tirelessly
invoked, the geometrical metaphor of the spheres well exemplified their vision
of society. Individual freedom of action is the central pillar of society’s
legal/political structure. Individuals are endowed with rights that are ample
and absolute within their sphere; the legislator is called to police the
boundaries of the respective spheres of freedom, securing their harmonic
coexistence. Any act that remains within the perimeter of the individual’s
sphere is not an abuse. Scialoja’s formulation of the geometric metaphor is
wonderful in its complexity:
In fact, law in an objective sense, traces the limits of the single individual liberties:
but as we said above, these limits are traced according to necessity. The single
liberties resemble polyhedra that touch each other in every point of their
periphery, so that you cannot exit from one without invading the other; but,
conversely, as far as you don’t invade an another’s, you don’t exit your own. Hence
as long as there is not legal invasion of another’s right, either of single individuals
or of society, nobody can be said to have transgressed the limits of her right.

The critics condemned the doctrine of abuse of rights as an inadmissible
interference with this harmonious coexistence of separate spheres as well as a
dangerous attack to the highest moral principle, i.e. individual liberty. Again,
Scialoja’s words are crisp and clear:
And note how this liberty [individual liberty] is a warranty of morality itself, a
liberty that looses its real nature when it subject to external coercion […] The

200
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social interest that law pursues by allowing the owner to act, even if animated by
wrong purposes, is that of liberty. The inquisition about the owner’s intent destroys
liberty, while law cherishes this liberty and hence impedes this inquisition.

In more dramatic tones, others saw abuse of rights as an aberration and
the master-way to socialism. Georges Ripert’s review of Josserand’s recently
published “De l’esprit de droits ed de leur relativité” waged a bold attack to the
social school based in Lyon by evoking the specter of “Soviet materialism”.
Reporting Josserand’s words of praise for the doctrine of abuse of rights as
formulated in the Sovietic Code, Ripert noted:
The University of Lyon seems to have an inclination towards the Code Civil of the
Soviet Socialist Republics. Its Institut de Droit Comparé has provided a translation
presented by Mr. Lambert as a magic mirror refracting the guiding principles of a
new legal regime. Mr Josserand, in turn, seems to look at law through this mirror.
[….] This book [Josserand’s] which opens with an invocation of the principles of
eternal justice against these of strict law, that in certain pages seems to be written
by a whole-hearted idealist, ends, in a peculiar contradiction, by taking as a model
the code of a purely materialist society lost in the absurd dream of entirely rational
economy201.

Conversely, although with different nuances and in varying degree, the
champions of abuse of rights advanced a relativistic conception of rights and a
notion of “social freedom”. They deemed their opponents’ image of an
harmonious coexistence of absolute spheres of freedom artificial and their
absolutist view of rights dangerous. Referring to the geometrical image of
individual liberties as neighboring polyhedra, Rotondi suggested that:
What appears so clear in theory turns out to be problematic in practice, since
human activity is so intense and restless, multifarious and mutable that law
inevitably fails to foresee all its manifestations, so that the perimeters [delimiting
the spheres of liberty], far from being determined with mathematical precision fade
in a grey zone, in a hinterland that separates the two legal spheres in a way that
the right and the wrong, as Manzoni would say, or better, the right of the one and
the right of the other cannot be separated with a neat cut.

“Subjective rights” seemed to Josserand and his Italian followers “powerful
Georges Ripert, Abus ou relativité des droits, REVUE
(1929).
201
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war-machines susceptible of being deployed against society at large or against
single individuals” and hence a conceptual category at variance with the laws
of solidarity governing a highly interdependent society. Modern industrial
society, the advocates of abuse of rights claimed, mandates a different notion of
freedom and a relativistic conception of rights. Rights are a guarantee of
freedom but this freedom, far from being an abstract, egoistic and anti-social
liberty, is a “social freedom”, embodying a higher ideal of solidarity and justice.
As instruments of social freedom rights are relative rather than absolute. The
freedom of the right holder encounters a limit in the content or social function
of the right itself; rights are to be exercised in accord to their social function
rather than for the pursuit of whatever individual goal or interest.
[…] and the relativity of rights has long been postulate because of their origin:
social products, rights are to serve a social purpose. Whatever idea one has
regarding the origins of law and even if one acknowledges the existence of some
sort of natural law, prior and superior to positive law, one has to admit that our
individual prerogatives presuppose the consent of the social community, whether
emanating expressly from the public powers or coming directly from the collective
consciousness […] In any way, individual prerogatives, even the most egoistic, are
social products in form and in substance; it would be unconceivable that they could
be exercised at the right holder’s convenience, diverted from their original purpose
and employed for any goal; it would be at contrary to their origin as well as to the
most urgent need of the social community which confers them.

CONCLUSION
The story of abuse of rights in the United States and in continental
Europe, I noted earlier, speaks to contemporary private lawyers called to rethink the nature and role of private law in the era of post-national sovereignty
and the crisis of social democracy. Comparative law’s potential as a tool for
large-scale legal reform has been the object of dispute in recent decades. Some
have argued that comparative law may have a constraining effect, reinforcing
legal professionals’ “fetishism of the actual”. The existing variations among the
legal institutions of Western capitalist democracies, they suggest, represent
only a subset of a larger inventory of unrealized possibilities202. Others have
202
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envisioned comparative legal analysis as a trigger for institutional
imagination, providing radical reformers with a repertoire of alternative
legal/institutional arrangements that have proven effective under real life
conditions203. This article suggests that comparative law may help fostering
private layers’ imagination by casting light on the potentialities and limits of
the revival of abuse of rights as a tool for redressing distributive inequalities.
Contemporary private lawyers face challenges which resemble the ones
encountered by European and American jurists at the turn of the nineteenth
century. Social democracy in its two Western manifestations, the New Deal
regulatory state and the celebrated “European Social Model” have long been in
crisis204. Although more a normative vision than a consolidated reality, the
European Social Model has evolved in the post-war era as a unique
combination of social and economic policies furthering security and promoting
growth and productivity. These policies were encapsulated in the institutional
arena of the nation-state205. However, world social and economic developments
have disempowered member states, severely limiting the ability of European
social capitalism to live up to its promises. The monetary union has
constrained member states’ leverage in formulating and implementing
monetary and fiscal policies and, in turn, re-distributive programs.
Liberalization and privatization policies have reduced the possibility of using
public-sector industries as an employment buffer. Further, European
competition policies have limited the possibility of resorting to state aids to a
similar effect206. As the rise of modern industrial society called jurists to rethink the terms of liberty, balancing economic freedom and social security,
economic globalization and regional integration confront contemporary lawyers
with the dramatic tension between market-making and market-correcting
policies.

Jeremy Waldron, Dirty Little Secret, 98 COLUM. L. REV 510 (1998).
SOSKICE, VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM. THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
(2001); GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM (1990).
205 Claus Offe, Social Protection in a Supra-National Context. European Integration and the Fates of the European Social
Model, in GLOBALIZATION AND EGALITARIAN REDISTRIBUTION, Pranah Bardhan, Sameul Bowels & Micheal
Wallerstein eds, (2006 ) at 33.
206
Fritz W. Scharpf, The European Social Model: Coping With the Challenges of Diversity, 40 J. COMMON MKT STUD 64570 (2002).
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Faced with this tension, European private lawyers have shown novel
interest for abuse of rights. Some believe that abuse of rights has a long history
but little future. They contend that the need to prove the right holder’s
intention is too onerous, that the doctrine is too rigid as a tool for balancing
conflicting interests and that similar equitable results are best achieved
through other means207. Others, retrieving the language of nineteenth century
“social” jurists, invoke a coherent and social European private law, in which
abuse of rights would play a novel role as a tool for achieving social values. For
instance, they call for the revival of an objective notion of abuse of rights in
European contract law. Contractual rights are seen as endorsing a variety of
larger socio-economic interests and their exercise for a purpose contrary to
such interests is deemed to be abusive208. Still others suggest departing from
the vocabulary of the “social”, and even setting aside the very word “social”,
loaded with implications and bent to serve hegemonic projects, to develop new
legal/institutional answers. More specifically, they claim that abuse of rights,
as other notions of nineteenth century “social” private law, is to be fully
updated to the current vocabulary209.
The comparative examination of American and European nineteenth
century abuse of rights theories and cases, I believe, provides contemporary
reformers with two cautionary tales. Progressives’ faith in abuse of rights as a
tool for social justice in European private law may be misplaced: abuse of
rights may fail to deliver what promises.
First, it may fall short of rectifying the market-oriented language of
European private law. In its nineteenth century life, abuse of rights hardly
challenged the individualistic premises of modern private law, leaving largely
intact the language of free will, individual autonomy and absolute property.
Similarly, today, abuse of rights may delude those who advocate a new social
lexicon for European private law. Abuse of rights, advocates of its revival hope,
would encourage a new vocabulary of “shared fundamental values concerning
Antonio Gambaro, Abuse of Rights in Civil Law Tradition, 4 EUR. REV. PRIV. L 561 (1995).
Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, Social Justice in European Contract Law. A Manifesto, 10
EUR. L. J. 653 (2004).
209 Ugo Mattei & Fernanda Nicola, A “Social Dimension” in European Private Law? A Call for Setting a Progressive
Agenda, 41 NEW ENGL . L. REV. 1 (2006).
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the social and economic relations between citizens”. It would challenge the idea
of rights as freedoms that simply exist, drawing attention on the relativity of
rights and on rights’ “purpose”. Further, it would privilege notions of “public
interest” and duties of “solidarity”. Yet, abuse of rights may prove little more
than an acoustic concession to a nineteenth century social vocabulary largely
inadequate to make sense of the questions faced by contemporary private
lawyers 210. It may fail to address the complexity of class structure in a
globalized socio-economic order where weaker strata are plural, layered and
often engaged in a zero-sum competition. Further, abuse of rights may prove of
limited impact because part of an emerging supra-national legal vocabulary
which coexists with deeply-rooted national legal traditions where the doctrine
has been framed and interpreted to very different effects.
Second, abuse of rights may fail to deliver progressive distributive
outcomes. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, American and
European cases show, abuse of rights resulted in highly diverse and ambiguous
outcomes, only occasionally re-dressing distributive asymmetries. The case law
of the European Court of Justice on abuse of rights displays a similar
ambiguity. In recent decades, the Court has used the doctrine to disqualify
individuals from relying upon a right conferred by a EU provision in
circumstances deemed undeserving.211 By and large, the Court has framed the
notion of “abuse” in objective terms, requiring a combination of objective
circumstances in which, despite the formal observance of the conditions laid
down by EU provisions, the purpose of those rules has not been attained212.
210

Duncan Kennedy, supra note 13.
See the opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in the Halifax case, C-255/02, delivered on April 7th
2005. Maduro discusses the two main contexts in which the notion of abuse has been analysed by the Court.”
First, when Community law provisions are abusively invoked in order to evade national law. Second, when
Community law provisions are abusively relied upon in order to gain advantages in a manner that conflicts with
the purposes and aims of those same provisions” He then continues: “To my mind a general principle of
Community law can certainly be considered to derive from this case-law. The Court synthesised it by stating that
‘Community law cannot be relied on for abusive or fraudulent ends’. That principle, however, enunciated in that
broad and rather circular way, is not, by itself, a useful instrument for assessing whether a right arising from a
specific provision of Community law is being exploited abusively. A more detailed doctrine or test to determine
when an abuse occurs is necessary to render it operative.
212 See Maduro’s objective articulation of abuse of rights in the Halifax opinion, supra.”In my view it is not
therefore a search for the elusive subjective intentions of the parties that ought to determine the existence of the
subjective element mentioned in Emsland. Instead, the intentions of the parties to improperly obtain an advantage
from Community law are merely inferable from the artificial character of the situation to be assessed in the light
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The outcomes, however, has proven double-edged. In the field of tax
avoidance, the doctrine has been used to prevent stronger parties’ fiscal abuses.
Through abuse of rights, the Court has enabled the tax authorities of a
Member state to reject companies’ claims for recovery or deduction of input
VAT where the transaction on which the right is based are aimed at artificially
creating the conditions to justify the application for deduction213. On the other
hand, in the area of free movement of persons and workers, abuse of rights
raises critical issues. In an enlarging Europe, where the volume of free
movement has increased dramatically, Member States have increasingly
invoked abuse of rights to prevent individuals from using the opportunity
afforded by EU law to “abusively” obtain social advantages or residency
permits or to evade restrictive national immigration rules. While the Court has
tended to narrow the application of the doctrine, the possibility that abuse of
rights might operate as an effective tool for emasculating weaker parties’ social
and economic rights is far from remote 214
Abuse of rights’ ambiguity as a “social corrective” raises broader
questions as to the nature and the structure of contemporary private law. Over
the course of the last two centuries, private law has evolved to reflect, facilitate
and legitimate changes in Western societies’ economic, political and ideological
structure. The legal fabric of the new order established by the French
Revolution and the modern bourgeoisie, “classical” nineteenth century private
law consisted of an essential framework meant to organize and police the free
interaction between autonomous individuals. In the late nineteenth century
and early twentieth century, the structure of “classical” private law was altered
to accommodate the development of industrial society and to reflect the socialof a set of objective circumstances. Provided that those objective circumstances are found to exist one must
conclude that a person who relies upon the literal meaning of a Community law provision to claim a right that
runs counter to its purposes does not deserve to have that right upheld. In such circumstances, the legal provision
at issue must be interpreted, contrary to its literal meaning, as actually not conferring the right. It is consideration
of the objective purpose of the Community rules and of the activities carried out, and not the subjective
intentions of individuals, which, in my view, lies at the heart of the Community law doctrine of abuse. I am of the
view, therefore, that the use of the term ‘abuse of rights’ to describe what is, according to the case-law of the
Court, in essence a principle of interpretation of Community law may actually be misleading. I prefer therefore to
use the term ‘prohibition of abuse of Community law’ and will speak of ‘abuse of rights’ only where simplicity so
requires.
213
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democratic compromise. Called to ensure simultaneously market efficiency and
non exploitative distributive outcomes, private law was re-organized according
to a binary structure “rights/will + corrective”. Abuse of rights, good faith,
unconscionability, the labor contract were conceived as “correctives” allowing
the effective enjoyment of rights and mitigating the most blatant distributive
inequalities215.
Faced with new challenges, contemporary private lawyers interrogate
the enduring desirability of the binary structure “rights/will + corrective”. In
Europe, while market liberals advocate the “un-making” of private 216, i.e. the
rolling back of social correctives, progressives invoke “flex-security” and call for
setting up “social correctives” at the supra-national level. The most promising
avenue, however, might be that indicated by a growing strand of
“experimentalist” private law scholarship217. A “freedom-promoting” private
law, capable of expanding the set of viable options an individual faces and of redressing distributive asymmetries, might look very different from binary
twentieth century private law. Rather than “limiting” and “correcting” rights,
experimentalist private lawyers direct attention to the need for recasting
rights, expanding the domain of resources subject to rights and devising new
criteria of ownership218.

***
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